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Abstract
The study of nonmonotonic logics is one mayor field of Artificial In-
telligence (AI). The reason why such kind of formalisms are so attrac-
tive to model human reasoning is that they allow to withdraw former
conclusion. At the end of the 1980s the novel idea of using argumenta-
tion to model nonmonotonic reasoning emerged in AI. Nowadays ar-
gumentation theory is a vibrant research area in AI, covering aspects of
knowledge representation, multi-agent systems, and also philosophical
questions.
Phan Minh Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) [Dung,
1995] play a dominant role in the field of argumentation. In AFs ar-
guments and attacks between them are treated as primitives, i.e. the
internal structure of arguments is not considered. The major focus is
on resolving conflicts. To this end a variety of semantics have been de-
fined, each of them specifying acceptable sets of arguments, so-called
extensions, in a particular way. Although, Dung-style AFs are among
the simplest argumentation systems one can think of, this approach
is still powerful. It can be seen as a general theory capturing seve-
ral nonmonotonic formalisms as well as a tool for solving well-known
problems as the stable-marriage problem.
This thesis is mainly concerned with the investigation of metalogical
properties of Dung’s abstract theory. In particular, we provide cardina-
lity, monotonicity and splitting results as well as characterization theo-
rems for equivalence notions. The established results have theoretical
and practical gains. On the one hand, they yield deeper theoretical
insights into how this nonmonotonic theory works, and on the other
the obtained results can be used to refine existing algorithms or even
give rise to new computational procedures. A further main part is the
study of problems regarding dynamic aspects of abstract argumenta-
tion. Most noteworthy we solve the so-called enforcing and the more
general minimal change problem for a huge number of semantics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence
Classical logics, such as first-order logic, can be seen as approaches which are mainly concer-
ned with a formalization of universal truths. In such a logic, whenever a formula φ is a logical
consequence of a set of axioms Σ, then it remains true for all time and without exception even
if we add new axioms to Σ. Without doubt such a kind of monotonic reasoning perfectly fits
together with the purpose or self-image of mathematics but it is inadequate to model common-
sense reasoning. In daily life we are often faced with incomplete knowledge. Nevertheless,
we want or have to draw conclusions. In such a situation we typically assume that the world
behaves as expected. Consequently, we conclude what is normally true as long as there is no
evidence to the contrary. If we later learn that the drawn conclusion is not justified since the
normality assumption is invalidated we have to withdraw it. The realization that classical logic
is not suitable to model such defeasible reasoning was the main reason for the increasing in-
terest in nonmonotonic logics within the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community in the late 1970s.
Among the pioneers of the field were John McCarthy, Raymond Reiter, Drew V. McDermott
and Jon Doyle (cf. [McCarthy, 1990; Reiter, 1980; McDermott and Doyle, 1980] or [Brewka,
1991] for excellent overview).
At the end of the 1980s the novel idea of using argumentation to model nonmonotonic rea-
soning emerged in AI (see [Loui, 1987; Lin and Shoham, 1989; Pollock, 1987] and [Prakken and
Vreeswijk, 2002] for a comprehensive overview). The new way to model defeasible inference
can be summarized as follows: building arguments based on the existence of proofs in a cer-
tain underlying logic, identifying conflicts between them and then determining acceptable sets
of arguments which finally justifies a certain decision or conclusion. One piece of work which
was highly influential in turning argumentation theory into the popular and vibrant research
area it is today was the the landmark paper of Phan Minh Dung [Dung, 1995]. Dung’s abs-
tract argumentation frameworks (AFs) treat arguments and attacks between them as undefined
primitives, i.e. the internal structure of arguments is not considered. The major focus is on
resolving conflicts. To this end a variety of semantics have been defined, each of which captures
different intuitions about how to reason about conflicting knowledge. Although, Dung-style
AFs are among the simplest argumentation systems one can think of, this approach is still po-
werful. For example, it has been shown how to reconstruct some mainstream nonmonotonic
formalisms as special forms, or more precisely as certain instances of this novel theory. Dung
himself provided such a correspondence for default logic [Reiter, 1980], defeasible logic [Pol-
lock, 1987] and logic programming under stable and well-founded semantics [Gelfond and
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Lifschitz, 1988; Gelder et al., 1988].
In the subsequent years further correspondences between existing nonmonotonic forma-
lisms and abstract argumentation theory were shown, e.g. reinterpretations of Nute’s defea-
sible logic [Governatori et al., 2000], a later version of Pollock’s system for defeasible reaso-
ning [Pollock, 1994; Pollock, 1995] and logic programming under 3-valued stable model se-
mantics [Wu et al., 2009]. Other research lines in abstract argumentation are the introduction
of new semantics as well as defining suitable extensions of Dung’s theory. The motivations
of the newly invented semantics range from the desired treatment of specific examples to ful-
filling a number of abstract principles (c.f. [Verheij, 1996; Baroni et al., 2005; Dvorˇák and Gaggl,
2012]). The further developments of Dung’s theory encompass attacks on attacks, collective
attacks as well as the addition of preferences or values to arguments in order to judge the
success of an attack (e.g. [Baroni et al., 2009; Nielsen and Parsons, 2006; Amgoud and Cayrol,
2002; Bench-Capon, 2003]).
The investigation of metalogical properties like cardinality results [Baumann and Strass, 2013],
monotonicity results [Cayrol et al., 2008; Baumann and Brewka, 2010], splitting results [Bau-
mann, 2011; Baumann et al., 2011; Baumann et al., 2012] and replacement theorems [Oikarinen
and Woltran, 2011; Gaggl and Woltran, 2011; Baumann, 2012a; Baumann, 2012b; Baumann
and Woltran, 2013; Baumann and Brewka, 2013a] has begun only recently and is still at the
beginning. This research field is the main subject of this thesis.
1.1.1 The Overall Instantiation Process
Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation can be seen as one major component in a multi-
stage reasoning process (compare [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]). The following steps can be
distinguished:
1. building a knowledge base
2. argument construction
3. conflict identification
4. abstraction through instantiating in a Dung-style AF
5. applying a semantics
6. drawing conclusions
One starts with building a knowledge base containing certain and uncertain knowledge about
a particular domain of discourse. Such a knowledge is usually represented as a theory in classi-
cal or defeasible logic. The next two steps are concerned with the creation of arguments based
on a certain construction method as well as the determination of their strength by applying a
reasonably defined notion of attack. Arguments typically consist of two parts, namely a sup-
port grounded in the knowledge base and a claim which is derivable from it. A frequently used
criterion for two arguments being in conflict is that they support contradictory conclusions. It
is important to realize that argument construction and conflict identification are monotonic in the
following sense: adding a new piece of information to a given knowledge base cannot rule out
an existing argument and its corresponding attacks given that the construction method and
the underlying notion of attack remain the same. Consequently, only new arguments which
may interact with the previous ones arise.
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The fourth step is the proper instantiation process. The derived arguments are conveyed
to an AF by abstracting away from the internal structure of arguments. This means, a struc-
tured argument consisting of a support and a claim becomes an abstract argument without
any content, i.e. it is just regarded as a node in a directed graph. Analogously, the former
identified conflicts are represented as vertices in the corresponding AF. Thus, the reason why
an argument attacks another one is not reflected on the abstract layer. After that we have to re-
solve the given conflicts. This can be done by applying a suitable semantics singling out sets of
arguments representing reasonable positions in the given abstract scenario. It is this evaluation
step where the nonmonotonicity comes into play. Adding new arguments and their associated
attacks may change the outcome of an AF in a nontrivial and nonmonotonic fashion. More
precisely, sets of arguments regarded as acceptable earlier may become unaccepted and vice
versa. Finally, having the reasonable positions at hand we have to draw justified conclusions.
Such a conclusion is not in terms of abstract arguments, but rather an expression in the un-
derlying logical language. Drawing a conclusion can be done by considering the particular
content of the accepted arguments. In doing so, different levels of scepticism can be applied.
For illustration purpose we sketch an instantiation process where the underlying know-
ledge base consists of strict and defeasible rules (indicated by “→” and “⇒”). Such a kind of
rule-based argumentation systems are considered in [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007; Prakken,
2009]. An analysis of instantiating abstract argumentation with classical logic can be found
in [Amgoud and Besnard, 2010; Gorogiannis and Hunter, 2011].
1. Knowledge Base
r1 ∶ ⇒ a
r2 ∶ a⇒ b
r3 ∶ b⇒ not a
r4 ∶ → c
r5 ∶ c⇒ not b
2. Arguments
a1 ∶ [r1 ∣ a]
a2 ∶ [a1, r2 ∣ b]
a3 ∶ [a2, r3 ∣ not a]
a4 ∶ [r4 ∣ c]
a5 ∶ [a4, r5 ∣ not b]
3. Conflicts
c1 ∶ a1 attacks a3
c2, c3 ∶ a2 attacks a3, a5
c4, c5, c6, c7 ∶ a3 attacks a1, a2, a3, a5
a4 attacks no-one
c8, c9 ∶ a5 attacks a2, a3
4. Instantiation
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
5. Resolving.
E1 = {a1, a2, a4}
E2 = {a1, a4, a5}
.
6. Conclusion
E1 = {a, b, c}
E2 = {a, c, not b}
Conc = {a,c}
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
Figure 1.1: The Entire Instantiation Process
1.1.2 Why Metalogical Analysis?
A metalogical investigation of an abstract formalism has theoretical and practical gains. On
the one hand, it yields deeper theoretical insights into how a certain approach works, and on
3
1.2. Structure of the Thesis and Main Contributions
the other the obtained results can be used to refine existing algorithms or may give rise to
new computational procedures. In particular, obtained results for abstract argumentation even
yield new insights in the instantiation-based context, as long as they are correctly interpreted
in the big picture.
In order to illustrate what kind of meta-properties we are interested in we briefly review
well-known properties of classical propositional logic. The operator Mod(S) denotes the clas-
sical model operator which returns the set of models for a given propositional theory S. As
usual σ(S) denotes the signature of S, i.e. σ(S) contains the atomic variables occurring in S.
1. anti-monotonicity: S ⊆ T ⇒Mod(T) ⊆ Mod(S)
2. splitting: Mod(S ∪ T) = Mod(S)∩Mod(T)
3. replacement: Mod(S) = Mod(T)⇔Mod(S ∪U) = Mod(T ∪U) for any U
4. cardinality: σ(S) = {A1, ..., An}⇒ ∣Mod(S)∣ ≤ 2n
The first property provides one with the possibility to reuse already computed models.
Such a property is of high interest for any logical formalism because computation of semantics
is usually much harder than verification. The second characteristic states that it is possible to
divide a theory in subtheories such that the formal semantics of the entire theory can be obtai-
ned by constructing the semantics of the subtheories. Also this property is interesting from a
computational point of view, especially in case of large inputs (compare [Gelfond and Przymu-
sinska, 1992; Lifschitz and Turner, 1994; Turner, 1996] for splitting results in major nonmono-
tonic formalisms). In general, equivalence tells us whether two syntactically different objects
represent the same information - which is relevant, for instance, for simplification issues. It
is a special attribute of classical logic that standard or classical equivalence, i.e. sharing the
same models even guarantees inter-substitutability in any logical context without lost of infor-
mation. Such a strong notion of equivalence is of great importance for dynamically evolving
scenarios since it allows to simplify parts of a theory without looking at the rest (see [Maher,
1986; Lifschitz et al., 2001; Turner, 2004; Truszczynski, 2006] for strong equivalence notions in
nonmonotonic theories). A priori bounds of the number of models for a given input are very
useful for algorithms computing semantics and may improve existing complexity results. The
last property states a quite naive bound for propositional formulae over n variables. Unfortu-
nately, without any further knowledge about the considered formula it is impossible to find
better bounds.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis and Main Contributions
The thesis is organized in eight chapters, the first one being this introduction. The rest of the
work is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 reviews the necessary background and definitions at work in abstract argu-
mentation. In particular, we present ten prominent argumentation semantics and survey
their behaviour with respect to certain abstract principles. For the sake of completeness
we briefly introduce the two most important reasoning problems together with their
computational complexity. Furthermore, we discuss several kinds of expansion as well
as their corresponding equivalence relations. We additionally provide some preliminary
relations between these different notions of equivalence.
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• The subsequent Chapter 3 studies the impact on the set of extensions if finitely or even
infinitely many new arguments are added. One main result is that the class of weak
expansions and semantics satisfying the directionality principle guarantee a monotonic
behaviour with respect to subset relations and cardinality (Theorem 3.2). We then show
how to benefit from the obtained results. In particular, we show how to simplify the
computation of justification states (Proposition 3.6).
In the last section of this chapter we turn to reasoning about actions which is a subfield of
artificial intelligence that is concerned with representing and reasoning about dynamic
domains. We propose to employ abstract argumentation for this purpose. The theoretical
results proven before will play a key role in showing that our approach can be efficiently
implemented.
• Chapter 4 is devoted to the fundamental principle of splitting. The main questions regar-
ding splitting is whether it is possible to divide a formal theory T in disjoint subtheoriesS1, ...,Sn such that the formal semantics of T can be obtained by constructing the se-
mantics of S1, ...,Sn. In the first section we consider partitions into two parts such that
the remaining attacks are restricted to a single direction, so-called classical splittings. We
prove the main splitting theorem and establish a general relation between abstract prin-
ciples and the splitting property (Theorems 4.10, 4.13).
In the second part we show how the conditions under which splitting is possible can
be relaxed. In fact, in case of stable semantics we prove a generalized splitting result
allowing for arbitrary splits (Theorem 4.28). Finally, we convey our idea of a non-classical
splitting to logic programs (Theorem 4.34) generalizing former results proven in [Lif-
schitz and Turner, 1994].
• In Chapter 5 we address the issue of characterizing equivalence notions lying in-between
standard and expansion equivalence. This means, rather than considering arbitrary ex-
pansions we focus here on restricted classes like normal and strong expansions.
First, we briefly summarize already existing results regarding expansion equivalence.
Then, in Section 5.2 we present characterization theorems with respect to strong expan-
sion equivalence for all semantics considered in this thesis. Two unexpected as well as
remarkable results are that strong expansion equivalence with respect to stable and stage
semantics coincide (Theorem 5.10) and furthermore, stage, stable, semi-stable, eager and
naive semantics do not distinguish between expansion and strong expansion equivalence
(cf. Figure 5.18). In Section 5.3 we proceed with normal expansion equivalence. The main
result is that two AFs are expansion equivalent if and only if they are normal expansion
equivalent (see Figure 5.18).
Additionally, in Section 5.4 we characterize weak expansion equivalence for stable and
preferred semantics (Theorems 5.38 and 5.40). Interestingly, the obtained characteriza-
tion theorems are not purely syntactical in contrast to the other results established in
this chapter. Furthermore, we consider local equivalence with respect to stage seman-
tics (Theorem 5.44). Finally, in Section 5.5, we summarize the obtained results, provide
relations between different notions of equivalence and discuss the role of self-attacking
arguments. One main result is that any equivalence notion on the set of AFs characteri-
zable through kernels presented in this thesis collapses to identity if we restrict ourselves
to self-loop-free AFs (Theorem 5.47).
• In Chapter 6 we provide an analytical and empirical study of the maximal and average
numbers of stable extensions in abstract argumentation frameworks. As one of the ana-
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lytical main results, we prove a tight upper bound on the maximal number of stable
extensions that depends only on the number of arguments n in the framework, namely
3
n
3 (Theorem 6.5). More interestingly, our empirical results indicate that the distribution
of stable extensions as a function of the number of attacks in the framework seems to
follow a universal pattern that is independent of the number of arguments (cf. Figures
6.4 and 6.5).
• Chapter 7 is dedicated to dynamic aspects of abstract argumentation. The first question
we study is the so-called enforcing problem. This is, in brief, the question whether it is
possible to modify a given AF in such a way that a desired set of arguments becomes an
extension or at least a subset of an extension. We show both impossibility and possibility
results (Theorems 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7). In particular, enforcing is always possible given that
the desired set of arguments is conflict-free.
In Section 7.2 we go an important step further. We are not only interested whether en-
forcements are possible, but also in the effort needed to enforce a set of arguments. In a
nutshell, the minimal change problem considered in this section corresponds to the ma-
thematical problem of determining the minimal number of modifications (additions or
removals of attacks) needed to enforce a certain set. We present characterization theo-
rems for weak, strong, normal, arbitrary expansions as well as arbitrary modifications
for the stable, preferred, complete and admissible semantics. The most remarkable result
is that the characteristic (representing the minimal change problem formally) does not
change if we switch simultaneously between strong, normal or arbitrary expansions and
preferred, complete or admissible semantics (Theorem 7.29).
In the subsequent Section 7.3 we proceed with a formal analysis of characteristics. In par-
ticular, given a collection of semantics and a modification type, what are the correspon-
ding tuples of characteristics one may obtain for an arbitrary argumentation framework
and set of arguments. In other words, we want to determine the set of all tuples of na-
tural numbers which may occur as characteristics simultaneously, the so-called spectrum.
In case of stable, semi-stable and preferred semantics we present a complete characte-
rization with respect to strong, normal and arbitrary expansions (Theorem 7.43). One
important consequence is that it may be arbitrarily more difficult to enforce arguments
using stable rather than semi-stable semantics, and also using semi-stable rather than
preferred semantics. Additionally, we provide some first results for the spectra with
respect to weak expansions as well as arbitrary modifications.
Section 7.4 studies novel dynamic notions of equivalence which guarantee equal mi-
nimal efforts needed to enforce certain subsets, namely minimal-D-equivalence and the
more general minimal change equivalence. We present characterization theorems for stable,
preferred, complete and admissible semantics (Theorems 7.51 and 7.52). Furthermore,
we study the relation between minimal change equivalence and expansion or standard
equivalence in general, i.e. rather than considering specific semantics we provide our
results for a whole range of semantics satisfying certain abstract principles (Theorems
7.54 and 7.55). Furthermore, we provide the complete picture for all equivalence rela-
tions considered in this thesis (so-called equivalence zoo) for the most important semantics.
In particular, in case of stable semantics the different forms of minimal change equiva-
lence are shown to be intermediate forms between strong expansion and weak expansion
equivalence (see Figure 7.18).
• Finally, in Chapter 8 we conclude this work. We summarize and discuss the results
achieved in this work and give pointers to possible future research directions.
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1.3 Publications
Most of the results presented in this thesis are already published at international conferences,
refereed workshops, journals papers and in a book in honour of Vladimir Lifschitz. In the
following we list the involved publications together with the chapters or sections where they
are mainly used.
• journal articles
1. [Baumann, 2012a] Normal and Strong Expansion Equivalence for Argumentation Frame-
works, Journal of Artificial Intelligence (Chapter 5)
2. [Baumann and Woltran, 2013] The Role of Self-attacking Arguments in Characterizations
of Equivalence Notions, accepted for Journal of Logic and Computation (Chapter 5)
• conference papers
3. [Baumann and Brewka, 2010] Expanding Argumentation Frameworks: Enforcing and
Monotonicity Results, Conference on Computational Models of Argument
(Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 7.1)
4. [Baumann, 2011] Splitting an Argumentation Framework, International Conference on
Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic Reasoning (Section 4.1)
5. [Baumann, 2012b] What Does it Take to Enforce an Argument? Minimal Change in
abstract Argumentation, European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(Sections 7.2, 7.4)
6. [Baumann and Strass, 2012] Default Reasoning about Actions via Abstract Argumenta-
tion, Conference on Computational Models of an Argument (Section 3.3)
7. [Baumann and Brewka, 2013b] Spectra in Abstract Argumentation: An Analysis of Mi-
nimal Change, International Conference on Logic Programming and Non-Monotonic
Reasoning (Section 7.3)
• workshop papers
8. [Baumann et al., 2011] Splitting Argumentation Frameworks: An Empirical Evaluation,
Workshop on Theorie and Applications of Formal Argumentation (Section 4.1)
9. [Baumann and Brewka, 2013a] Analyzing the Equivalence Zoo in Abstract Argumenta-
tion, International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems
(Section 7.4)
10. [Baumann and Strass, 2013] On the Maximal and Average Numbers of Stable Extensions,
Workshop on Theorie and Applications of Formal Argumentation (Chapter 6)
• book contribution
11. [Baumann et al., 2012] Parameterized Splitting: A Simple Modification-Based Approach,
Correct Reasoning - Essays on Logic-Based AI in Honour of Vladimir Lifschitz
(Sections 4.2, 4.3)
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Chapter 2
Background of Abstract
Argumentation
In this chapter we introduce the necessary definitions at work in abstract argumentation. As
pointed out in the introductory part argumentation theory as considered in the AI-community
can be divided into deductive and abstract argumentation (see [Besnard and Hunter, 2008] for
a comprehensive overview). In the latter area Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks
(AFs) [Dung, 1995] play a dominant role. Here, arguments and attacks between them are
treated as primitives, i.e. the internal structure of arguments is not considered. The major
focus is on resolving conflicts and therefore, a variety of semantics have been defined, each of
them specifying acceptable sets. The motivations of these semantics range from the desired
treatment of specific examples to fulfilling a number of abstract principles. We present ten
different semantics and survey their behaviour with respect to certain evaluation criteria pro-
posed by [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007]. We then introduce the two most important reasoning
problems together with a survey of their complexity for all semantics under consideration.
The last two subsections are devoted to the inherently dynamic nature of argumentation.
In a dispute, for instance, new arguments are put forward in response to former arguments
with the objective to convince the participants of a certain opinion. In order to analyze such
argumentation scenarios we introduce several kinds of expansions capturing the specific dy-
namics of typical argumentation processes. Finally, we introduce and motivate equivalence
relations which allow for replacements in such typical argumentation scenarios without loss
of information.
2.1 Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
We start with the definition of an argumentation framework (AF) given by [Dung, 1995].
Definition 2.1. An argumentation framework (AF) is a pair F = (A, R), where A is a set whose
elements are called arguments and R ⊆ A × A a binary relation, called the attack relation.
In the following we introduce some notations and technical terms we will use throughout
the thesis. If (a, b) ∈ R holds we say that a attacks b, or b is defeated by a in F . Furthermore, we
will slightly abuse notations, and write (A, b) ∈ R for ∃a ∈ A ∶ (a, b) ∈ R. In this case we say (the
set) A attacks b. Likewise we use the abbreviations (b, A) ∈ R and (A, A′) ∈ R. An argument
a ∈ A is defended by a set A′ ⊆ A in F if for each b ∈ A with (b, a) ∈ R, (A′, b) ∈ R. For a set
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E ⊆ A we use R+F(E), or simply R+E, for E ∪ {b ∣ (a, b) ∈ R, a ∈ E}. This set is called the range of
E in F . For an AF F = (B, S) we use A(F) to refer to B and R(F) to refer to S. We introduce
the union for two AFs F and G as expected, namely F ∪G = (A(F)∪ A(G), R(F)∪ R(G)). An
AF F = (A, R) is said to be finite iff it contains finitely many arguments only, i.e. ∣A∣ = n for
some n ∈N. Furthermore, F is called finitary iff each argument a ∈ A possesses at most finitely
many attackers, i.e. it exists n ∈N, such that ∣{b ∈ A ∣ (b, a) ∈ R}∣ = n.
If not specified otherwise we restrict ourselves to finite AFs (including the empty frame-
work) as done in most work on abstract argumentation during the last 20 years. However,
this convention does not mean that non-finite AFs are of no interest. To the contrary, in recent
times some work showing practical applications and theoretical properties of non-finite AFs
has been presented in the literature [Modgil, 2009; Baroni et al., 2011b; Weydert, 2011]. For this
reason we will give pointers to the non-restrictive case or sometimes we even prove results for
infinite AFs.
As one can easily notice AFs are set-theoretically just directed graphs where nodes are
interpreted as arguments and edges represent conflicts between them. The following AF F
will be used throughout the whole thesis. We will take this running example to exemplify the
above introduced definitions and vocabulary.
Example 2.2. Let A = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and R = {(a, b), (a, d), (b, c), (c, a), (d, d), (e, d), (e, f ), ( f , e)}.
The graphical representation of F = (A, R) is given as follows.
cb
a d e f
Figure 2.1: Running Example F
The following statements apply to F :
• c attacks a and is in turn defeated by b,
• d is defended by {a, c, f} and {a, c, f} attacks d,
• the range of {a, b, f} is the whole framework, i.e. R+F({a, b, f}) = A.
• F is finite and thus, finitary.
Finally, we introduce the union of two AFs as well as the restriction of an argumentation
framework to a subset of its arguments as expected. These set operations will be frequently
used in the thesis.
Definition 2.3. Given two AFs F = (A, R), G = (B, S) and a set A′ ⊆ A.
• The union of F and G is given by: F ∪G = (A ∪ B, R ∪ S).
• The restriction of F to A′ is defined as: F ∣A′ = (A′, R ∩ (A′ × A′)).
We say that F ∣A′ is the by A′ induced subframework of F .
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2.1.1 Semantics
A semantics σ is a function which assigns to any AF F a set of sets of arguments denoted byEσ(F). Each one of them, a so-called σ-extension, is considered to be acceptable with respect
to F . For two semantics σ and τ we use σ ⊆ τ to indicate that for any AF F , Eσ(F) ⊆ Eτ(F).
Numerous semantics are available for abstract argumentation frameworks among those al-
ready defined by [Dung, 1995], namely stable, admissible, preferred, complete and grounded
semantics. To overcome the problem of non-existence of stable extensions, semi-stable and
stage semantics [Caminada et al., 2012; Verheij, 1996] were suggested. Another approach for
semantics is driven by the motivation that semantics which always prescribe exactly one exten-
sion to any AF are important but the grounded semantics (the only unique-statues semantics
originally proposed) is too cautious. Ideal and eager semantics [Caminada, 2007; Dung et al.,
2006] follow this idea. Finally, we consider here also the so-called naive semantics.
Definition 2.4. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and E ⊆ A. E is a
1. conflict-free set (E ∈ c f (F)) iff there is no a ∈ E, such that (E, a) ∈ R,
2. stable extension (E ∈ Estb(F)) iff E ∈ c f (F) and for each a ∈ A ∖ E, (E, a) ∈ R holds,
3. admissible extension1 (E ∈ Ead(F)) iff E ∈ c f (F) and each a ∈ E is defended by E in F ,
4. preferred extension (E ∈ Epr(F)) iff E ∈ Ead(F) and for each E′ ∈ Ead(F), E /⊂ E′ holds,
5. complete extension (E ∈ Eco(F)) iff E ∈ Ead(F) and for any a ∈ A defended by E in F , a ∈ E,
6. grounded extension (E ∈ Egr(F)) iff E ∈ Eco(F) and for each E′ ∈ Eco(F), E′ /⊂ E holds,
7. semi-stable extension (E ∈ Ess(F)) iff E ∈ Ead(F) and for each E′ ∈ Ead(F), R+F(E) /⊂ R+F(E′),
8. stage extension (E ∈ Estg(F)) iff E ∈ c f (F) and for each E′ ∈ c f (F), R+F(E) /⊂ R+F(E′) holds,
9. ideal extension of F (E ∈ Eid(F)) iff E ∈ Ead(F), E ⊆ ⋂P∈Epr(F) P and for each A ∈ Ead(F)
satisfying A ⊆ ⋂P∈Epr(F) P we have E /⊂ A,
10. eager extension of F (E ∈ Eeg(F)) iff E ∈ Ead(F), E ⊆ ⋂P∈Ess(F) P and for each A ∈ Ead(F)
satisfying A ⊆ ⋂P∈Ess(F) P we have E /⊂ A and
11. naive extension (E ∈ Ena(F)) iff E ∈ c f (F) and for each E′ ∈ c f (F), E /⊂ E′ holds.
To get a first impression of the different behavior of the introduced semantics we consider
the running example.
Example 2.5. Consider the AF F depicted in Figure 2.1. The listed sets in the first column re-
present all conflict-free sets of F , i.e. c f (F) = {∅,{e},{ f},{a, e},{b, e},{c, e},{a, f},{b, f},{c, f}}.
The entry “×” in line C column σ indicates that the conflict-free set C is a σ-extension of F , i.e.
C ∈ Eσ(F).
1Note that it is more common to speak about admissible sets instead of the admissible extensions. For reasons of
unified notation we used the uncommon version.
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dstbp dssp dstgp dprp dadp dcop dgrp didp degp dnap
× × × ×
× × × × ×
× × ×
× ×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
∅
{e}
{ f}
{a, e}
{b, e}
{c, e}
{a, f}
{b, f}
{c, f}
Figure 2.2: Evaluation Table of F
We want to mention that complete extensions can be equivalently defined as conflict-free
fixpoints of the so-called characteristic function. This monotonic function was originally intro-
duced in [Dung, 1995] and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.6. Given an AF F = (A, R). The characteristic function ΓF ∶ 2A → 2A is defined as
ΓF(S) = {a ∈ A ∣ a is defended by S in F}.
To familiarize the reader with the equivalent definition of complete extensions we give
two short examples: First, ΓF({e}) = {e} since e defends itself against f and no other argu-
ment is defended by e. Consequently, {e} is a complete extension, in contrast to {a, f} where
ΓF({a, f}) = {c, f} ≠ {a, f}.
Observe that a grounded extension is defined as a minimal (with respect to subset relation)
complete extension. Thus, it corresponds to the least conflict-free fixpoint of ΓF . The main
advantage of this alternative characterization is that the least fixpoint can be achieved by ap-
plying iteratively ΓF on the empty set which allows for an efficient computation in case of
finite AFs.
Now let us proceed with the analysis of basic properties of the introduced semantics. Consi-
dering the table above a first important question that comes to mind is the question of compa-
rability with respect to subset relation of the different semantics. The table indicates that such
relations do not exist for any pair of semantics σ and τ. For instance, in case of semi-stable and
stage semantics neither ss ⊆ stg nor stg ⊆ ss. The following proposition clarifies the question
for the considered semantics. In the interest of readability we present the relations graphically
instead of providing a long list of propositions.
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Proposition 2.7. For semantics σ and τ, σ ⊆ τ iff there is a link between σ and τ in Figure 2.3.
dstbp
dssp
dstgp
dprp
dnap
dcop dadp
dc f p
dgrp didp degp
Figure 2.3: Relations between Semantics
Proof. First, consider the lower branch. Obviously, na ⊆ c f . Let E ∈ Estg(F) ∖ Ena(F). Conse-
quently there is a set E′, such that E′ ∈ c f (F) and E ⊂ E′. We have R+F(E) ⊆ R+F(E′). Note
that R+F(E′) ⊆ R+F(E) requires (E, E′ ∖ E) ∈ R(F). This would contradict the conflict-freeness
of E′ in F . Thus, stg ⊆ na. Furthermore, if E ∈ Estb(F), then R+F(E) = A(F) and consequently,
E ∈ Estg(F). Hence, stb ⊆ stg.
Second, consider the upper branch. By definition we have co ⊆ ad ⊆ c f . Let E ∈ Epr(F) ∖Eco(F). Thus, there is an argument e ∈ A(F)∖ E which is defended by E. Since E is admissible
and therefore conflict-free we deduce (E, e) ∉ R(F). Thus, (e, e) ∉ R(F). This means, E ∪ {e} ∈Ead(F) contradicting the subset maximality of E. Hence, pr ⊆ co. Let E ∈ Ess(F) ∖ Epr(F).
Consequently there is a set E′, such that E′ ∈ Ead(F) and E ⊂ E′. We deduce R+F(E) ⊆ R+F(E′).
Observe that equal ranges of E and E′ imply (E, E′ ∖ E) ∈ R(F). This in turn would contradict
the conflict-freeness of E′ in F . Thus, ss ⊆ pr is shown. If E ∈ Estb(F), then R+F(E) = A(F).
Consequently, E defends all its elements. This means E fulfills all criteria of a semi-stable
extension. Altogether, stb ⊆ ss ⊆ pr ⊆ co is shown.
Finally, we consider gr ⊆ co, id ⊆ co and eg ⊆ co. The first proposition holds by definition.
Consider E ∈ Eid(F) ∖ Eco(F). Then there is an argument e ∈ A(F) ∖ E which is defended by
E. Let P ∈ Epr(F). Since e is defended by E, E ⊆ P and P ∈ c f (F) we have e is defended by P.
Since pr ⊆ co is already shown we deduce e ∈ P, for any preferred extension P. Furthermore,
since E is admissible and therefore conflict-free in F we deduce E ∪ {e} ∈ Ead(F) contradicting
the subset maximality of E. In a similar way one may show eg ⊆ co.
The evaluation table of the running example F (Figure 2.2) shows that stable extensions do
not necessarily exist. We call a semantics σ universally defined iff for any AF F , ∣Eσ(F)∣ ≥ 1. We
mention that the other semantics considered in this thesis always possess at least one extension
in case of finite AFs. This can be seen as follows: First, the empty set is always admissible and
conflict-free. Furthermore, the definiens of the semantics are looking for sets maximal in range
or maximal/minimal with respect to subset relation. Finally, only finitely many subsets have
to be considered since we are dealing with finite AFs. It is an important observation that
universally definedness of an semantics σ in case of finite AFs does not necessarily carry over
to the infinite case. This property holds for semi-stable semantics. Remarkably, it warrants the
existence of extensions for the class of finitary AFs [Weydert, 2011].
A further important property of semantics is the following strengthening of universally
definedness, namely guaranteeing at least one and at most one extension for every argumen-
tation framework. If a semantics σ satisfies this property we say that σ follows the unique
13
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status approach. The following proposition states that grounded, ideal and eager semantics
yield exactly one unique extension. Furthermore, ideal semantics accepts more arguments
than grounded semantics and eager semantics is even more credulous than ideal semantics.
Proposition 2.8. For any AF F , ∣Egr(F)∣ = ∣Eid(F)∣ = ∣Eeg(F)∣ = 1. Furthermore, if G ∈ Egr(F),
I ∈ Eid(F) and E ∈ Eeg(F), then G ⊆ I ⊆ E.
Proof. Since we already observed that the considered semantics are universally defined it suf-
fices to prove uniqueness. For a contradiction we assume that ∣Eσ(F)∣ > 1 where σ ∈ {gr, id, eg}.
Consider ideal semantics. Let I1, I2 ∈ Eid(F). Consequently, I1 and I2 are maximal admissible
sets, such that I1, I2 ⊆ ⋂P∈Epr(F) P. Therefore, I1 /⊂ I2 and I2 /⊂ I1 Since preferred extensions
are conflict-free we have I1, I2 ∈ c f (F). Together with the already assumed admissibility of I1
and I2 we have I1 ∪ I2 = I ∈ Ead(F). Furthermore, I ⊆ ⋂P∈Epr(F) P is implied contradicting the
maximality I1 and I2. A proof for eager semantics can be obtained by replacing preferred with
semi-stable. In case of grounded semantics we refer to [Dung, 1995, Theorem 25] where it was
shown that the set of all complete extensions forms a complete semi-lattice. Thus, there is a
least complete extension being a subset of any other complete extension.
In consideration of the last sentence we observe that the unique grounded extension can be
equivalently defined as the maximal complete (admissible) set G that is subset of each complete
extension. By Proposition 2.7 we have ss ⊆ pr ⊆ co and thus ⋂C∈Eco(F) C ⊆ ⋂P∈Epr(F) P ⊆⋂S∈Ess(F) S. Consequently, if G, I, E represents the unique grounded, ideal and eager extension,
then G ⊆ I ⊆ E for any AF F .
The following two propositions provide us some sufficient conditions for the agreement of
certain semantics. The first one states that stable, stage and semi-stable semantics coincide if
the considered AF possesses at least one stable extension. The second proposition claims the
agreement of preferred, semi-stable and ideal semantics for AFs possessing a unique preferred
extension. Note that the prerequisites of both propositions are essential (compare Figure 2.1).
Proposition 2.9. For any AF F , if Estb(F) ≠ ∅, then Estb(F) = Estg(F) = Ess(F).
Proof. In consideration of Proposition 2.7 it suffices to prove that Estg(F) ⊆ Estb(F) and Ess(F) ⊆Estb(F) in case of Estb(F) ≠ ∅. Assume E ∈ Estb(F). Since E ∈ Estg(F), E ∈ Ess(F) and
R+F(E) = A(F) is implied we deduce R+F(S) = A(F) for any S ∈ Eσ(F) (σ ∈ {stg, ss}). This
means, S ∈ Estb(F) concluding the proof.
Proposition 2.10. For any AF F , if ∣Epr(F)∣ = 1, then Epr(F) = Ess(F) = Eid(F) = Eeg(F).
Proof. Assume ∣Epr(F)∣ = 1. Since semi-stable semantics is universally defined and ss ⊆ pr
is already shown we obtain Epr(F) = Ess(F). In consideration of the definition of ideal and
semi-stable semantics Epr(F) = Eid(F) and Ess(F) = Eeg(F) follow immediately.
2.1.2 Abstract Principles
In [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007] several general criteria for comparing and evaluating semantics
were introduced. This paper was an important step to classify semantics because until its pu-
blication comparisons between semantics were almost exclusively example driven. One main
motivation for considering abstract principles instead of dealing with concrete semantics (and
AFs) is that possible results using abstract properties are general enough to cover semantics
which may be defined in the future. In the following we introduce some abstract properties
and provide a full picture for the considered semantics.
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Definition 2.11. A semantics σ satisfies
1. admissibility (AD), if for each AF F and for each σ-extension E we have: E ∈ Ead(F),
2. reinstatement (RE), if for each AF F and for each σ-extension E we have: any argument
a ∈ A(F) defended by E in F , a ∈ E,
3. conflict-freeness (CF), if for each AF F and for each σ-extension E we have: E ∈ c f (F),
4. directionality (DI), if for each AF F and any U ∈ US(F) = {U ∣ U ∈ A(F), (A(F)∖U, U) ∉
R(F)} we have: Eσ(F ∣U) = {E ∩U ∣ E ∈ Eσ(F)} and
5. I-maximality (IM), if for each AF F and for each two σ-extensions E1, E2 we have: if
E1 ⊆ E2, then E1 = E2.
The following table provides an overview of the considered semantics (compare [Baroni
and Giacomin, 2007; Baroni et al., 2011a; Gaggl, 2013]). In case of admissible and eager
semantics we use red-highlighted entries. This reflects the situation that (to the best of our
knowledge) these semantics have not been explicitly studied in the literature. We discuss the
obtained results below the table.
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CF
DI
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Figure 2.4: Evaluation Criteria: A Complete Picture
The presented results with regard to the first three abstract principles are not very surpri-
sing. Obviously, semantics which always return admissible, complete or conflict-free exten-
sions satisfy admissibility, reinstatement or the conflict-freeness principle. Roughly speaking,
these principles qualify basic requirements concerning single extensions, namely: the argu-
ments of a certain extension E are able to defend E collectively, consists of all arguments
defended by E and are compatible with each other.
The directionality and I-maximality criteria are requirements involving the whole set of
extensions and even extensions of certain subframeworks. The latter principle is satisfied if no
extension may be a strict subset of another one. Consequently, semantics following the unique
status approach possess this property. In particular, eager semantics does. The simple AFF = ({a},∅) proves that the admissible semantics does not satisfy I-maximality. The directio-
nality criterion claims that the evaluation of a certain argument should only be affected by its
attackers and the attackers of its attackers and so on. This means, an unattacked set should not
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be affected by the remaining part of the AF. The proof that admissible semantics satisfies direc-
tionality is implicitly given by combining [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007, Proposition 55] and [Ba-
roni and Giacomin, 2004, Proposition 2].2 The AF F = ({a, b, c},{(a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (c, c)}) ta-
ken from [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007, Figure 4] shows that eager semantics does not satisfy
directionality. Observe that Eeg(F ∣{a,b}) = {∅} ≠ {{b}} = {E ∩ {a, b} ∣ E ∈ Eeg(F)}.
A note on infinite AFs. Evidently, if an abstract criterion is not even satisfied in case
of finite AFs, then the same applies to the overall class of AFs. If we have a closer look
at the proof of Proposition 2.7 we observe that finiteness is not used. Consequently, stable,
semi-stable, preferred, grounded, ideal, eager and complete semantics satisfy admissibility,
reinstatement and the conflict-freeness principle even in case of arbitrary AFs since they always
return complete extensions. In general it is nontrivial to determine whether the fulfillment of
a certain criterion carries over to infinite AFs given that the considered criterion focuses on
properties of the whole set of extensions.
2.1.3 Reasoning
A certain argumentation semantics σ assigns a set of σ-extensions to a given AF F . We said
that any single σ-extension is considered to be acceptable with regard to F . What about
the acceptance status of a certain argument a? There are some obvious ways to assign a
certain status to an argument. First, an argument is either justified or rejected. The latter
holds if the semantics do not return an extension containing the considered argument. In
case of justified arguments we may consider at least two different levels of scepticism, namely
credulous or sceptical acceptance (see [Baroni and Giacomin, 2009] for further classifications).
The first acceptance status is assigned if the considered argument a is contained in at least one
extension. A strengthening of this status is sceptical acceptance. Here a has to be contained in
any extension. Here are the formal definitions.
Definition 2.12. Given an AF F , a semantics σ and an argument a ∈ A(F). The argument a is
1. rejected (with respect to σ and F), if a ∉ ⋃E∈Eσ(F) E,
2. credulously accepted (with respect to σ and F), if a ∈ ⋃E∈Eσ(F) E and
3. sceptically accepted (with respect to σ and F), if a ∈ ⋂E∈Eσ(F) E.
It may be observed that sceptical acceptance implies credulous acceptance. The converse
direction holds in case of a unique status approach. Furthermore, an argument a is credulously
accepted if and only if it is not rejected. A decision whether a certain argument a is credulously
or sceptically accepted with respect to a semantics σ and AF F (also known as Credσ or Sceptσ
respectively) can be easily given if we have access to all σ-extensions. Of course, this approach
is computationally costly, especially if there are exponentially many different extensions (in the
size of the inputframework F).3 Hence, there is a great interest in results or better algorithms
providing a simplified method for checking the aforementioned decision problems. In Section
3.2 we will show that in some cases the acceptability of a certain argument can be decided by
regarding a subframework only.
For the sake of completeness we provide a complexity classifications of the sceptical and
credulous reasoning problems. We want to emphasize that there are further decision problems
of interest, i.e. verifying whether a specific set of arguments is an extension (Verσ) or simply
2In Section 4.1.3 we we will present an alternative proof (including infinite AFs).
3Such an example is given by Fn = ({ai , bi ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n},{(ai , bi), (bi , ai) ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). Here, ∣Estb(F)∣ = 2n.
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the question whether there is an σ-extensions for a given AF (Existsσ). For a very good in-
troduction into the computational complexity of abstract argumentation we refer the reader
to [Dunne and Wooldridge, 2009]. A detailed analysis is given in [Dvorˇák, 2012].
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Figure 2.5: Complexity of Credσ and Sceptσ
2.1.4 Dynamics and Expansions
Dung’s argumentation frameworks are static: they specify sets of acceptable arguments given
a fixed set of arguments and attacks among them. Since argumentation is inherently dynamic,
it is natural to investigate the dynamic behavior of AFs. What are typical dynamic scenarios
or how does argumentation usually take place? Consider therefore the following citation
[Besnard and Hunter, 2009]:
Argumentation starts when an initial argument is put forward, making some claim.
An objection is raised, in the form of a counterargument. The latter is addressed in
turn, eventually giving rise to a counter-counterargument, if any. And so on.
Furthermore, with regard to the overall instantiation process it turns out that in almost
all deductive argumentation systems older arguments and their corresponding attacks survive
and only new arguments which may interact with the previous ones arise given that a new
piece of information is added to the underlying knowledge base (see [Besnard and Hunter,
2001]). This kind of dynamics corresponds to the concept of normal expansions firstly intro-
duced in [Baumann and Brewka, 2010]. This class of expansions is further divided into strong
and weak expansions. These are normal expansions which add strong or weak arguments only,
i.e. the added arguments never are attacked by former arguments or attack the previous ones.
In contrast to strong expansions the study of weak expansions may seem to be more of an
academic exercise than a task with practical relevance. Being aware of this fact, we emphasize
that there are formalisms, like Value Based AFs [Bench-Capon, 2003] where weak expansions
naturally occur. Former arguments may be arguments which advance higher values than the
further arguments. Consequently, the new arguments cannot attack the former (compare the
idea of “attack-succeed” in [Bench-Capon, 2003]). The last kind of dynamic scenarios we consi-
der are so-called local expansions. This is an somehow orthogonal concept to normal expansions
where no new arguments are raised, but the attack relation can be augmented. Such an ex-
pansion might occur if the underlying notion of attack is changed and the current framework
has to be reinstantiated (compare [Gorogiannis and Hunter, 2011] for a detailed discussion).
Definition 2.13. An AF F∗ is an expansion of AF F = (A, R) (for short, F ⪯E F∗) iff F∗ =(A ∪ A∗, R ∪ R∗) where A∗ ∩ A = R∗ ∩ R = ∅. An expansion is called
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1. normal (F ⪯N F∗) iff ∀ab ((a, b) ∈ R∗ → a ∈ A∗ ∨ b ∈ A∗),
2. strong (F ⪯S F∗) iff F ⪯N F∗ and ∀ab ((a, b) ∈ R∗ → ¬(a ∈ A ∧ b ∈ A∗)),
3. weak (F ⪯W F∗) iff F ⪯N F∗ and ∀ab ((a, b) ∈ R∗ → ¬(a ∈ A∗ ∧ b ∈ A)),
4. local (F ⪯L F∗) iff A∗ = ∅.
For short, normal expansions add new arguments and possibly new attacks which involve
at least one of the fresh arguments. Strong (weak) expansions are normal and only add ar-
guments which are never attacked by (attack) former arguments. Finally, local expansions do
not introduce any new arguments but possibly new attacks among the old arguments. For the
purpose of illustration we present the following simple example.
Example 2.14. The AF F is the initial framework. Weak and strong expansions of F are given
by FW or FS, respectively. Furthermore, the AFs FE, FN and FL show an arbitrary, normal
and local expansion of F .
aF ∶ b aFW ∶ b
c d
aFS ∶ b
c d
aFE ∶ b
c d
aFN ∶ b
c d
aFL ∶ b
Figure 2.6: Notions of Expansions
2.1.5 Equivalence
In general, equivalence tells us whether two syntactically different object represent the same
information - which is relevant, for instance, for simplification issues. In monotonic forma-
lisms, we usually have only one standard, model based notion of equivalence. Consider logical
equivalence in propositional or first order logic. It is well-known that this standard notion of
equivalence is even a congruence relation with respect to the logical connectives. This pro-
perty is the main reason for the validity of the so-called replacement theorem which states that
if two formulae φ1 and φ2 are logically equivalent then no change in the set of models of any
formula Φ occurs if we replace one of them with the other (compare Theorem 4.1 in [Rauten-
berg, 1996]). For short, possessing the same models guarantees inter-substitutability in any
logical context. Generally, an analogous statement in case of nonmonotonic formalisms does
not hold, as it was shown in [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] for logic programs and [Oikarinen
and Woltran, 2011] for abstract argumentation frameworks. Consequently, for the purpose of
replacement a stronger notion of equivalence is required. Consider the following example.
Example 2.15. The AFs F1 and F2 possess the unique semi-stable extension {e}. That means,F1 and F2 are standard equivalent.
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dF1 ∶ e dF2 ∶ e
Figure 2.7: Standard Equivalence
The AF G syntactically results by replacing the subframework F1 of F with F2. One may
easily verify that Ess(F) = {{e}} ≠ {{e},{ f}} = Ess(G) proving that F and G are not standard
equivalent.
cb
aF ∶ d e f
cb
aG ∶ d e f
Figure 2.8: Non-replaceability
As shown above, standard equivalence of two AFs is not sufficient for their mutual replaceabi-
lity without loss of information. Nevertheless, possessing the same extensions guarantees that
all queries with respect to credulous or skeptical accepted arguments are answered identically.
In this sense, standard equivalence is appropriate for non-dynamical, static argumentation
scenarios since it allows replacements without changing the semantics. Strong equivalence, in
contrast, guarantees inter-substitutability in any dynamical scenario. In other words, two AFsF and G are strongly equivalent if they share the same acceptable sets of arguments when
conjoined with any further framework H.
In Section 2.1.4 we introduced and discussed several kinds of expansion which are compa-
tible with the very nature of argumentation. The observation that argumentation is not static
and furthermore, a typical dynamic scenario or re-instantiation process corresponds to a cer-
tain subclass of expansions suggests to study the middle ground between the two extremes
of standard and strong equivalence, namely so-called normal expansion, strong expansion, weak
expansion and local expansion equivalence.
Now we formally define the aforementioned notions of equivalence. For the sake of clarity
and comprehensibility we use expansion equivalence instead of strong equivalence since any kind
of expansions are allowed.
Definition 2.16. Given a semantics σ. Two AFs F and G are
1. standard equivalent with respect to σ (F ≡σ G) iff they possess the same extensions under
σ, i.e. Eσ(F) = Eσ(G) holds,
2. expansion equivalent with respect to σ (F ≡σE G) iff
for each AF H, F ∪H ≡σ G ∪H holds,
3. normal expansion equivalent with respect to σ (F ≡σN G) iff
for each AF H, such that F ⪯N F ∪H and G ⪯N G ∪H, F ∪H ≡σ G ∪H holds,
4. strong expansion equivalent with respect to σ (F ≡σS G) iff
for each AF H, such that F ⪯S F ∪H and G ⪯S G ∪H, F ∪H ≡σ G ∪H holds,
5. weak expansion equivalent with respect to σ (F ≡σW G) iff
for each AF H, such that F ⪯W F ∪H and G ⪯W G ∪H, F ∪H ≡σ G ∪H holds and
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6. local expansion equivalent with respect to σ (F ≡σL G) iff
for each AF H, such that A(H) ⊆ A(F ∪G), F ∪H ≡σ G ∪H holds.
We recall some useful relations concerning standard equivalence and different semantics
which will be used throughout the paper.
Proposition 2.17. For any AFs F and G,
1. F ≡ad G ⇒ F ≡σ G, σ ∈ {pr, id},
2. F ≡co G ⇒ F ≡σ G, σ ∈ {pr, gr, id}.
Proof. The only non-trivial statement is F ≡co G ⇒ F ≡id G. The other relations follow immedia-
tely by Definition 2.4 and Proposition 2.7. Assume F ≡co G. Hence, ⋂P∈Epr(F) P = ⋂P∈Epr(G) P
since F ≡pr G is guaranteed. Without loss of generality let E be ideal in F but not in G. We have
that ideal extensions are complete (Proposition 2.7). Consequently, since both AFs share the
same complete extensions we have that E is also complete, thus admissible in G and further-
more, a subset of ⋂P∈Epr(G) P. Consequently, the ideal extension E′ of G is a proper superset of
E. Note that E′ is also complete, thus admissible in F contradicting the assumption that E is
ideal in F .
Now we present some preliminary relations between the mentioned notions of equivalence.
The presented implications follow directly from Definition 2.16. Figure 2.9 summarizes all
results in a compact way.
Proposition 2.18. For any AFs F , G, and any (possible) semantics σ the following holds:
1. F ≡σE G ⇒ F ≡σN G ⇒ F ≡σS G ⇒ F ≡σ G
2. F ≡σE G ⇒ F ≡σN G ⇒ F ≡σW G ⇒ F ≡σ G
3. F ≡σE G ⇒ F ≡σL G ⇒ F ≡σ G
expansion
equivalence
local
expansion
equivalence
normal
expansion
equivalence
weak
expansion
equivalence
strong
expansion
equivalence
standard
equivalence
Figure 2.9: Relations between Equivalence Notions
In general the converse directions do not necessarily hold. Since any arbitrary expansion
can be split into a normal and local part one could conjecture that normal and local expansion
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equivalence jointly imply expansion equivalence. In Chapter 5 we will devote particular atten-
tion to the question of how to decide the described notions of equivalence. We will see that
certain non-redundant frameworks, so-called kernels, play a major role in deciding equivalence.
Using the results presented in this chapter we will not only verify the addressed conjecture
but even the significantly stronger result that normal expansion equivalence and expansion
equivalence coincide for all considered semantics (see Section 5.3).
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Chapter 3
Monotonic Aspects
This chapter addresses the problem of revising a Dung-style argumentation framework by
adding finitely or infinitely many new arguments which may interact with old ones. We study
the relations between the semantics of the initial and the revised argumentation frameworks.
In particular, we are interested in subset relations as well as cardinality statements. We will
show how to use the obtained results to simplify the computation of justification states. In
fact, in certain scenarios, so-called weak expansion chains, it suffices to consider a subframework
only. Moreover, in some cases the decisive subframework may be finite even if the underlying
argumentation framework is infinite. In the third section we turn to reasoning about actions
which is a subfield of artificial intelligence that is concerned with representing and reasoning
about dynamic domains. We propose to employ abstract argumentation for this purpose. The
theoretical results proven before will play a key role in showing that our approach can be
efficiently implemented.
3.1 Monotonicity Results
Adding new arguments and their associated interactions obviously may change the outcome
of an AF in a nonmonotonic way: arguments accepted earlier may become unaccepted, others
become accepted; the number of extensions may shrink or increase, depending on the new
arguments. For instance, it is easy to verify that we obtain a total collapse of stable extensions
if we revise an AF by adding a self-defeating argument. The following example presents a
more realistic dynamical evolvement of the running example F (see Figure 2.1).
Example 3.1. The arguments and attacks marked with red represent the added information.
We use Frev to denote the revised version of the initial framework F .
cb
a d e f n m
Figure 3.1: The Revised AF Frev
We already observed that Epr(F) = {{e},{ f}} = {E1, E2} (Figure 2.2). Furthermore, we haveEpr(Frev) = {E1 ∪ {n}, E1 ∪ {m}, E2 ∪ {m}}. Consequently, the following interrelations hold:
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1. the number of extensions increased
2. every old belief set is contained in a new one
3. every new belief set is the union of an old one and a new argument
The previous example contrasts with the general observation that adding new arguments
and attacks may change the outcome of an AF in a nonmonotonic fashion. Such a behaviour
allows for reusing already computed extensions and is therefore worth studying. What are
sufficient conditions for monotonic evolvements? The following theorem proves that the class
of weak expansions and semantics satisfying the directionality principle guarantee the desired
behaviour.
Theorem 3.2. Given an AF F = (A, R) and a semantics σ satisfying directionality, then for all AFsG = (B, S), such that F ⪯W G we have:
1. ∣Eσ(F)∣ ≤ ∣Eσ(G)∣, (cardinality)
2. ∀E ∈ Eσ(F) ∃E′ ∈ Eσ(G) ∃C ⊆ B ∖ A ∶ E′ = E ∪C and (subset)
3. ∀E′ ∈ Eσ(G) ∃E ∈ Eσ(F) ∃C ⊆ B ∖ A ∶ E′ = E ∪C (representation)
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that B = A ∪ A′ and S = R ∪ R′, such that
A ∩ A′ = R ∩ R′ = ∅ (compare Definition 2.13). Since G is assumed to be a weak expansion ofF , A ∈ US(G). Furthermore, the directionality of σ implies Eσ(G∣A) = {E′ ∩ A ∣ E′ ∈ Eσ(G)}
(Definition 2.11). Since G∣A = F we obtainEσ(F) = Eσ(G∣A) = {E′ ∩ A ∣ E′ ∈ Eσ(G)} (3.1)
which will be frequently used throughout the proof.
1. Obviously, ∣Eσ(F)∣ = ∣{E ∩ A ∣ E ∈ Eσ(G)}∣. Furthermore, ∣{E ∩ A ∣ E ∈ Eσ(G)}∣ ≤ ∣Eσ(G)∣ conclu-
ding the proof.
2. (reduction to the absurd) Assume ∃E ∈ Eσ(F), such that ∀E′ ∈ Eσ(G) ∀C ⊆ B∖ A ∶ E′ ≠ E∪C.
Consequently, for any E′ ∈ Eσ(G), E′ ∩ A ≠ E. Assuming E′ ∩ A = E would imply E′ = E ∪ C
where C = E′ ∖ A. This means Eσ(F) /⊆ {E′ ∩ A ∣ E′ ∈ Eσ(G)} in contrast to equation 3.1.
3. (reduction to the absurd) Assume ∃E′ ∈ Eσ(G), such that ∀E ∈ Eσ(F) ∀C ⊆ B∖ A ∶ E′ ≠ E∪C.
Now, for any E ∈ Eσ(F), E′ ∩ A ≠ E because assuming the existence of an σ-extension E with
the property E′ ∩A = E implies E′ = E∪C with C = E′ ∖A. Consequently, {E′ ∩A ∣ E′ ∈ Eσ(G)} /⊆Eσ(F) in contrast to equation 3.1.
The theorem above proves that class of weak expansions behaves monotonically with res-
pect to the cardinality of extensions given that the considered semantics satisfies directionality.
Furthermore, every old belief set is contained in a new one and every new belief set can be
represented as the union of an old one and a (possibly empty) set of new arguments. Having
a closer look at the proof of Theorem 3.2 reveals that the same assertion applies to the infinite
case provided that the considered semantics still satisfies directionality (see Section 4.1.3).
3.2 Computation of Justification States
We already observed in Section 2.1.3 that a decision whether a certain argument a is credu-
lously or sceptically accepted with respect to a semantics σ and AF F can be easily given if
we have access to all σ-extensions. Such an approach is computationally costly, especially if
there is a huge number of extensions. In this section we will show how to benefit from the
monotonicity results.
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Proposition 3.3. Given an AF F and a semantics σ satisfying directionality, then for all AFs G, such
that F ⪯W G we have:
1. ⋃
E∈Eσ(F) E ⊆ ⋃E′∈Eσ(G) E′ (credulously justified arguments persist),
2. ⋂
E∈Eσ(F) E ⊆ ⋂E′∈Eσ(G) E′ (sceptically justified arguments persist).
Proof. 1. Given a ∈ ⋃E∈Eσ(F) E. Thus, it exists a σ-extension E, such that a ∈ E. Using statement
2 of Theorem 3.2 justifies a ∈ E′ for some E′ ∈ Eσ(G). Consequently, a ∈ ⋃E′∈Eσ(G) E′.
2. Given a ∈ ⋂E∈Eσ(F) E. This means, for any E ∈ Eσ(F) we have a ∈ E. Statement 1 of Theorem
3.2 guarantees that there is at least one σ-extension. Furthermore, by statement 3 we have that
any E′ ∈ Eσ(F) has a representation as E′ = E ∪C with E ∈ Eσ(F). Consequently, a ∈ E′ for any
E′ ∈ Eσ(F) and thus, a ∈ ⋂E′∈Eσ(G) concluding the proof.
That means, a sceptically (credulously) justified argument in F is skeptically (credulously)
justified in G. Remember that the preferred, admissible, complete, grounded and ideal satisfy
the directionality principle (compare Figure 2.4). We proceed with the introduction of a new
concept, a so-called expansion chain.
Definition 3.4. Let C = ⟨F1, ...,Fn⟩ be a sequence of AFs, F an AF. C is called expansion chain ofF iff
1. F = Fn and
2. Fi ⪯N Fi+1 (Fi+1 is a normal expansion of Fi) for all i: 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
C is called weak (resp. strong) if all expansions in the chain are weak (resp. strong).
The following example illustrates the new concept.
Example 3.5. The sequence C1 = ⟨F1,F2⟩ is a weak expansion chain of the running example F
(compare Figure 2.1). Furthermore, C2 = ⟨F1,F2,F3⟩ is a weak expansion chain of Frev depicted
in Figure 3.1. The AFs are defined as follows: F1 = ({a, b, c},{(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}), F2 = F1 ∪({d, e, f},{(a, d), (d, d), (e, d), (e, f ), ( f , e)}) and F3 = F2 ∪ ({n, m},{(d, n), ( f , n), (n, m), (m, n)}).
cb
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Figure 3.2: Weak Expansion Chains
Finally, we present a simplified method for checking whether an argument a is in some,
respectively all extensions of an AF F .
Proposition 3.6. Given a semantics σ satisfying directionality and let C = ⟨F1, ...,Fn⟩ be a weak
expansion chain of F . If i is the smallest integer, such that a ∈ A(Fi), then
1. a ∈ ⋃
E∈Eσ(F) E ⇔ a ∈ ⋃E′∈Eσ(Fi) E′ (status decidable in Fi),
2. a ∈ ⋂
E∈Eσ(F) E ⇔ a ∈ ⋂E′∈Eσ(Fi) E′ (status decidable in Fi).
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Proof. 1. (⇒) Given a ∈ ⋃E∈Eσ(F) E. Consequently, there exists an E ∈ Eσ(F), a ∈ E. We have
a ∈ A(Fi) and Fi ⪯W F . With the help of statement 3, Theorem 3.2 we conclude E = E′ ∪ C
where E′ ∈ Eσ(Fi) and C ⊆ A(F)∖ A(Fi). Since i is the smallest integer, such that a ∈ A(Fi) we
deduce a ∈ E′ and finally, a ∈ ⋃E′∈Eσ(Fi) E′. (⇐) Given a ∈ ⋃E′∈Eσ(Fi) E′. In the light of statement
1, Proposition 3.3 we immediately get a ∈ ⋃E∈Eσ(F) E.
2. (⇒) Let a ∈ ⋂E∈Eσ(F) E. Thus, for any E ∈ Eσ(F), a ∈ E. Assume that there is an E′ ∈ Eσ(Fi),
such that a ∉ E′. Applying statement 2, Theorem 3.2 we deduce the existence of an E ∈ Eσ(F),
such that E = E′ ∪C where C ⊆ A(F)∖A(Fi). Since i is the smallest integer, such that a ∈ A(Fi)
we deduce a ∉ C and thus, a ∉ E in contrast to the assumption. (⇐) This direction follows
immediately by statement 2, Proposition 3.3.
The proposition shows that it is sufficient to check the acceptability of an argument a in the
chain-member Fi which is the first AF in which a appears. The following example illustrates
this property and concludes the section.
Example 3.7. Consider again the revised version Frev of the initial framework F (compare
Example 3.1). Since { f} ∈ Epr(F) we deduce f is credulously accepted in Frev and thus, e is
not sceptically accepted in Frev.
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Figure 3.3: Computation of Justification States
3.3 Application: Reasoning about Action
Reasoning about action is a subfield of artificial intelligence that is concerned with represen-
ting and reasoning about dynamic domains. We propose to employ abstract argumentation
for this purpose. Specifically, we present a translation of action domains from a specification
language into Dung-style argumentation frameworks. As the key advantage of our approach,
we use existing semantics for argumentation to make predictions about the domain in various
manners and utilize monotonicity results to show that the approach can be efficiently imple-
mented. This demonstrates the practical value not only of its theoretical results, but also of
abstract argumentation itself.
3.3.1 Background: Action Theories
Action theories are used to represent agents’ knowledge about dynamic domains. Envisioned
by pioneer John McCarthy as early as 1959 [McCarthy, 1959], one of their tasks is to predict
how the world will evolve over time. Such predictions are highly relevant in artificial intelli-
gence, for example to enable an agent to plan ahead the course of actions suitable to meet its
goals. A major representational and inferential problem any action theory must solve is the
so-called frame problem of specifying the world properties that do not change when an action
is performed [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969]. Having been discovered in 1969, it took until 1991
that the frame problem was solved in a generally accepted way [Reiter, 2001]. Today, the field
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of reasoning about actions and change has brought forth quite a number of logic-based for-
malisms, each with their own solution to the frame problem (see [Thielscher, 2011] for a more
comprehensive treatment).
Empowered by these advances in classical action theories, researchers began to recognize
that agents typically have only incomplete knowledge about their environment, and started to
address this issue. Mueller [Mueller, 2006] described a general method for default reasoning
about (linear) time based on the circumscription of abnormality predicates. Kakas et al. [Kakas
et al., 2008] sketched an integration of temporal and default reasoning and in subsequent works
developed an argumentation-based semantics for the approach using linear time [Michael and
Kakas, 2009; Michael and Kakas, 2011]. Lakemeyer and Levesque [Lakemeyer and Levesque,
2009] gave a definition of progression [Reiter, 2001] in the presence of state defaults for a
modal fragment of the Situation Calculus that uses branching time. Baumann et al. [Baumann
et al., 2010] approached the state default problem of inferring what usually holds in an abstract
formalism that is independent of a particular time structure [Thielscher, 2011].
In parallel to the development of the highly expressive, logic-based formalisms for rea-
soning about changing worlds, researchers have proposed so-called action languages [Gelfond
and Lifschitz, 1998] for describing domains. They are simpler, much closer to natural language
and usually have a semantics based on state transition systems. The approach presented in
this paper is in effect also based on this paradigm since we define an action language with
argumentation-based semantics.
3.3.2 Specifying Action Domains
This section describes our approach for reasoning about actions and change via abstract ar-
gumentation. Roughly, the approach works as follows. The user specifies an action domain
in an action language that we define next. Our definitions construct an argumentation fra-
mework from a description of a domain in this action language. The obtained argumentation
framework can be used to answer queries about the domain using various semantics.
The vocabulary for speaking about dynamic domains consists of three components. First
fluents, properties that may change over time. Second actions (also called events), that happen
and initiate those changes. Third a time structure, that specifies the time points at which we
are interested in the state of the world and how these time points relate to each other. The first
two can be viewed as constant symbols, the third element is given by a directed tree whose
nodes are time points and whose edges induce a reachability relation among the time points.
Definition 3.8. A domain vocabulary is a tuple (F, A, T,≺), where
• F is a set of fluents. A fluent literal is of the form f or ¬ f for some f ∈ F. Define f def= ¬ f
and ¬ f def= f , and for a set L of fluent literals set L def= {l ∣ l ∈ L}. The set of all fluent literals
is then F± def= F ∪ F.
• A is a set of actions.
• The pair (T,≺) is a time structure, a directed graph with the properties
– T is a countable set of time points, each with a finite degree,
– 0 ∈ T is the root of the tree (called the least time point),
– for any t ∈ T there is a unique finite, directed path from 0 to t.
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The intuition behind trees as time structures is that edges lead to direct successor time
points and the direction of the edges express the flow of time. Hence our time structures may
be branching into the future, but they are always linear with respect to the past. This is a
very abstract view of time that can accommodate different notions of time that are used in
the literature: For example, the pair (N,{(n, n + 1) ∣ n ∈N}) of the natural numbers with the
usual successor relation defines a discrete linear time structure [Mueller, 2006]. The second
major time structure used in the reasoning about actions community, the branching time of
situations [Reiter, 2001], can be modeled using terms.
Taking 0 to denote the initial situation and the binary function do to indicate action appli-
cation at a time point, we inductively define T0 def= {0}, and for i ≥ 0
Ti+1 def= Ti ∪ {do(a, s) ∣ a ∈ A, s ∈ Ti} and T def= ∞⋃
i=0 Ti.
The ordering on situations with least element 0 is then defined as usual [Reiter, 2001].1
The state of the world at a time point of any time structure is described by providing the
truth values of the relevant aspects of the environment represented by fluents. Since some
world aspects might be unknown, we allow the representation of incomplete knowledge about
a time point. Formally, a so-called state is modeled as a consistent set of fluent literals. This
prevents an agent from believing contradictory propositions, but allows for incompleteness of
its knowledge.
Actions are formalized by stating their action preconditions – world properties that must hold
in order for the action to be executable – and direct effects, that express how actions change
the state of the world. Since world states are modeled using fluents, the changes initiated by
actions are modeled by fluent literals that become true whenever certain fluent literals – the
effect preconditions – hold. Finally, to formalize how the world normally behaves we use defaults
– which say that a fluent literal normally holds whenever all literals in a set of prerequisites
hold. Several action languages offer additional expressiveness, for example indirect action
effects. We however want to keep it simple here since our main goal is to show how abstract
argumentation can be used to reason about dynamic domains.
A specification of an action domain in our action language consists of two parts: the first
part contains such general knowledge about the domain – action preconditions, action effects,
state defaults –, the second part contains information about what holds and happens at various
time points of a specific domain instance. We begin with how to express knowledge about the
general workings of a domain.
Definition 3.9. Consider a fixed domain vocabulary (F, A, T,≺), and let a ∈ A be an action,
l ∈ F± be a fluent literal and C ⊆ F± be a finite set of fluent literals. A statement can be:
• a precondition statement: possible a if C
• a direct effect statement: action a causes l if C
• a default statement: normally l if C
In statements of the above form, we will refer to literal l as the consequent. If C = ∅ for
a statement, we omit the if part in writing. For illustration, we use the following running
example throughout this section.
1For the interested reader, the predecessor relation for situations is then given by s ≺ do(a, s) for all a ∈ A, s ∈ T.
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Example 3.10. (Machine supervision) In this simplified domain, the agent’s task is to supervise
the operation of a machine. If the temperature of the machine becomes too high, it has to be
shut down. Normally, however, the machine operates within temperature. To make statements
about this domain, we use the set of fluents F = {On,Cool} to express that the machine is
on and within acceptable temperature, and the set of actions A = {Switch} for toggling the
machine’s power button.
How fluents and actions interrelate is now given through the following statements. When
switching the machine on/off, the status of fluent On flips
action Switch causes On if {¬On} , action Switch causes ¬On if {On}
and turning it off furthermore causes the machine to cool down, formalized as
action Switch causes Cool if {On} .
The usual state of affairs in normal operation mode is expressed by the default statement
normally Cool if {On} .
For a specific domain instance, we will also assume given a narrative consisting of observa-
tions of the status of fluents and occurrences of actions at various time points. Although we
introduce a more general notation, in this paper, we restrict our attention to actions that end
in the direct successor time point.
Definition 3.11. For a fixed domain vocabulary (F, A, T,≺), let a ∈ A be an action, l ∈ F± a
fluent literal and s, t ∈ T time points with s ≺ t. An axiom can be:
• an observation axiom: observed l at t
• an occurrence axiom: happens a from s to t
So when we use the linear time structure shown earlier, action occurrences are always of
the form happens a from n to n + 1 for some n ∈N, which means that a has a fixed duration
of one time-step. However, we allow the possibility of concurrency, that is, multiple actions
happening at the same time.
The combination of general information about the domain and information about a specific
instance is now called an action domain specification.
Definition 3.12. An action domain specification, or domain for short, is a set Σ = Υ ∪Ω where Υ
is a finite set of statements and Ω is a set of axioms.
Example 3.13. (Example 3.10 continued) We extend the partial domain signature of the ma-
chine supervision domain by the time structure (T,≺) where T = {0, 1, 2, 3} and ≺ is given by{(0, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3)}. (Note that in this case 0 = 0.) Now we can express a narrative where the
machine is initially off, then switched on at time point 1 and nothing further happens:
Ω = {observed ¬On at 0,happens Switch from 1 to 2}.
Whenever using situations as underlying time structure of a domain, we tacitly assume
included the set {happens a from s to do(a, s) ∣ a ∈ A, s ∈ T} of occurrence axioms (expressing
the meaning of situations as hypothetical future time points) and restrict the user specification
to observation axioms.
For any action domain specification – be it linear-time or branching-time – we now want to
make predictions about how the domain will normally evolve over time. We do this by trans-
lating the specifications into argumentation frameworks and using argumentation semantics
to reason about the domains.
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3.3.3 Encoding
In the previous section, we introduced the syntax of a language for describing dynamic do-
mains. Now we present the argumentation-based semantics for that language. To this end,
we define a translation function from action domain specifications into abstract argumentation
frameworks.
This translation function will be mostly modular, which means that most of the constituents
of a domain description can be translated in isolation, that is, without considering other parts
of the domain. It is mostly modular because there will be one exception for modularity: to
correctly express the effects of actions, we need access to effect statements when translating
occurrence axioms. The rest of the translation will however be modular.
The basic intuition underlying our translation is the following. Each piece of knowledge
about the domain is modeled as an argument [Michael and Kakas, 2009; Michael and Kakas,
2011]. The most important arguments will express whether a fluent holds at a time point.
There will be other arguments, that state various causes for fluents to have a certain truth
value. For example, there will be arguments stating persistence as a reason for a fluent being
true or false, arguments about direct action effects, default conclusions and lastly observations.
To resolve conflicts between these causes – e.g. persistence says a fluent should be false while a
direct effect says it should be true – we use a fixed natural priority ordering that prefers obser-
vations over action effects, which are in turn preferred over defaults, that on their part trump
persistence. This priority ordering is expressed in the defined framework via attacks, that
(along with the remaining attacks) encode the relation between different pieces of knowledge
in the domain and eventually determine the semantics of the given specification.
For the rest of this subsection, we assume a given action domain specification Σ over a
domain vocabulary (F, A, T,≺). Although the translation can be defined in a strictly formal
way, we have chosen a less rigorous presentation that we hope is much easier to read. In the
paragraphs below, we define arguments and attacks that are created from elements of Σ. To
express that argument a attacks argument b, we will write a b. The resulting argumentation
framework FΣ is understood to contain all arguments and attacks that we define below. Along
the way, we will illustrate most of the definitions with the relevant parts of the argumentation
framework of our running example domain.
Fluents and time points. First of all, we create arguments that express whether a fluent is
true or false at a time point, or alternatively whether a fluent literal holds at a time point. For
a fluent literal l ∈ F± and time point t ∈ T they are of the form holds(l, t). Obviously, a fluent
cannot be both true and false at any one time point, so for all f ∈ F and t ∈ T, we create the
attacks holds( f , t) holds(¬ f , t) and holds(¬ f , t) holds( f , t).
Persistence. To solve the frame problem, we define arguments f rame(l, t1, t2) for all l ∈ F± and
t1 ≺ t2. These arguments say “the truth value of fluent literal l persists from time point t1 to
its direct successor t2.” First, we express that l holding at t1 is evidence against its negation l
persisting from t1 to t2: holds(l, t1) f rame(l, t1, t2). Also, l persisting from t1 to t2 is evidence
against it being false at t2: f rame(l, t1, t2) holds(l, t2).
Example 3.14. (Example 3.13 continued) The AF about fluent On and time points 0, 1 looks
thus:
holds(On, 0)
holds(¬On, 0)
f rame(¬On, 0, 1)
f rame(On, 0, 1)
holds(On, 1)
holds(¬On, 1)
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Defaults. Now we encode default conclusions: for normally l if C ∈ Σ and t ∈ T we create
arguments de f (l, t) and de f (l, t) with the intended meaning that l normally holds (normally
does not hold) at t. The argument for l being normally true at t attacks the arguments for
l being false or normally false at t: We add de f (l, t) holds(l, t) and de f (l, t) de f (l, t). A
default is inapplicable if some prerequisite c ∈ C is false at t, expressed by holds(c, t) de f (l, t)
for each c ∈ C. Defaults generally override persistence, so a default normally l if C will
attack persistence of literal l to time point t. If there is a time point s ≺ t we add the attack
de f (l, t) f rame(l, s, t).
We also create special arguments that express whether the world is abnormal with regard
to a specific default, that is, whether the default was violated at the time point. A state default
normally l if C is violated whenever all literals in C hold but l does not hold, which hints
at an abnormality of the world. For a default normally l if C ∈ Σ and time points s, t ∈ T
with s ≺ t we create the argument viol(l, s) and the attacks detailed below. First, we require
that abnormal situations do not go away by default, therefore a violated default blocks its own
application at the successor time point by the attack viol(l, s) de f (l, t). Conversely, a default
is not violated at s iff one of: (1) it was applied, hence the attack de f (l, s) viol(l, s); (2) its
consequent holds (the world is normal), thus we add holds(l, s) viol(l, s); or (3) one of its
prerequisites is false, hence we include the attack holds(c, s) viol(l, s) for each c ∈ C.
Example 3.15. (Example 3.14 continued) Here is a part of the argumentation (sub-)framework
expressing that the machine is usually cool when on. (The lower part about persistence of Cool
is isomorphic to the above graph for persistence of On.) Below we can see that holds(¬On, 0)
defends de f (Cool, 1), which in turn defends holds(Cool, 1).
holds(¬On, 0) viol(Cool, 0) de f (Cool, 1)
holds(Cool, 0)
holds(¬Cool, 0)
f rame(¬Cool, 0, 1)
f rame(Cool, 0, 1)
holds(Cool, 1)
holds(¬Cool, 1)
Action effects. Now for modeling the direct effects of actions. Let action occurrence
happens a from s to t ∈ Σ and effect statement action a causes l if C ∈ Σ. We
devise an argument dir(l, a, s, t) that encodes occurrence of effect l through a from s to t.
First, the action effect l can never materialize if some precondition in C is false: we add
holds(c, s) dir(l, a, s, t) for all c ∈ C. If there is a precondition statement possible a if Ca ∈
Σ, we add the attacks2 holds(c, s) dir(l, a, s, t) for all c ∈ Ca. As usual, to derive effect
l at t we attack its negation l at t, dir(l, a, s, t) holds(l, t). Since effects override both de-
faults and persistence, a direct effect l also attacks persistence of and default conclusions
about its negation l, as well as possible conflicting effects. We add dir(l, a, s, t) f rame(l, s, t),
dir(l, a, s, t) de f (l, t) and finally dir(l, a, s, t) dir(l, a′, s, t) for all a′ ∈ A.
Example 3.16. (Example 3.15 continued) If the machine was turned off, it would cool down.
holds(¬On, 1)
holds(On, 1)
dir(Cool,Switch, 1, 2)
f rame(¬Cool, 1, 2)
holds(¬Cool, 2)
holds(Cool, 2)
2If there is no precondition statement for an action, we assume that it is always possible.
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Observations. For observations observed l at t ∈ Σ we create arguments obs(l, t) and
obs(l, t) saying that l (resp. l) has been observed. Observations are the strongest causes,
i.e. they attack all other causes, including observations to the contrary: obs(l, t) holds(l, t),
obs(l, t) f rame(l, s, t) for s ≺ t, obs(l, t) de f (l, t), obs(l, t) dir(l, a, s′, t) for s′ ≺ t and
all a ∈ A, finally obs(l, t) obs(l, t).
Example 3.17. (Example 3.16 continued) Initially, the machine is observed to be off.
obs(¬On, 0) holds(On, 0) holds(¬On, 0)
This concludes our definition of the argumentation framework FΣ associated with an action
domain specification Σ.
Example 3.18. (Example 3.17 continued) The full argumentation framework FΣ constructed
from the machine supervision domain is too large to show here, we can however have a look
at its extensions and what they predict about the domain. The grounded extension of FΣ is
given by
{obs(¬On, 0), holds(¬On, 0),
f rame(¬On, 0, 1), holds(¬On, 1),
dir(On,Switch, 1, 2), holds(On, 2), de f (Cool, 2), holds(Cool, 2),
f rame(On, 2, 3), holds(On, 3), f rame(Cool, 2, 3), holds(Cool, 3)}
In words, the observation that the machine is off lets us conclude it is indeed off; this persists
to time point 1. Then the machine is switched on, fluent On becomes true and persists that
way. Meanwhile, there is no information about the temperature of the machine; however, after
it is switched on, the default can be applied and the machine is henceforth assumed to be cool.
There are two stable extensions, which contain everything that is grounded and addi-
tionally make a commitment toward the initial status of Cool, where the first one contains
holds(Cool, 0) and the second one holds(¬Cool, 0). There are three complete extensions, the
grounded one and the two stable extensions.
3.3.4 Encoded Priorities
The example framework just seen illustrated the workings of our approach, yet allows no
general conclusions about beneficiary properties of the constructed frameworks. We will now
proceed to prove several nice properties that are highly relevant for knowledge representation
and ultimately pave the way for an efficient implementation of our approach.
We start with some general observations. First, the AFs we construct in Section 3.3.3 are
always finitary, that is, every argument has only finitely many attackers, although they may of
course be infinite due to an infinite set of time points. Second, it follows from the definition
that the argumentation frameworks are free of self-loops. According to results about expansion
equivalence [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011], this means that all attacks encoded therein are
actually meaningful.
In this subsection we will show that the causes influencing the truth values of world pro-
perties respect a certain priority ordering. Intuitively, this means that the AFs we construct
“do the right thing” with respect to domain behaviour.
A fluent f can hold, respectively not hold, at a time point t for different reasons: because
an observation says so, it is a direct effect of an action, it is the conclusion of an applicable
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state default or simply because of persistence. Whenever two of these reasons are in conflict,
for instance persistence says f should be true at t while an action effect says f should be false,
we somehow have to decide for a truth value of f . We now want to show that the extensions
of the translated AFs FΣ satisfy a certain priority ordering among these reasons, namely (from
most to least preferred)
observations < direct effects < default conclusions < persistence.
Hence when persistence says f should be true and a direct effect says f should be false, then
the preferred cause “direct effect” takes precedence and f will indeed not hold. We will
show that the above ordering is indeed established. We begin with showing the superiority
of observations. In the sequel, we call an observation o, an action a or a default δ contrary
to l at t in Σ iff they justify l, that is observed l at t ∈ Σ, happens a from s to t ∈ Σ and
action a causes l if Ca ∈ Σ or normally l if C ∈ Σ, respectively.
Proposition 3.19 (Observations override everything). Let Σ be a domain and FΣ the associated AF. If
observed l at t ∈ Σ and observed l at t ∉ Σ, then for any semantics σ ∈ {stb, pr, co, gr} and any
E ∈ Eσ(FΣ), we find holds(l, t) ∈ E and holds(l, t) ∉ E.
Proof. First, observe that obs(l, t) is unattacked in FΣ, i.e. obs(l, t) ∈ ΓFΣ(∅) Furthermore, it
attacks the argument holds(l, t) and the possibly existing argument(s) de f (l, t), f rame(l, s, t),
dir(l, a, s, t) for any a ∈ A. These arguments are exactly the (possible) attackers of holds(l, t).
This means holds(l, t) is defended by obs(l, t). Hence, holds(l, t) ∈ CFΣ(CFΣ(∅)) and thus,
holds(l, t) ∈ E where E is the unique grounded extension of FΣ. Note that the grounded
extension E satisfies E ⊆ E′ for any E′ ∈ Eσ(FΣ) where σ ∈ {stb, pr, co}. Consequently, holds(l, t)
is contained in any stable, preferred and complete extension of FΣ too. Finally, holds(l, t)
cannot be included in an extension E since every considered semantics σ is based on conflict-
freeness.3
Proposition 3.20 (Direct effects override default conclusions). Let Σ be a domain and FΣ the associated
AF. If
1. observed l at t ∉ Σ, (absence of contrary observation l)
2. happens a from s to t ∈ Σ, (attempting to execute action a)
3. action a causes l if Ca ∈ Σ and (l is a direct effect of action a)
4. possible a if Ca ∈ Σ, (action preconditions of action a)
then for any semantics σ ∈ {stb, pr, co, gr} and any E ∈ Eσ(FΣ), such that
• holds(Ca, s) ∈ E,4 (action a is executable)
• holds(Ca, s) ∈ E and (effect statement is applicable)
• for any action a¯ contrary to l at t in Σ there is a ca¯ ∈ Ca¯ ∪Ca¯ such that holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E,
(contrary actions are blocked)
3In the following proofs we will leave the last two comments out. This means we will only show that holds(l, t) is
contained in the unique grounded extension of FΣ.
4For a set C = {c1, . . . , cn} of fluent literals, the expression holds(C, s) ∈ S abbreviates the more complex{holds(c1, s), . . . , holds(cn, s)} ⊆ S.
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we find holds(l, t) ∈ E and holds(l, t) ∉ E.
Proof. Let E be the unique grounded extension of FΣ. Since we assumed that holds(Ca, s),
holds(Ca, s) ∈ E and furthermore, holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E for any contrary actions a¯ we state that
dir(l, a, s, t) ∈ E because the possible attackers of dir(l, a, s, t), namely holds(Ca, s), holds(Ca, s)
and dir(l, a¯, s, t) are counterattacked by holds(Ca, s), holds(Ca, s) or holds(ca¯, t), respectively.
Thus, dir(l, a, s, t) ∈ E. Observe that the argument dir(l, a, s, t) attacks the arguments holds(l, t)
and f rame(l, s, t) as well as the possibly existing arguments dir(l, a¯, s, t) and de f (l, t). This
means holds(l, t) is defended by dir(l, a, s, t) and thus, holds(l, t) ∈ E.
Proposition 3.21 (Default conclusions override persistence). Let Σ be a domain and FΣ the associated
AF. If
1. observed l at t ∉ Σ, (absence of contrary observation l)
2. normally l if C ∈ Σ, (default δ concludes l)
then for any semantics σ ∈ {stb, pr, co, gr} and any E ∈ Eσ(FΣ), such that
• de f (l, t) ∈ E and (default δ is applied)
• for any action a¯ contrary to l at t in Σ there is a ca¯ ∈ Ca¯ ∪Ca¯ such that holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E,
(contrary actions are blocked)
we find holds(l, t) ∈ E and holds(l, t) ∉ E.
Proof. Let E ∈ Egr(FΣ), de f (l, t) ∈ E and furthermore, holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E for any contrary action a¯.
The attackers of holds(l, t) ∈ E are: First, holds(l, t), f rame(l, s, t) and possibly de f (l, t) which
are counterattacked by de f (l, t) and second, in case of existence, the arguments dir(l, a, s, t)
which are counterattacked by holds(ca¯, t). Thus, holds(l, t) is defended by the set A ⊆ E contai-
ning de f (l, t) and holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E for any contrary action a¯. Consequently, holds(l, t) ∈ E
concluding the proof.
Proposition 3.22 (The frame problem is solved). Let Σ be a domain and FΣ the associated AF. If
observed l at t ∉ Σ (absence of contrary observation l), then for any semantics σ ∈ {stb, pr, co, gr}
and any E ∈ Eσ(FΣ), such that
• holds(l, s) ∈ E, (fluent literal holds before)
• for any action a¯ contrary to l at t in Σ there is a ca¯ ∈ Ca¯ ∪Ca¯ such that holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E,
(contrary actions are blocked)
• for any default δ¯ contrary to l at t in Σ there is a cδ¯ ∈ Cδ¯ such that holds(cδ¯, t) ∈ E or viol(l, s) ∈ E,
(contrary defaults are blocked)
we find holds(l, t) ∈ E and holds(l, t) ∉ E.
Proof. Let E ∈ Egr(FΣ), holds(l, s) ∈ E and furthermore, holds(ca¯, t) ∈ E and holds(cδ¯, t) ∈ E
or viol(l, s) ∈ E for any contrary action a¯ or contrary default δ¯, respectively. At first, it can
be checked that f rame(l, s, t) ∈ E since all (possible) attackers, namely dir(l, a, s, t), de f (l, t)
and holds(l, s) ∈ E are counterattacked by at least one argument mentioned above. Since
f rame(l, s, t) attacks holds(l, s), holds(l, s) attacks f rame(l, s, t) and we assumed that contrary
actions or defaults are blocked we deduce holds(l, t) ∈ E.
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Theorem 3.23. Let Σ be a domain and FΣ the associated AF, and consider reasoning in the stable,
complete, preferred and grounded semantics. Concerning the causes that influence whether fluents hold
at a time point, we have the following:
1. observations override action effects,
2. action effects override default conclusions,
3. default conclusions override persistence and
4. the frame problem is solved.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 3.19–3.22.
Hence when, for example, persistence says f should be true and a direct effect says f
should be false, then the preferred cause “direct effect” takes precedence and f will indeed
not hold. Above, default conclusions refers to the consequents of applicable state defaults,
where we recall that violated state defaults are inapplicable at the next time point. So if, in
our running example, the machine is On and ¬Cool at one time point, the default statement
normally Cool if {On} is violated and ¬Cool will persist.
3.3.5 Stratification and Computing Extensions
The results of the previous section show that the argumentation semantics considered in this
section respect a suitable priority ordering among causes. If this ordering is the same across
the semantics, the reader may ask, then where lies the difference between them? Roughly, the
different semantics are used to model different types of knowledge (complete v. incomplete)
and modes of reasoning (well-founded v. hypothetical). The grounded semantics, for example,
accepts only conclusions that are well-founded with respect to definite knowledge. However,
this may lead to the agent having only incomplete knowledge about the domain. The stable
semantics, on the other hand, may make unproven assumptions about the world, but provides
complete knowledge about the domain in each extension:
Proposition 3.24. Let Σ be a domain with associated AF FΣ = (A, R). For each E ∈ Estb(FΣ), t ∈ T
and f ∈ F we have either holds( f , t) ∈ E or holds(¬ f , t) ∈ E.
Proof. Let E ∈ Estb(FΣ). Clearly {holds( f , t), holds(¬ f , t)} ⊈ E since E is conflict-free. Now
assume to the contrary that there are t ∈ T and f ∈ F with holds( f , t) ∉ E and holds(¬ f , t) ∉
E. Since E is stable, we have e1, e2 ∈ E with (e1, holds( f , t)) ∈ R and (e2, holds(¬ f , t)) ∈ R.
Roughly, e1 and e2 must be causes among observations, direct effects, defaults and persistence.
If they have different priorities, say, e1 overrides e2, then (e1, e2) ∈ R and E is not conflict-free,
contradiction. If they have the same priority, we have (e1, e2), (e2, e1) ∈ R and E is again not
conflict-free, contradiction.
While this result hints at the benefits of using the stable semantics for reasoning about
actions with our frameworks, this conclusion has to be qualified: the existence of stable exten-
sions cannot be guaranteed in general.
Example 3.25. Consider the domain Σ consisting only of the default statements
normally f if {¬ f} and normally ¬ f if { f}
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over the vocabulary ({ f} ,∅,{0} ,∅). It leads to the argumentation framework FΣ containing
(among others) the odd cycle de f ( f , 0) holds(¬ f , 0) holds( f , 0) de f ( f , 0). The single
admissible set ∅ is a preferred extension, but there is no stable extension. The example is ho-
wever contrived in that the specified defaults make no intuitive sense. How can f be normally
false if it is true and vice versa?
We already observed that the constructed AF FΣ may be infinite but is in any case finitary.
Hence, using a result of Dung, we may obtain the unique grounded extension of FΣ by iterati-
vely applying the characteristic function on the empty set [Dung, 1995]. Unfortunately, there is
no similar (constructive) method for the other semantics we are interested in. Nevertheless we
will show that the evaluation of an argument from FΣ can be implemented in principle since
we only have to compute extensions in finite subframeworks. Here, the concept of stratification
plays the lead. A stratification divides the arguments of an AF into layers that satisfy a simple
syntactic dependency criterion: a layer of an argumentation framework is any subset of its
arguments that is not attacked from the outside. If there is an increasing sequence of layers
whose union is the set of all arguments, then the argumentation framework is called stratified.
We will relate the new concept to the already introduced weak expansion chains (compare
Definition 3.5) and thus may apply monotonicity results.
Definition 3.26. Let F = (A, R) be an argumentation framework. A set L ⊆ A is a layer ofF iff for all a ∈ L and b ∈ A ∖ L we have (b, a) ∉ R. A strictly increasing sequence of layers
L0 ⊂ L1 ⊂ . . . is a stratification of F iff L0 ∪ L1 ∪ . . . = A.
We call an stratification infinite (finite) iff it possesses infinitely (finitely) many layers. For a
layer Li, the argumentation framework associated to layer Li is Fi def= (Li, R ∩ (Li × Li)). An AFFΣ automatically constructed from a domain Σ allows for a fairly straightforward definition
of a stratification:
Definition 3.27. Let Σ be a domain over vocabulary (F, A, T,≺) and FΣ = (A, R) be the ar-
gumentation framework obtained from it by the encoding specified in Section 3.3.3. For time
points s, t ∈ T define
L(t) def= {holds(l, t), obs(l, t), viol(l, t), de f (l, t) ∣ l ∈ F±}∩ A
L(s, t) def= { f rame(l, s, t), dir(l, a, s, t) ∣ l ∈ F±, a ∈ A}∩ A
For a set B ⊆ A of arguments denote by T(B) the time points occurring in B. Now define by
induction on natural numbers the sets L0 def= L(0) and for n ∈N,
Ln+1 def= ⋃s∈T(Ln),s≺t(L(s)∪ L(s, t)∪ L(t))
For the stratification, we construct the bottom layer by taking all arguments about the least
time point 0. The following layers are then defined inductively according to the time structure:
in each step, we add the arguments about direct successors of the time points in the arguments
in the previous layer. It is straightforward to prove that the construction as a matter of fact
yields a stratification:
Proposition 3.28. Let Σ be a domain over vocabulary (F, A, T,≺); let FΣ = (A, R) be the AF construc-
ted from Σ by the encoding from Section 3.3.3. Then the sets L0, L1, . . . obtained according to Defini-
tion 3.27 are a stratification for FΣ.
Proof. We first show that for all n ∈N, we have Ln ⊂ Ln+1. Let a ∈ Ln. We do a case distinction
on the structure of a.
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1. a ∈ L(t) for some t ∈ T. Then t ∈ T(Ln) and a ∈ L(t) ⊆ Ln+1.
2. a ∈ L(s, t) for s, t ∈ T. Then s ∈ T(Ln) and s ≺ t, thus a ∈ L(s, t) ⊆ Ln+1.
This shows Ln ⊆ Ln+1. Assuming that Ln is about s, for any t ∈ T with s ≺ t and f ∈ F it is clear
that we have holds( f , t) ∈ Ln+1 but holds( f , t) ∉ Ln, thus Ln ⊂ Ln+1. It remains to show that there
are no attacks from A∖ Ln into Ln, that is, from Ln+1 ∪ Ln+2 ∪ . . . into Ln. From the encoding in
Section 3.3.3, it follows that an argument about t ∈ T in FΣ only attacks arguments about t or
about t′ ∈ T with t ≺ t′. Hence for any m ∈N, layer Lm only attacks Lm ∪ Lm+1.
Of course the same holds for finite stratifications, that end in some layer Lm = A. The
real power of stratifications lies however in being able to decide the status of an argument
after discarding a possibly infinite part of the framework. In the following we anticipate
Proposition 4.14 in Section 4.1.3 showing that grounded, complete and preferred semantics
satisfy directionality even in case of infinite AFs.
Proposition 3.29. Let Σ be a domain and FΣ = (A, R) its associated argumentation framework with
stratification L0, L1, . . . according to Definition 3.27. For any semantics σ ∈ {gr, co, pr} we have:
1. a ∈ ⋃
E∈Eσ(FΣ) E ⇔ a ∈ ⋃E′∈Eσ(Fn) E′ (status decidable in Fn),
2. a ∈ ⋂
E∈Eσ(FΣ) E ⇔ a ∈ ⋂E′∈Eσ(Fn) E′ (status decidable in Fn).
where Fn is the AF associated to the least layer Ln such that a ∈ Ln.
Proof. First, we use that grounded, preferred and complete semantics satisfy the directiona-
lity principle (compare Theorem 4.13). By Definition 3.27 and Proposition 3.28 we obtain
a (possibly infinite) stratification of FΣ and assume that Ln is the smallest (with respect
to subset relation) layer with a ∈ Ln. Now FΣ admits the (finite) weak expansion chain
Cn = ⟨F1,F2, . . . ,Fn,FΣ⟩. Applying Proposition 3.6 yields the assertion.
It is crucial to note that this result makes implementing our approach feasible in principle,
since it reduces the relevant decision problems about infinite AFs to equivalent problems about
finite AFs. What is more, translating action domains to stratified argumentation frameworks
also provides an important step towards an efficient implementation: An intelligent agent that
constantly executes actions has to decide upon future actions in a timely manner. Consider
an agent that has executed m actions since having been switched on. To plan n time points
into the future, it needs to consider an argumentation framework of a size that grows in m+ n.
As time passes, n (the lookahead into the future) might be kept constant but m (the history of
past actions) will surely grow up to the point where despite only involving a linear blowup
the associated AFs are too large for the agent to handle. The solution to this problem is known
as progression in the reasoning about actions community: every once in a while, the agent
replaces its knowledge base about the whole past by a smaller but equivalent one about the
present, thereby effectively resetting m [Reiter, 2001]. That way, the size of the knowledge base
the agent handles can be significantly reduced while keeping the information it contains. For
grounded semantics, the obvious technical approach to progression is then to replace the sub-
framework F ′Σ speaking about the past until time point t by its unique grounded extension
E′, thereby obtaining a splitting. Splittings will be the object of study in Chapter 4. Empirical
evidence about extensions of AFs admitting a splitting [Baumann et al., 2012] shows that this
provides a promising basis for implementing the approach presented in this paper.
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3.4 Conclusions and Related Work
We provided theoretical insights about the impact of further arguments and attack relations.
In particular, we showed that the class of weak expansions behaves monotonically with respect
to the cardinality of extensions and justification state of arguments if the considered semantics
satisfies directionality. Note that the established results (restricted to the class of finite AFs)
were already published in [Baumann and Brewka, 2010]. One key advantage of the shown
relations is the use of the directionality principle which makes our results general enough to
cover semantics which may be defined in the future.
There are several papers analyzing the dynamics in abstract argumentation. In [Cayrol
et al., 2008] a typology of revisions is proposed for the case that one new argument along with
one new interaction is added. Furthermore they proved sufficient conditions for being of a
certain revision type. A further work [Cayrol et al., 2010] from the same authors continues this
line including monotonicity and cardinality results. Furthermore, in [Boella et al., 2009] so-
called attack refinement principles are introduced stating whether the extension stays the same
if a single attack is added. They studied the fulfillment of these principles with respect to
grounded semantics.
In the third section we presented an encoding of action domains into abstract argumenta-
tion frameworks published in [Baumann and Strass, 2012]. In being independent of a particular
notion of time and able to do default reasoning in dynamic domains, the approach goes well
beyond the capabilities of current action languages. We used theoretical results from argu-
mentation to show how our approach can be put to use and argue how it can be implemented.
In continuation of their preliminary earlier work [Kakas et al., 2008], Michael and Kakas
developed an approach that combines default reasoning with temporal reasoning and is based
on assumption-based argumentation [Michael and Kakas, 2009; Michael and Kakas, 2011]. The
approach uses a fixed linear time structure and a tailor-made definition of argumentation
semantics. The work presented in this paper uses a more general notion of time, furthermore
we employ abstract argumentation with the standard definitions of its semantics, and can
immediately use existing results from this area, in particular existing solvers. Earlier, Kakas et
al. [Kakas et al., 1999] translated domains in an action language based on linear time into the
argumentation framework of logic programming without negation as failure, a contribution
much closer to the original work on action languages [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1998].
38
Chapter 4
Splitting Results
Splitting is a fundamental principle and has been investigated for several nonmonotonic for-
malisms. For instance, in an important and much cited paper Vladimir Lifschitz and Hudson
Turner [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] have shown how, under certain conditions, logic programs
under answer set semantics can be split into two disjoint parts, a “bottom" part and a “top"
part. The bottom part can be evaluated independently of the top part. Results of the evalua-
tion, i.e., answer sets of the bottom part, are then used to simplify the top part. To obtain
answer sets of the original program one simply has to combine an answer set of the simpli-
fied top part with the answer set which was used to simplify this part. Similar results were
obtained for default logic [Turner, 1996] as well as auto-epistemic logic [Gelfond and Przymu-
sinska, 1992]. The possibility of splitting has important implications, both from the theoretical
and from the practical point of view. On the theoretical side, splitting allows for simplification
of proofs showing properties of a particular formalism. On the practical side, splitting results
may yield more efficient computations.
In this chapter we study the concept of splitting in Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
works. We first consider so-called classical splittings which are intimately connected to the al-
ready introduced concept of weak expansions. In the second part we show how the conditions
under which splitting is possible can be relaxed. The main idea is to encode the possibility of
attack in form of new arguments. This way we can split in cases where classical splitting is not
possible. Finally, we convey our idea of a non-classical splitting to logic programs generalizing
results proven in [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994].
4.1 Classical Splitting Results
We start with the consideration of partitions into two parts such that the remaining attacks
are restricted to a single direction. It turns out that for stable semantics the result is similar
to logic programs. However, for admissible, preferred, complete and grounded semantics, a
more sophisticated modification is needed which takes into account that arguments may be
neither accepted nor refuted in extensions. As a byproduct we will prove that admissible, pre-
ferred, complete and grounded semantics satisfy directionality even in the case of infinite AFs.
Furthermore, the specific way of partitioning allows us to transfer the obtained results into
the field of dynamical argumentation. In particular, we will strengthen a former monotonicity
result (Theorem 3.2).
We proceed with the formal foundation, i.e. we develop the technical tools which are needed
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to prove the splitting results.
4.1.1 Classical Splitting, Reduct, Undefined Set and Modification
We start with the definition of classical splittings.
Definition 4.1. Let F1 = (A1, R1) and F2 = (A2, R2) be AFs such that A1 ∩ A2 = ∅. Let R3 ⊆
A1 × A2. We call the tuple (F1,F2, R3) a classical splitting of the argumentation frameworkF = (A1 ∪ A2, R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3).
For short, a classical splitting of a given AF F is a partition in two disjoint AFs F1 and F2
such that the remaining attacks between F1 and F2 are restricted to a single direction. The
following proposition establishes the connection between splittings and weak expansions. It
states that weak expansions and the introduced splitting definition are in a sense two sides
of the same coin. Note that this property is pretty obvious. Being aware of this fact, we still
present it in the form of a proposition.
Proposition 4.2. If (F1,F2, R3) is a splitting of F , then F is a weak expansion of F1. Vice versa, ifF = (A, R) is a weak expansion of F1 = (A1, R1), then (F1,F2, R3) with F2 = (A∖ A1, R∩ (A∖ A1 ×
A ∖ A1)) and R3 = R ∩ (A1 × (A ∖ A1)) is a splitting of F .
Now we turn to the main question. Given a splitting (F1,F2, R3) of an AF F . How are the
extensions of F and the extensions of F1 and F2 related?
Example 4.3. Consider the following AF F and its splitting (F1,F2, R3).
a6a5a4a3a2a1
Figure 4.1: Classical Splitting
There are two stable extensions of F , namely E′ = {a1, a5} and E′′ = {a1, a6}. Furthermore
we observe that E1 = {a1} and E2 = {a4, a6} are the unique stable extensions of F1 and F2,
respectively. Observe that we cannot reconstruct the extensions E′ and E′′ out of the extensions
E1 and E2. This is not very surprising because we do not take into account the attack (a1, a4). If
we delete the argument a4 in F2 which is attacked by E1 and then compute the stable extensions
in the reduced AF ({a5, a6},{(a5, a6), (a6, a5)}) we get the “missing” singletons {a5} and {a6}.
In fact, E’ and E” can be reconstructed as unions, namely E′ = {a1}∪ {a5} and E′′ = {a1}∪ {a6}.
a6a5a3a2a1
Figure 4.2: The Reduct of F2 with respect to E1 and R3
We will see that this observation holds in general for the stable semantics. The following
definition of a reduct captures the intuitive idea.
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Definition 4.4. Let F = (A, R) be an AF, A′ a set disjoint from A, S ⊆ A′ and L ⊆ A′ × A. The(S, L)-reduct of F , denoted FS,L is the AF
FS,L = (AS,L, RS,L)
where
AS,L = {a ∈ A ∣ (S, a) ∉ L)} and RS,L = {(a, b) ∈ R ∣ a, b ∈ AS,L}.
The intuitionally described reduced version of the AF F2 depicted in Figure 4.2 can be
formalized in the following way: ({a5, a6},{(a5, a6), (a6, a5)}) = F2E1,R3 . Unfortunately it turns
out that the reduct used above does not obtain the desired properties for other semantics we
are interested in. Here is a counterexample.
Example 4.5. Given the following AF F and its splitting (F1,F2, R3).
a5a4a3a2a1
Figure 4.3: Counterexample Reduct (σ ∈ {pr, co, gr})
We observe that E = {a1} is the unique preferred, complete and grounded extension of F .
The same holds for the AF F1, i.e. E1 = {a1}. Furthermore, the (E1, R3)-reduct of F2 equals F2
since a1 does not attack arguments in F2. The reduct of F2 establishes the unique preferred,
complete and grounded extension E2 = {a4}. Yet the union of E1 and E2 differs from E.
Given a splitting (F1,F2, R3) of F . The problem described above stems from the fact that
the distinction between those arguments which are not in the extension because they are refuted
(attacked by an accepted argument) and those not in the extension without being refuted is not
taken care of. The former have no influence on F2. However, the latter - which we will call
undefined in contrast to the refuted ones - indeed have an influence on F2, as illustrated in
Example 4.5. To overcome this problem, we introduce a simple modification. Whenever there
is an undefined argument a in the extension of the first AF F1 which attacks an argument b in
the second (maybe reduced) AF F2, we modify the latter so that b is both origin and goal of
the attack.
Example 4.6 (Example 4.5 continued). The fact that a3 is undefined with respect to E1 leads to
the undefinedness of both a4 and a5, and this is not captured by the (E1, R3)-reduct of F2. We
can enforce undefinedness of a4 (and thus of a5) in F2 by introducing a self-attack for a4.
a5a4a3a2a1
Figure 4.4: The Modification of F2 with respect to E1 and R3
Now, the modified AF ({a4, a5},{(a4, a4), (a4, a5)}) establishes the empty set as the unique
extension under preferred, complete and grounded semantics. Thus, E can be reconstructed
as union, namely E = {a1}∪∅.
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Here are the formal definitions capturing the ideas outlined above.
Definition 4.7. Let F = (A, R) be an AF, E an extension of F . The set of arguments undefined
with respect to E is
UE = {a ∈ A ∣ a ∉ E, (E, a) ∉ R}.
Definition 4.8. Let F = (A, R) be an AF, A′ a set disjoint from A, S ⊆ A′ and L ⊆ A′ × A. The(S, L)-modification of F , denoted modS,L(F), is the AF
modS,L(F) = (A, R ∪ {(b, b) ∣ (S, b) ∈ L}).
Given a splitting (F1,F2, R3) of F , an extension E of F1 which leaves the set of arguments
UE undefined, we will use modUE ,R3 (FE,R32 ) to compute what is missing from E. In case of
Example 4.6 we computed the extensions of ({a4, a5},{(a4, a4), (a4, a5)}) which can be equi-
valently formalized as mod{a3},R3 (F2E1,R3). Note that, although links are added, under all
standard measures of the size of a graph (e.g. number of links plus number of vertices) we
have ∣F1∣+ ∣modUE ,R3 (FE,R32 ))∣ ≤ ∣F ∣.
In the next section we will present our formal results using the technical tools defined here.
Before doing so we will prove some simple properties which are frequently used throughout
the proofs.
Proposition 4.9. Given an AF F = (A, R) which possesses a splitting (F1,F2, R3) such that F1 =(A1, R1) and F2 = (A2, R2), the following hold:
1. E1 ∈ Estb(F1)⇒ modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ) = FE1,R32 ,
(neutrality of the modification with respect to the stable reduct)
2. E ∈ c f (F)⇒ E ∩ A1 ∈ c f (F1)∧ E ∩ A2 ∈ c f (FE∩A1,R32 ),
(preserving conflict-freeness [intersection])
3. E1 ∈ c f (F1)∧ E2 ∈ c f (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ))⇒ E1 ∪ E2 ∈ c f (F).
(preserving conflict-freeness [union])
Proof. 1. Given E1 ∈ Estb(F1). Consequently, all arguments in A1 ∖ E1 are attacked by E1 and
thus, UE1 = ∅. This means, modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ) = FE1,R32 .
2. Subsets of conflict-free sets are conflict-free. Furthermore, R1 ⊆ R and RE∩A1,R32 ⊆ R2 ⊆ R.
Hence, it suffices to show that E ∩ A1 ⊆ A1 (obvious) and E ∩ A2 ⊆ AE∩A1,R32 . The latter can be
seen as follows: the assumption E ∈ c f (F) guarantees (E ∪ A1, E ∪ A2) ∉ R3. Thus, E ∪ A2 ⊆
AE∩A1,R32 concluding the proof.
3. First, E1 ∈ c f (F) since we have assumed that E1 ∈ c f (F1) and (F1,F2, R3) is a splitting
of F . Furthermore, E2 ∈ c f (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) implies E2 ∈ c f (FE1,R32 ) (less attacks). Thus,
E2 ∈ c f (F) and (E1, E2) ∉ R3 has to hold. Finally, (E2, E1) ∉ R3 because (F1,F2, R3) is a splitting
of F . Altogether, E1 ∪ E2 ∈ c f (F) is implied.
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4.1.2 Splitting Theorem
Given a splitting of an AF F , the general idea is to compute an extension E1 of F1, reduce
and modify F2 depending on what extension we got, and then compute an extension E2 of
the modification of the reduct of F2. The resulting union of E1 and E2 is an extension of F .
The second part of the theorem proves the completeness of this method, i.e. all extensions are
constructed this way.
Theorem 4.10. Let F = (A, R) be an AF which possesses a splitting (F1,F2, R3) with F1 = (A1, R1)
and F2 = (A2, R2). Furthermore, let σ ∈ {stb, ad, pr, co, gr}.
1. If E1 is an extension of F1 and E2 is an extension of the (UE1 , R3)-modification of FE1,R32 , then
E = E1 ∪ E2 is an extension of F .
E1 ∈ Eσ(F1)∧ E2 ∈ Eσ (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ))⇒ E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Eσ(F)
2. If E is an extension of F , then E1 = E∩ A1 is an extension of F1 and E2 = E∩ A2 is an extension
of the (UE1 , R3)-modification of FE1,R32 .
E ∈ Eσ(F)⇒ E ∩ A1 ∈ Eσ(F1)∧ E ∩ A2 ∈ Eσ (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 ))
Proof. (stable semantics) 1. Statement 3 of Proposition 4.9 guarantees conflict-freeness of
E1 ∪E2 in F . We will show now that E1 ∪E2 attacks all arguments in (A1 ∪A2)∖ (E1 ∪E2). First,
for any a ∈ A1 ∖ E1 we have (E1, a) ∈ R1 ⊆ R because E1 ∈ Estb(F1) is assumed. On the other
hand, if a ∈ A2 ∖ E2 we have either (E2, a) ∈ R2 or (E1, a) ∈ R3. This can be seen as follows: by
statement 1 of Proposition 4.9 we have modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ) = FE1,R32 . Thus, E2 ∈ Estb (FE1,R32 ) and
consequently, if a ∈ AE1,R32 , then (E2, a) ∈ RE1,R32 ⊆ R2 ⊆ R. If not, then a ∈ {a ∈ A2 ∣ (E1, a) ∈ R3}
(compare Definition 4.4). Consequently, (E1, a) ∈ R3 ⊆ R.
2. By statement 2 of Proposition 4.9 we have E∩A1 = E1 ∈ c f (F1). Furthermore, any a ∈ A1 ∖E1
is attacked by E1 in F1 because we assumed that E ∈ Estb(F) and (F1,F2, R3) is a splitting
of F . This means, E1 ∈ Estb(F1). Given statements 1 and 2 of Proposition 4.9 we deduce
E ∩ A2 = E2 ∈ c f (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )). Since AE1,R32 = {a ∈ A2 ∣ (E1, a) ∉ R3} and E ∈ Estb(F) we
deduce (E2, a) ∈ R2 for any a ∈ AE1,R32 ∖E2. Finally, using statement 1 of Proposition 4.9 justifies
E2 ∈ Estb (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 )) .
(admissible semantics) 1. Since admissible sets are conflict-free we deduce E1 ∪ E2 ∈ c f (F)
(statement 3 of Proposition 4.9). We have to show that E1 ∪E2 is even admissible in F . We show
this by case distinction. Assume (a, E1) ∈ R. Thus, a ∈ A1 and (a, E1) ∈ R1 since (F1,F2, R3)
is assumed to be a splitting of F . Furthermore, E1 ∈ Ead(F1) implies (E1, a) ∈ R1 ⊆ R. As-
sume now (a, E2) ∈ R. If a ∈ A1 or more precisely a ∈ A1 ∖ E1, then (E1, a) ∈ R1 ⊆ R has to
hold because assuming the contrary, i.e. (E1, a) ∉ R1 implies (E2, E2) ∈ R (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ))
(added self-loop) in contrast to the assumed admissibility and hence conflict-freeness of E2 in
modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ). Let a ∈ A2. If a ∈ {a ∈ A2 ∣ (E1, a) ∈ R3 ⊆ R}, then nothing is to show. If not,
we have a ∈ AE1,R32 = {a ∈ A2 ∣ (E1, a) ∉ R3}. Since E2 ∈ Ead (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) is assumed it
follows E2 ∈ Ead (FE1,R32 ) and hence, (E2, a) ∈ RE1,R32 ⊆ R2 ⊆ R. Altogether, E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Ead(F) is
shown.
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2. First, E ∩ A1 = E1 ∈ c f (F1) and E ∩ A2 = E2 ∈ c f (FE∩A1,R32 ) is given by statement 2 of Propo-
sition 4.9. Furthermore, E2 ∈ c f (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) because an additional self-loop in E2 re-
sulting from an attack of an undefined argument with respect to E1 in F1 would contradict the
admissibility of E in F because we assumed that (F1,F2, R3) is an splitting of F . For the same
reasons we conclude that E1 ∈ Ead(F1). Consider now E2. Let a ∈ A (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) ∖ E2
and (a, E2) ∈ R (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )). Remember that A (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) = AE1,R32 = {a ∈
A2 ∣ (E1, a) ∉ R3}. Furthermore, since a ∉ E2 we have (a, E2) ∈ RE1,R32 ⊆ R2. Since E ∈ Ead(F) is
assumed we conclude (E2, a) ∈ R2 and even (E2, a) ∈ RE1,R32 ⊆ R (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) because
a ∈ AE1,R32 . Thus, E2 ∈ Ead (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 )) is shown.
(preferred semantics) 1. Due to the previous proof and since any preferred extension is ad-
missible we have E1 ∪E2 ∈ Ead(F). Assume E1 ∪E2 is not maximal with respect to set inclusion,
i.e. there is an E′ ∈ Ead(F) ∶ E1 ∪ E2 ⊂ E′. Consequently, at least one of the following two cases
hold: E1 ⊂ E′ ∩ A1 or E2 ⊂ E′ ∩ A2. The first case contradicts the maximality of E1 in F1 because
E′ ∩A1 is an admissible extension of F1 (statement 2 of Theorem 4.10 for σ = ad). Consider now
the second case, namely E2 ⊂ E′ ∩ A2. Without loss of generality we may assume E′ ∩ A1 = E1.
In combination with statement 2 of Theorem 4.10 we deduce E′ ∩ A2 ∈ Ead (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ))
in contradiction to the maximality of E2 in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ). Thus, E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Epr(F) has to
hold.
2. Let E ∈ Epr(F). By statement 2 of Theorem 4.10 E1 = E ∩ A1 ∈ Ead(F1) and E2 = E ∩ A2 ∈Ead (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) are guaranteed. Assume E1 is not preferred in F1, i.e. there is an
E′1 ∈ Ead(F1), such that E1 ⊂ E′1. We will show now that E2 is admissible in modUE′1 ,R3 (FE′1,R32 )
and thus, E′1 ∪ E2 ∈ Ead(F) (statement 1 of Theorem 4.10) in contradiction to the maximality of
E in F . First, E2 ⊆ AE′1,R32 = A (modUE′1 ,R3 (FE′1,R32 )) because assuming the contrary would imply(E′1, E2) ∈ R3. Since E is assumed to be admissible in F and furthermore, (F1,F2, R3) is an split-
ting of F we conclude (E1, E′1) ∈ R1 in contradiction to the conflict-freeness of E′1 ∈ F1. Second,
observe that UE′1 ⊆ UE1 and RE′1,R32 ⊆ RE1,R32 . Consequently, E2 ∈ c f (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) justi-
fies E2 ∈ c f (modUE′1 ,R3 (FE′1,R32 )). Finally, using the admissibility of E2 in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )
and the observations UE′1 ⊆ UE1 and RE′1,R32 ⊆ RE1,R32 justify E2 ∈ Ead (modUE′1 ,R3 (FE′1,R32 )).
Consequently, E′1 ∪ E2 ∈ Ead(F) (statement 1 of Theorem 4.10) contradicting the assumption
E ∈ Epr(F). Finally, assuming that E ∩ A2 ∉ Epr (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 )) contradicts the as-
sumption E ∈ Epr(F). This can be seen as follows: First, E ∩ A2 ∈ Ead (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 ))
is given by statement 2 of Theorem 4.10 (σ = ad). Thus, there exists a set E′2 being a proper
superset of E2, such that E′2 ∈ Ead (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 )). Hence, by statement 1 of Theorem
4.10 E1 ∪ E′2 ∈ Ead(F) in contradiction to E ∈ Epr(F).
(complete semantics) 1. We have to show E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Eco(F). Note that admissibility is already
given by statement 1 of Theorem 4.10 (σ = ad). Thus, it suffices to show that for each a ∈ A1 ∪A2
defended by E1 ∪ E2 in F , a ∈ E1 ∪ E2. Assume not, hence there is an a ∈ (A1 ∪ A2)∖ (E1 ∪ E2),
such that a is defended by E1 ∪ E2 in F . Supposing a ∈ A1 ∖ E1 contradicts E1 ∈ Eco(F1) be-
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cause (F1,F2, R3) is assumed to be a splitting of F . Consider now a ∈ A2 ∖ E2. Obviously,
a ∈ AE1,R32 because assuming the contrary would contradict the conflict-freeness of E1 in F1.
We have to consider three attack-scenarios: First, a is attacked by arguments in A2 ∖AE1,R32 (and
obviously defended by E1 in F). The reduct-relation RE1,R32 do not contain such attacks and
hence, every “attack” is counter-attacked by E2 in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ). Second, a is attacked by
arguments in AE1,R32 ∖ E2. Hence, it must be defended by elements of E2 in FE1,R32 . Further-
more, it is even defended by E2 in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ) because the modified attack-relation still
retains such counter-attacks. Finally, a may be attacked by arguments A1 ∖ E1. Thus, it has to
be defended by E1 in F since (F1,F2, R3) is a splitting of F . Obviously, the reduct-relation
RE1,R32 do not contain such attacks. Consequently, every “attack” is counter-attacked by E2
in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ). This means, in any case we conclude E2 ∉ Eco (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) in
contradiction to the assumption.
2. Given E ∈ Eco(F). By statement 2 of Theorem 4.10 E1 = E ∩ A1 ∈ Ead(F1) and E2 = E ∩ A2 ∈Ead (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) are guaranteed. Assume E1 ∉ Eco(F1). Thus, there exists an a ∈ A1 ∖E1
defended by E1 in F1. Since (F1,F2, R3) is assumed to be a splitting of F we conclude a is de-
fended by E in F in contrast to E ∈ Eco(F). Thus, E1 ∈ Eco(F1). Consider now E2. Suppose there
is an argument a ∈ AE1,R32 ∖ E2, such that a is defended by E2 in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ). Clearly, the
potential attackers of a in AE1,R32 ∖ E2 are still counter-attacked by E2 in F . Furthermore, since
AE1,R32 = {b ∈ A2 ∣ (E1, b) ∉ R3} we have: if a is attacked by arguments in A2 ∖ AE1,R32 , then a is
defended by E1 in F . Finally, note that a is not self-defeating in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ) because E2
has to be conflict-free. Thus, a is not attacked by arguments in UE1 in F . This means, if a is
attacked by arguments in A1 ∖ E1 in F , then a is defended by E in F . Altogether, E ∉ Eco(F) in
contradiction to the assumption.
(grounded semantics) 1. Since grounded extensions are complete we have E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Eco(F)
(statement 1 of Theorem 4.10 for σ = co). Thus, it suffices to show minimality with respect to
subset relation. Assume not, i.e. there is a set E′ ∈ Eco(F), such that E′ ⊂ E1 ∪E2. Consequently,
at least one of the following two cases has to hold: E′1 = E′ ∩ A1 ⊂ E1 or E′2 = E′ ∩ A2 ⊂ E2. The
first case contradicts the minimality of E1 in F1 because E′1 is complete in F1 (statement 2 of
Theorem 4.10 for σ = co). Consider now the second case and assume E′1 = E1. Using statement
2 of Theorem 4.10 we deduce E′2 ∈ Eco (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) in contradiction to the minimality
of E2 in modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ). Thus, E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Eco(F) has to hold.
2. Let E ∈ Egr(F). By statement 2 of Theorem 4.10 E1 = E ∩ A1 ∈ Eco(F1) and E2 = E ∩ A2 ∈Eco (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )) are implied. This means, ΓF(E) = E and ΓF1(E1) = E1. Assume E1 is
not grounded in F1. This means, there is an E′1 ∈ Eco(F1), such that E′1 ⊂ E1 and ΓF1(E′1) = E′1.
Since E1 and E′1 are fixpoints of ΓF1 and (F1,F2, R3) is assumed to be a splitting of F we
have: ΓiF(E1) ∖ E1 ⊆ A2 and ΓiF(E′1) ∖ E′1 ⊆ A2 for any ordinal i. Furthermore, by assump-
tion we have E′1 ⊂ E1 ⊆ E. Consequently, ΓiF(E′1) ⊂ ΓiF(E1) ⊆ ΓiF(E) = E for any ordinal i
since ΓF is monotonic. Infinite iteration (exceeding the number of arguments) stabilizes the
chain, i.e. ΓjF(E′1) = Γ(ΓjF(E′1)) for some ordinal j (see [Grossi and Gabbay, 2013, Remark
1] for further information). This contradicts E ∈ Egr(F) since ΓjF(E′1) ⊂ E has to hold by
construction. This means, E1 ∈ Egr(F1). Finally, assuming that E2 ∉ Egr (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 ))
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contradicts the assumption E ∈ Egr(F). This can be seen as follows: Assuming the existence
of an E′2 ∈ Eco (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )), such that E′2 ⊂ E2 implies E1 ∪ E′2 ∈ Eco(F) (statement 2 of
Theorem 4.10). Consequently, E ∈ Egr(F) cannot hold in contrast to the assumption.
We want to emphasize that the proofs do not make use of finiteness. Hence, splitting
results can be used for the whole class of AFs if considered under stable, admissible, preferred,
complete or grounded semantics.
What about the other semantics we consider in this thesis? The following examples show
that the splitting theorem 4.10 does not hold in general in case of semi-stable, stage, eager, ideal
and naive semantics. The development of the right technical tools required to prove similar
splitting results is part of future work.
Example 4.11. Given the following AF F and its splitting (F1,F2, R3). We have Ess(F) =Estg(F) = {{a2},{a3}}. Thus, Eeg(F) = {∅}. Furthermore, Ess(F1) = Estg(F1) = {{a2}}. Hence,Eeg(F1) = {{a2}}. This means, {a3} ∩ {a1, a2, a3} = {a3} ∉ Eσ(F1) for σ ∈ {ss, stg, eg} in contrast
to the splitting theorem 4.10, statement 2.
a1 a2 a3 a4
Figure 4.5: Counterexample for σ ∈ {ss, stg, eg}
Now we turn to ideal semantics. We want to mention that one may prove a similar result
as statement 2, Theorem 4.10, namely
E ∈ Eid(F)⇒ E ∩ A1 ∈ Eid(F1)∧ E ∩ A2 ∈ Ead (modUE∩A1 ,R3 (FE∩A1,R32 )) .
Additionally, one may even prove that
E ∈ Eid(F)⇒ E ∩ A2 ⊆ ⋂
P∈Epr(modUE∩A1 ,R3(FE∩A1,R32 ))
P
holds but in general, it cannot be shown that E ∩ A2 is maximal with respect to this property
as required for ideal extensions. Consider therefore the following counterexample.
Example 4.12. Given the following AF F and its splitting (F1,F2, R3). We have Epr(F) ={{a1, a3, a5},{a2, a4},{a2, a5}}. Thus, Eid(F) = {∅}. Obviously, ∅∩ {a1, a2} = ∅ ∈ Eid(F1) sinceEpr(F1) = {{a1},{a2}}.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Figure 4.6: Counterexample for σ = id
Clearly, the empty set does not attack anything. Thus, the reduct of F2 with respect to ∅
and R3 equals F2. Consider now the modification of F2 with respect to U∅ = {a1, a2} and R3
depicted in the following figure:
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a3 a4 a5
Figure 4.7: Modification of F2 with respect to {a1, a2} and R3
On the one hand, we have Epr (modU∅,R3 (F2∅,R3)) = {{a5}} and hence,Eid (modU∅,R3 (F2∅,R3)) = {{a5}}. On the other hand, ∅∩{a3, a4, a5} = ∅ in contrast to statement
2 of the splitting theorem 4.10.
Finally, for naive semantics one may use the AF F = ({a1, a2, a3},{(a2, a3)}) to show that
classical splitting results do not hold.
4.1.3 Splittings, Directionality and Monotonicity
In this section we will draw benefit from the classical splitting results proven in the section
before. First, we will establish a general relation between universally definedness, the splitting
property and the directionality principle. In particular, we prove that admissible, preferred,
complete and grounded semantics satisfy directionality even in case of infinite AFs. As a
second application we will strengthen the former monotonicity results (Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 4.13. For any (possible) semantics σ we have: If σ is universally defined and satisfies
classical splitting results (Theorem 4.10), then σ satisfies directionality principle DI (Definition 2.11).
Proof. Given a universally defined semantics σ satisfying classical splitting results. We have to
show that for any U ∈ US(F) = {U ∣ U ∈ A(F), (A(F) ∖U, U) ∉ R(F)} we have: Eσ(F ∣U) ={E ∩U ∣ E ∈ Eσ(F)}. Assume not, hence there is an U ∈ US(F), such that Eσ(F ∣U) ≠ {E ∩U ∣
E ∈ Eσ(F)}. Observe that F ∣U ⪯W F and thus, (F ∣U ,F2, R3) is a splitting of F where F2 and
R3 are given as specified in Proposition 4.2. First, consider Eσ(F ∣U) /⊆ {E∩U ∣ E ∈ Eσ(F)}. This
means, there exists an E1 ∈ Eσ(F ∣U), such that E1 ∉ {E ∩U ∣ E ∈ Eσ(F)}. Since we assumed
that σ warrants the existence of extensions for any AF we deduce E2 ∈ Eσ (modUE1 ,R3 (FE1,R32 )).
Consequently, E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Eσ(F) by statement 1 of the splitting theorem 4.10. Obviously, (E1 ∪
E2) ∩U = E1 in contradiction to E1 ∉ {E ∩U ∣ E ∈ Eσ(F)}. Consider now {E ∩U ∣ E ∈ Eσ(F)} /⊆Eσ(F ∣U). Hence, there exists an E ∈ Eσ(F), such that E ∩U ∉ Eσ(F ∣U). This is impossible
because we have that (F ∣U ,F2, R3) is a splitting of F and thus, statement 2 of the splitting
theorem 4.10 guarantees E ∩U ∈ Eσ(F ∣U) concluding the proof.
Just as an aside, note that universally definedness and satisfying the directionality principle
is not sufficient for the fulfillment of classical splitting results (consider ideal semantics as a
counter-example). The following proposition generalizes a former result in [Baroni and Gia-
comin, 2007] depicted in Figure 2.4 stating that admissible, preferred, complete and grounded
semantics satisfy directionality provided that the considered frameworks are finite.
Proposition 4.14. Admissible, preferred, complete and grounded semantics satisfy directionality for
the whole class of AFs.
Proof. In consideration of Theorems 4.13 and 4.10 it suffices to show that admissible, pre-
ferred, complete and grounded semantics are universally defined. Clearly, the empty set is
always admissible whether or not the considered AF is finite. Furthermore, Dung itself has
already shown that every AF possess at least one preferred extension [Dung, 1995, Corollary
12]. Consequently, complete semantics warrants the existence of at least one extension since
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pr ⊆ co holds for any AF (compare Proposition 2.7). Finally, due to the monotonicity of the
characteristic function the existence of the unique grounded extension is guaranteed [Tarski,
1955] (see [Grossi and Gabbay, 2013, Remark 1] for further information).
Let us compare the splitting theorem 4.10 with the former monotonicity result (Theorem
3.2). The splitting theorem obviously strengthens the outcome of the monotonicity result for
the admissible, preferred, grounded and complete semantics which all satisfy the directionality
principle. We do not only know that an old belief set is contained in a new one and furthermore
every new belief set is the union of an old one and a (possibly empty) set of new arguments but
rather that every new belief set is the union of an old one and an extension of the corresponding
modified reduct and vice versa. Furthermore, the cardinality inequality of the monotonicity
result can be strengthened in the sense that we may provide a precise value of the number of
extensions of the expanded AF through counting extensions of certain modified and reduced
parts of the entire framework only.
Corollary 4.15. Let (F ,F2, R3) be a splitting of the argumentation framework G = (A1 ∪ A2, R1 ∪
R2 ∪ R3). This means, F ⪯W G. For any semantics σ ∈ {ad, pr, co, gr} we have:1
1. ∣Eσ(F)∣ ≤ ∑
Ei∈Eσ(F) ∣Eσ (modUEi ,R3 (FEi ,R32 ))∣ = ∣Eσ(G)∣, (cardinality)
2. ∀E ∈ Eσ(F) ∃E′ ∈ Eσ(G) (∃C ⊆ B ∖ A ∶)∃C ∈ Eσ (modUE ,R3 (FE,R32 )) ∶ E′ = E ∪C, (subset)
3. ∀E′ ∈ Eσ(G) ∃E ∈ Eσ(F) (∃C ⊆ B ∖ A ∶)∃C ∈ Eσ (modUE ,R3 (FE,R32 )) ∶ E′ = E ∪C
(representation)
4.1.4 Dynamic Scenario: Reusing Extensions
Argumentation is a dynamic process. Obviously the set of extensions of an AF may change if
new arguments and their corresponding interactions are added. Computing the justification
state of an argument or even extensions from scratch each time new information is added is
very inefficient. In subsection 3.2 we showed that in case of weak expansions and semantics
satisfying directionality (compare Proposition 3.3) credulously as well as sceptically justified
arguments persist. In this section we go a step further. Now we not only use already computed
extensions to draw conclusions about the justification state of an argument but also to precisely
determine the new set of extensions. Consider therefore the following example.
Example 4.16. Given an AF F = ({a1, ..., an}, R) and its set of extensions Eσ(F) = {E1, ..., Em}
(σ ∈ {pr, co, gr}). Consider now a weak expansion with two additional arguments b1 and b2,
such that b1 is attacked by the old arguments a1 and a2 and furthermore, b2 is defeated by b1.
Let G be the resulting AF depicted below.2
1The red-highlighted parts illustrate the strengthening compared to the monotonicity result 3.2 obtained by the
splitting theorem 4.10.
2We omit the arguments a3, ...an as well as the attack relation R since they are unimportant for the purpose of this
example.
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F a1
a2
b1 b2
Figure 4.8: Reusing Extensions - The AF G
What are the σ-extensions of the expanded AF G. Since G is a weak expansion of F we
immediately obtain a splitting (compare Proposition 4.2) and thus, may apply the splitting
theorem 4.10. Given an extension Ei of F we have to distinguish three cases:
1. a1 or a2 is an element of Ei,
2. a1 and a2 are not in Ei and not in UEi ,
3. a1 and a2 are not in Ei and at least one of them is in UEi .
The AFs below are the resulting modifications in these three cases. In the first case the
argument b1 disappears because b1 is attacked by at least one element of the extension Ei. In
the second and third case the arguments b1 and b2 survive because they are not attacked by
Ei. Furthermore in the last case we have to add a self-loop for b1 since a1 or a2 are undefined
with regard to Ei.
b2 b1 b2 b1 b2
Figure 4.9: Reusing Extensions - Different Cases
The resulting preferred, complete and grounded extensions of the modified frameworks
depicted above are {b2} in the first case, {b1} in the second and ∅ in the last case. Now we
may construct (Theorem 4.10, statement 1) σ-extensions of the expanded AF G by using the
already computed σ-extensions of F , namely
1. Ei ∪ {b2} ∈ Eσ(G),
2. Ei ∪ {b1} ∈ Eσ(G) and
3. Ei ∈ Eσ(G).
Due to the completeness (Theorem 4.10, statement 2) of the splitting method we constructed
all extensions of G concerning Ei.
Note that in general, new arguments occur as a response, i.e., an attack, to a former ar-
gument. In this situation the former extensions are usually not reusable because we do not
operate within the class of weak expansions. Being aware of this fact, we emphasize that there
are formalisms, like Value Based AFs [Bench-Capon, 2003] where weak expansions naturally
occur. Former arguments may be arguments which advance higher values than the further
arguments. Consequently, the new arguments cannot attack the former (compare the idea of
“attack-succeed” in [Bench-Capon, 2003]).
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4.1.5 Static Scenario: Computing Extensions
In [Baumann et al., 2011] we perform a systematic empirical evaluation of the effects of splitting
on the computation of extensions. Our study shows that the performance of algorithms may
dramatically improve when splitting is applied. In this section we sketch the main idea and
present some performance results for stable, preferred and grounded semantics. For readers
interested in more details we refer to the original paper [Baumann et al., 2011].
The main idea is as follows:
1. given an AF F
2. generate a splitting (F1,F2, R3) of F
3. compute extensions E1, ..., En of F1 via existing algorithm Alg
4. reduce and modify F2 with respect to Ei, i.e. compute modUEi ,R3 (FEi ,R32 )
5. compute extensions E1i , ..., E
m
i of modUEi ,R3 (FEi ,R32 ) via existing algorithm Alg
6. combine Ei and E
j
i to an extension of F
4.1.5.1 How to generate a splitting?
To generate a splitting we use the related graph-theoretic concept of strongly connected com-
ponents (SCC). A directed graph is strongly connected if there is a path from each vertex to
every other vertex. The SCCs of a graph F are its maximal strongly connected subgraphs.
Contracting every SCC to a single vertex leads to an acyclic graph. It is well-known that an
acyclic graph induces a partial order on the set of vertices. Based on this order every SCC-
decomposition can be easily transformed into a splitting. The following figure exemplifies the
idea. We sketch three different splittings, namely S1, S2 and S3. Note that S1 corresponds to
the most obvious possibility, namely taking the union of the initial nodes of the decomposition
(= F1) and the union of the remaining subgraph (= F2).
a bC1 c dC2
eC3
fC4
g h
i
C5
C1 C2
C3
C4 C5
S1
S2
S3
Figure 4.10: SCCs and Splittings
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For computing strongly connected components we used standard Tarjan algorithm from
[Tarjan, 1972]. The running time of it is linear in the number of arguments and attacks of F .
As depicted in Figure 4.10 there are usually more than one possibilities to generate a splitting.
In the implementation we tried to achieve a splitting (F1,F2, R) of F , such that the number of
arguments of F1 is approximately the same as or slightly more than the number of arguments
of F2. By choosing this range we attempted to balance the number of arguments and at
the same time keeping in mind that any further computations may slow down the splitting
process. According to those requirements an optimal splitting for the example depicted above
would run along the line S3.
4.1.5.2 Labelling Approach and Splitting Results
The evaluation was based on an implementation of Caminada’s labelling algorithm [Modgil
and Caminada, 2009], arguably the standard genuine algorithm for computing extensions. We
will not show how this algorithm works but we will briefly introduce the labelling approach
[Caminada, 2006] and show how to reformulate splitting results in terms of labellings.
Given an AF F = (A, R), a labelling is a total function L ∶ A → {in, out, undec}. We use x(L)
for L−1({x}), i.e. x(L) = {a ∈ A ∣ L(a) = x}. Analogously to Eσ(F) we write Lσ(F) for the set
of all labellings prescribed by semantics σ for an AF F also referred to as σ-labellings of F or
simply (if clear from context), labellings of F . The following concept of a complete labelling
play a central role within the context of labelling-based semantics.
Definition 4.17. Given an AF F = (A, R) and a labelling L of it. L is called a complete labelling
(L ∈ Lco(A)) iff for any a ∈ A the following holds:
1. If a ∈ in(L), then for each b ∈ A such that (b, a) ∈ R, b ∈ out(L),
2. If a ∈ out(L), then there is an b ∈ A such that (b, a) ∈ R and b ∈ in(L),
3. If a ∈ undec(L), then there is an b ∈ A such that (b, a) ∈ R and b ∈ undec(L) and
there is no b ∈ A such that (b, a) ∈ R and b ∈ in(L).
Now we are ready to define the remaining counterparts of the extension-based semantics
in terms of complete labellings.
Definition 4.18. Given an AF F = (A, R) and a labelling L ∈ Lco(F). L is a
1. stable labelling (L ∈ Lst(F)) iff undec(L) = ∅,
2. preferred labelling (L ∈ Lpr(F)) iff for each L′ ∈ Lco(F), in(L) /⊂ in(L′),
3. grounded labelling (L ∈ Lgr(F)) iff for each L′ ∈ Lco(F), in(L′) /⊂ in(L).
The following theorem opens the door to make splitting results applicable in case of
labelling-based semantics.
Theorem 4.19. [Modgil and Caminada, 2009] Given an AF F . For each σ ∈ {co, stb, pr, gr},
1. E ∈ Eσ(F) iff ∃L ∈ Lσ(F) ∶ in(L) = E and
2. ∣Eσ(F)∣ = ∣Lσ(A)∣ holds.
Now we may reformulate the splitting theorem 4.10 in terms of labellings.
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Theorem 4.20. Let F = (A, R) be an AF which possesses a splitting (F1,F2, R3) with F1 = (A1, R1)
and F2 = (A2, R2). Furthermore, let σ ∈ {stb, pr, co, gr}.
1. If L1 is a labelling of F1 and L2 is a labelling of the (undec(L1), R3)-modification of F in(L1),R32 ,
then there is exactly one labelling L of F , such that in(L) = in(L1)∪ in(L2).
L1 ∈ Lσ(F1)∧ L2 ∈ Lσ (modundec(L1),R3 (F in(L1),R32 ))⇒∃! L ∈ Lσ(F) ∶ in(L) = in(L1)∪ in(L2)
2. If L is a labelling of F , then there is exactly one labelling L1 of F1, such that in(L1) = in(L)∩ A1
and furthermore, exactly one labelling L2 of the (undec(L)∩A1, R3)-modification ofF in(L)∩A1,R32 .
L ∈ Lσ(F)⇒ ∃! L1 ∈ Lσ(F1) ∶ in(L1) = in(L)∩ A1∧∃! L2 ∈ Lσ (modundec(L)∩A1,R3 (F in(L)∩A1,R32 )) ∶ in(L2) = in(L)∩ A2
4.1.5.3 Empirical Results
The evaluation was mainly focused on preferred and stable semantics. We also included results
for grounded semantics, but as this semantics is known to be polynomial an improvement of
performance here was never expected, and our results confirm this.
Our evaluation of runtime for the grounded, preferred and stable semantics was based
on the sampling of 100 generated frameworks where 20 examples randomly extracted from
each of the following arguments/attacks combinations: 10/30, 50/100, 100/175, 200/375 and
500/750.
The following items summarize the most important observations:
1. execution with splitting was always faster than the one without
2. a gain of around 60% on average for both preferred and stable semantics
3. splitting may significantly improve runtime for stable semantics in frameworks where no
stable labellings exist
In a nutshell, the results confirm that the additional overhead introduced by splitting is
negligible. On the contrary it is worthwhile to use splittings.
4.2 Generalized Splitting Results
In the previous section we studied the concept of a classical splitting which allows to obtain the
extensions of the original framework by computing and combining extensions of two disjoint
and partially modified subframeworks. The restriction we made was that the attacks between
the splitted parts are restricted to a single direction. The aim of this section is to make this
technique also applicable in cases where classical splits are not possible. This means, we
present a simple modification approach allowing for arbitrary splits. We present generalized
splitting results for stable semantics representing one of the most important semantics for
Dung frameworks. All results are already published in [Baumann et al., 2012].
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4.2.1 k-Splitting, Conditional Extension and Match
We start with the definition of k-splittings.
Definition 4.21. Let F = (A, R) be an AF. Given a set S ⊆ A we define S¯ = A∖S, RS→ = R∩ (S× S¯)
and RS← = R ∩ (S¯ × S). The set S is called a k-splitting of F if k = ∣RS←∣.
A k-splitting S of F induces two sub-frameworks of F , namely FS1 = F ∣S and FS2 = F ∣S¯,
together with the sets of links RS→ and RS← connecting the sub-frameworks in the two possible
directions. If ∣RS←∣ = 0, then (FS1 ,FS2 , RS→) is a classical splitting of F (compare Definition 4.1).
This means, there is a one-to-one correspondence between 0-splittings and classical splittings.
Example 4.22. Consider the following AF F and its 4-splitting S = {a1, a2, a3}. Observe thatEstb(F) = {{a3, b2, b5},{a1, b2, b3, b4}}.
FS1 FS2
a1
a2
a3
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
Figure 4.11: A 4-splitting of F
How to obtain or reconstruct the stable extensions of F? The basic idea is as follows.
We first find a stable extension of FS1 . However, we have to take into account that one of the
elements of S may be attacked by an argument of FS2 . For this reason we must provide, for each
argument a in FS1 attacked by an argument in FS2 , the possibility to assume it is attacked. To this
end we add for a a new argument att(a) such that a and att(a) attack each other. Now we may
choose to include the new argument in an extension which corresponds to the assumption
that a is attacked. Later, when extensions of FS2 are computed, we need to check whether
the assumptions we made actually are satisfied. Only if they are, we can safely combine the
extensions of the sub-frameworks we have found.
Definition 4.23. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and S a k-splitting of F . A conditional extension of FS1
is a stable extension of the modified AF [FS1 ] = (AS, RS) where
• AS = S ∪ {att(a) ∣ a ∈ A⊕RS←} and
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• RS = (R ∩ (S × S))∪ {(att(a), a), (a, att(a)) ∣ a ∈ A⊕RS←}.
We use A⊕
RS← = {a ∣ (A, a) ∈ RS←}.
In other words, [FS1 ] is obtained from FS1 by adding a copy att(a) for each argument a
attacked from FS2 , and providing for each such a a mutual attack between a and att(a). For a
k-splitting we thus add k nodes and 2k links to FS1 . In case of a 0-splitting S, note that [FS1 ] = FS1
as intended.
Example 4.24 (Example 4.22 continued). Consider again the 4-splitting S = {a1, a2, a3} of F
depicted in Figure 4.11. According to Definition 4.23 we obtain [FS1 ] as depicted below. The
set of the grey highlighted arguments E = {att(a1), att(a2), a3} is a conditional extension ofFS1 , i.e. a stable extension of the modified framework [FS1 ]. Further stable extensions of [FS1 ]
are given by E1 = {a1, att(a2), att(a3)}, E2 = {att(a1), a2, att(a3)}, E3 = {att(a1), a2, a3} and
E4 = {att(a1), att(a2), att(a3)}.
[FS1 ] FS2
a1att(a1)
a2
att(a2)
a3att(a3)
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
Figure 4.12: Conditional Extensions of FS1
Each conditional extension E of FS1 may contain meta-information in the form of att(x)
elements. This information will later be disregarded, but is important to verify the assumptions
extensions of FS2 need to fulfill so that E can be augmented to an extension of the entire
argumentation framework F . As in case of classical splitting, E will be used to modify FS2
accordingly, thus propagating effects of elements in E on FS2 . In the generalized case we also
need to take the meta-information in E into account to make sure the assumptions we made
are valid. In particular,
• if att(a) is in E yet a is not attacked by another element in E∩S, then we know that a must
be externally attacked from an element of FS2 . In other words, we are only interested in
extensions of FS2 which contain at least one attacker of a.
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• if b is in E yet it is attacked by some argument in FS2 , then we are only interested in
extensions of FS2 not containing any of the attackers of b.
Before we turn these ideas into a definition we present a useful lemma which helps to un-
derstand our definition. In the following, given an AF F = (A, R) and a set E ⊆ A we use
E+R = E ∪ {b ∣ (E, b) ∈ R}. Observe that any conflict-free set such that E+R = A is a stable exten-
sion of F and vice versa.
Lemma 4.25. Let F = (A, R) be an AF. Let further B and C1, . . . , Cn be sets such that B, C1, . . . , Cn ⊆
A, and D = {d1, . . . , dn} such that D ∩ A = ∅. The stable extensions of the AFF ′ = (A ∪D, R ∪ {(b, b) ∣ b ∈ B or b ∈ D}∪ {(c, dj) ∣ c ∈ Cj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n})
are exactly the stable extensions E of F containing no element of B and at least one element of every Ci,
i.e. Ci ∩ E ≠ ∅ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. Let E ∈ Estb(F), such that E does not contain an element of B (+) and Ci ∩ E ≠ ∅ for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (*). We observe E ∈ c f (F ′) because of E ⊆ A and (+), and furthermore,
E+R(F ′) = E+R(F) ∪D = A ∪D because of (*). Thus, E ∈ Estb(F ′).
Assume now E ∈ Estb(F ′). We observe that E ∩ B = ∅ since conflict-freeness has to be
fulfilled. Furthermore, Ci ∩ E ≠ ∅ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has to hold because E+R(F ′) = A ∪{d1, . . . , dn} and only arguments in Ci attack the argument di by construction. Obviously, E ⊆ A
since the elements of D are self-attacking. Furthermore, E ∈ c f (F) because R(F) ⊆ R(F ′).
Consider now the attack-relation R(F ′). We obtain E+R(F) = E+R(F ′) ∖ D = (A ∪ D) ∖ D = A
which proves E ∈ Estb(F).
Based on the lemma we can now define the modification of FS2 that is needed to compute
those extensions which comply with a conditional extension E, capturing also the assumptions
made in E. First, we can eliminate all arguments attacked by an element of E. This step
corresponds to the usual propagation needed for classical splittings as well. In addition, we
make sure that only those extensions of the resulting framework are generated which (1)
contain an attacker for all externally attacked nodes of S, and (2) do not contain an attacker
for any element in E. For this purpose the techniques of the lemma are applied.
Definition 4.26. Let F = (A, R) be an AF, S a k-splitting of F and let E be a conditional
extension of FS1 . Furthermore, let
EA(S, E) = {a ∈ S ∖ E ∣ a ∉ (S ∩ E)⊕R}
denote the set of arguments from FS1 not contained in E because they are externally attacked.
An (E, S)-match of F is a stable extension of the AF [FS2 ]E = (A′, R′) where
• A′ = (S¯ ∖ E+
RS→)∪ {in(a) ∣ a ∈ EA(S, E)} and
• R′ = (R ∩ (A′ × A′))∪ {(in(a), in(a)), (b, in(a)) ∣ a ∈ EA(S, E), (b, a) ∈ RS←} ∪{(c, c) ∣ (c, E) ∈ RS←}.
In other words, we take the framework FS2 and modify it with respect to a given conditional
extension E of FS1 . To this end, we remove those arguments from FS2 which are attacked by E
via RS→ but we make a copy of each argument a in FS1 externally attacked by FS2 via RS←. These
additional self-attacking arguments in(a) are used to represent the forbidden situation where
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an externally attacked argument a actually remains unattacked. Finally, we exclude those
arguments in FS2 from potential extensions which attack an argument in E located in FS1 ; these
are the self-loops (c, c) for arguments s with (c, E) ∈ RS←. Again the size of the modification is
small whenever k is small: we add at most k nodes and 2k links to FS2 .
Example 4.27 (Example 4.24 continued). We continue. On the right-hand side we have the
modification of FS2 with respect to the conditional extension E = {att(a1), att(a2), a3}, i.e. the
AF [FS2 ]E. Observe that EA(S, E) = {a2} because a2 is not an element of E and furthermore, it
is not attacked by an argument in E ∩ S = {a3}. Hence, we have to add a self-attacking node
in(a2) to FS2 which is attacked by the attackers of a2, namely the arguments b2 and b3. The
argument a3 (which belongs to the extension E) is attacked by the argument b3 and attacks the
argument b4. Hence, we have to add a self-loop for b3 and further, we have to delete b4 and its
corresponding attacks.
[FS1 ] [FS2 ]E
a1att(a1)
a2
att(a2)
a3att(a3)
b1
b2
b3
in(a2)
b4
b5
Figure 4.13: (E, S)-match of F
The set of the light-grey highlighted arguments E′ = {b2, b5} is an (E, S)-match of F , i.e. a
stable extension of [FS2 ]E; in fact, it is the only (E, S)-match of F . Recall that (E ∩ S) ∪ E′ ={a3, b2, b5} is a stable extension of the initial AF F . One can further check that {b2, b3, b4} is
an (E1, S)-match of F with E1 as given in the previous example. On the other hand, for the
remaining conditional extensions of FS1 , no corresponding matches exist. Take, for instance,
E2 = {att(a1), a2, att(a3)}; here we have to put self-loops for b2 and b3, but b2 remains unatta-
cked in [FS2 ]E2 . Thus no stable extension for [FS2 ]E2 exists.
4.2.2 Generalized Splitting Theorem
Now we are prepared to prove a splitting theorem for k-splittings in case of stable semantics.
Theorem 4.28. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and let S be a k-splitting of F .
1. If E is a conditional extension of FS1 and E′ an (E, S)-match of F , then (E ∩ S) ∪ E′ is a stable
extension of F .
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2. If H is an extension of F , then there is a set X ⊆ {att(a) ∣ a ∈ A+
RS←} such that E = (H ∩ S) ∪X
is a conditional extension of FS1 and H ∩ S¯ is an (E, S)-match of F .
Proof. ad 1. First we will show that (E∩S)∪E′ ∈ c f (F). Given that E is a conditional extension
of FS1 we deduce E ∈ c f ([FS1 ]). Consequently, E ∩ S ∈ c f ([FS1 ]) (less arguments) and thus,
E ∩ S ∈ c f (FS1 ) (less attacks). Finally, E ∩ S ∈ c f (F) since (FS1 ) ∣S = F ∣S holds. Let E′ be
an (E, S)-match of F , i.e. E′ ∈ Estb ([FS2 ]E). According to Lemma 4.25, E′ ∈ stb(F ′) whereF ′ = (S¯ ∖ E⊕
RS→ , R(F)∖ (E⊕RS→ , E⊕RS→)). Thus, E′ ∈ c f (F). Obviously, (E ∩ S, E′) ∉ R(F) since
E ∩ S ⊆ S and E′ ⊆ S¯ ∖ E⊕
RS→ . Assume now (E′, E ∩ S) ∈ R(F). This means, there are arguments
e′ ∈ E′ and e ∈ E ∩ S, such that (e′, e) ∈ R. This contradicts the conflict-freeness of E′ in[FS2 ]E because R ([FS2 ]E) contains the set {(c, c) ∣ (c, E) ∈ RS←}. Thus, (E′, E ∩ S) ∉ R(F) and(E ∩ S)∪ E′ ∈ c f (F) is shown.
We now show that ((E ∩ S)∪ E′)+R(F) = S ∪ S¯ = A. Let us consider an argument s, such that
s ∉ ((E ∩ S) ∪ E′)+R(F). Assume s ∈ S. Consequently, s ∈ EA(S, E). Since E′ is an (E, S)-match
of F , by Lemma 4.25, E ∈ Estb(F ′) such that (E, in(s)) ∈ R(F ′). By definition of F ′ we have
R(F ′) ⊆ R(F) and thus (E, in(s)) ∈ R(F) contradicting the assumption. Assume now s ∈ S¯.
Obviously, s ∈ S¯ ∖ E⊕
RS→ . Since E′ is an (E, S)-match of F we deduce by Lemma 4.25 that E′ is
a stable extension of F ′ as defined above. Thus, s ∈ (E′)+R(F) contradicting the assumption.
Altogether, we have shown that (E ∩ S)∪ E′ is a stable extension of F .
ad 2. Let (H ∩ S)+R(F)∪˙B = S. Since H ∈ Estb(F) is assumed it follows B ⊆ (H ∩ S¯)+R(F). This
means, B ⊆ A+
RS← . Consider now X = {att(b) ∣ b ∈ B}. It can be easily seen that E = (H ∩ S) ∪X
is a conditional extension of [FS1 ]. Note that B = EA(S, E). Since H ∈ Estb(F) it follows
H ∩ S¯ ∈ Estb(F ′) where F ′ is as above. Furthermore, there is no argument c ∈ H ∩ S¯, such that(c, d) ∈ RS← with d ∈ E. Remember that B = EA(S, E). Hence, for every b ∈ B, (H∩ S¯)∩{b}⊕RS← ≠ ∅,
since H ∈ Estb(F). Thus, Lemma 4.25 is applicable which implies that H ∩ S¯ is an (E, S)-match
of F .
Note that k-splittings, on the one hand, divide the search space into smaller fractions in
many cases, but on the other hand this might result in the computation of more stable ex-
tensions which turn out to be “useless” when propagated from the first to the second part of
the split, i.e. they do not contribute to the evaluation of the entire framework. So from the
theoretical side it is not clear how k-splitting effects the computation times. Recently, in [Wong,
2013] an empirical evaluation of the effects of k-splitting on the average computation time was
performed. The results therein provide empirical support for our claim that using k-splittings
can improve the performance of existing algorithms similar to classical splittings as discussed
in Section 4.1.5.
4.3 Splittings for Logic Programs
In an important and much cited paper [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] Vladimir Lifschitz and
Hudson Turner have shown how, under certain conditions, logic programs under answer set
semantics can be split into two disjoint parts, a “bottom" part and a “top" part. The bottom
part can be evaluated independently of the top part. Results of the evaluation, i.e., answer sets
of the bottom part, are then used to simplify the top part. To obtain answer sets of the original
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program one simply has to combine an answer set of the simplified top part with the answer set
which was used to simplify this part. In this section we present a simple generalization of these
results very similar to the generalized splitting results in case of argumentation frameworks
(Theorem 4.28).
We point out that generalizations for logic programs have been investigated in depth
in [Janhunen et al., 2009]. In fact, Janhunen et al. describe an entire rather impressive mo-
dule theory for logic programs based on modules consisting of rules together with input,
output and hidden variables. To a certain extent some of our results can be viewed as being
“implicit" already in that paper. Nevertheless, we believe that the constructions we describe
here complement the abstract theory in a useful manner.
4.3.1 Background: Logic Programs
We briefly introduce the theory of logic programs. Thereby we restrict the discussion to normal
logic programs. Such programs are sets of rules of the form
a ← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn (4.1)
where a and all bi’s and cj’s are atoms. Intuitively, the rule is a justification to “establish” or
“derive” that a (the so called head) is true, if all default literals to the right of ← (the so called
body) are true in the following sense: a non-negated atom bi is true if it has a derivation, a
negated one, not cj, is true if cj does not have one. Variables can appear in rules, however
they are just convenient abbreviations for the collection of their ground instantiations.
The semantics of (ground) normal logic programs [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988; Gelfond
and Lifschitz, 1991] is defined in terms of answer sets, also called stable models for this class
of programs. Programs without negation in the bodies have a unique answer set, namely the
smallest set of atoms closed under the rules. Equivalently, this set can be characterized as
the least model of the rules, reading ← as classical implication and the comma in the body as
conjunction.
For programs with negation in the body, one needs to guess a candidate set of atoms S
and then verifies the choice. This is achieved by evaluating negation with respect to S and
checking whether the “reduced" negation-free program corresponding to this evaluation has S
as answer set. If this is the case, it is guaranteed that all applicable rules were applied, and that
each atom in S has a valid derivation based on appropriate rules. Here is the formal definition:
Definition 4.29. Let P be a normal logic program, S a set of atoms. The Gelfond/Lifschitz-reduct
(GL-reduct) of P and S is the negation-free program PS obtained from P by
1. deleting all rules r ∈ P with not cj in the body for some cj ∈ S,
2. deleting all negated atoms from the remaining rules.
S is an answer set of P iff S is the answer set of PS. We denote the collection of answer sets of
a program P by AS(P).
For convenience we will use rules without head (constraints) of the form
← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn (4.2)
as abbreviation for
f ← not f , b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn (4.3)
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where f is an atom not appearing anywhere else in the program. Adding rule 4.2 to a program
has the effect of eliminating those answer sets of the original program which contain all of the
bis and none of the cjs.
For other types of programs and an introduction to answer set programming, a problem
solving paradigm based on the notion of answer sets, the reader is referred to [Brewka et al.,
2011].
4.3.2 k-Splitting, Conditional Answer Set and Match
A classical splitting S can be defined as a set of atoms dividing a program P into two disjoint
subprograms PS1 and P
S
2 such that no head of a rule in P
S
2 appears anywhere in P
S
1 .
One way to visualize this is via the dependency graph of P. The nodes of the dependency
graph are the atoms in P. In addition, there are two kinds of links, positive and negative
ones: whenever b appears positively (negatively) in a rule with head c, then there is a positive
(negative) link from b to c in the dependency graph. A (proper) splitting S now is a set of
atoms such that the dependency graph has no links - positive or negative - to an atom in S
from any atom outside S.
Now let us consider the situation where a (small) number k of atoms in the heads of rules
in PS2 appear negatively in bodies of P
S
1 . This means that the dependency graph of the program
has a small number of negative links pointing in the wrong direction. As we will see methods
similar to those we used for argumentation can be applied here as well. In the following
head(r) denotes the head of rule r, At(r) the atoms appearing in r and pos(r) (respectively
neg(r)) the positive (respectively negative) atoms in the body of r. We also write head(P) for
the set {head(r) ∣ r ∈ P} and At(P) for {At(r) ∣ r ∈ P}.
Definition 4.30. Let P be a normal logic program. Let S ⊆ At(P), such that for each rule r ∈ P,
head(r) ∈ S implies pos(r) ⊆ S. Furthermore, let S¯ = At(P) ∖ S and VS = {c ∈ S¯ ∣ r ∈ P, head(r) ∈
S, c ∈ neg(r)}. The set S is called a k-splitting if ∣VS∣ = k.
Analogously to AFs where a splitting induces two disjoint sub-frameworks, here the set S
induces two disjoint sub-programs, PS1 having heads in S and P
S
2 having heads in S¯. Whenever∣VS∣ ≠ 0, there are some heads in PS2 which may appear in bodies of PS1 , but only in negated
form. This is not allowed in classical splittings (as defined in [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994])
which thus correspond to 0-splittings.
Note an important distinction between splittings for AFs and for logic programs: an arbi-
trary subset of arguments is an AF splitting, whereas a splitting S for a program P needs to
fulfill the additional requirement that for each rule r ∈ P with its head contained in S, also the
entire positive body stems from S.
Example 4.31. Consider the following simple program
(1) a ← not b
(2) b ← not a
(3) c ← a
The program does not have a (nontrivial) classical splitting. However, it possesses the 1-
splitting S = {a, c} (together with the complementary 1-splitting S¯ = {b}). PS1 consists of rules
(1) and (3), PS2 of rule (2). It is easily verified that VS = {b}.
For the computation of answer sets we proceed in the same spirit as before by adding rules
to PS1 which allow answer sets to contain meta-information about the assumptions which need
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to hold for an answer set. We introduce atoms ndr(b) to express the assumption that b will be
underivable from PS2 .
Definition 4.32. Let P be a normal logic program, let S be a k-splitting of P and let PS1 , respec-
tively PS2 , be the sets of rules in P with heads in S, respectively in S¯. Moreover, let VS be the
set of atoms in S¯ appearing negatively in PS1 .[PS1 ] is the program obtained from PS1 by adding, for each b ∈ VS, the following two rules:(1b) b ← not ndr(b)(2b) ndr(b)← not b
E is called conditional answer set of PS1 iff E is an extension of [PS1 ].
Intuitively, ndr(b) represents the assumption that b is not derivable from PS2 (since b ∈ VS it
cannot be derivable from PS1 anyway). The additional rules allow us to assume b - a condition
which we later need to verify. The construction is similar to the one we used for AFs where it
was possible to assume that an argument is attacked (compare Definition 4.23).
Now, given an answer set E of [PS1 ], we use E to modify PS2 in the following way. We first
use E to simplify PS2 in exactly the same way this was done by Lifschitz and Turner: we replace
atoms in S appearing positively (negatively) in rule bodies of PS2 with true whenever they are
(are not) contained in E. Moreover, we delete each rule with a positive (negative) occurrence of
an S-atom in the body which is not (which is) in E. We call the resulting program E-evaluation
of PS2 . Next we add adequate rules (constraints) which guarantee that answer sets generated
by the modification of PS2 match the conditions expressed in the meta-atoms of E. This is
captured in the following definition:
Definition 4.33. Let P, S, and PS2 be as in Def. 4.32, and let E be a conditional answer set of
PS1 . Let [PS2 ]E, the E-modification of PS2 , be obtained from the E-evaluation of PS2 by adding the
following k rules {← not b ∣ b ∈ E ∩VS}∪ {← b ∣ ndr(b) ∈ E}.
E′ is called (E, S)-match iff E′ is an answer set of [PS2 ]E.
4.3.3 Generalized Splitting Theorem
Now we can verify that answer sets of P can be obtained by computing an answer set E1 of [PS1 ]
and an answer set E2 of the E1-modification of PS2 (we just have to eliminate the meta-atoms
in E1).
Theorem 4.34. Let P be a normal logic program and let S be a quasi-splitting of P.
1. If E is a conditional answer set of PS1 and F an (E, S)-match, then (E∩ S)∪ F is an answer set of
P.
2. If H is an answer set of P, then there is a set X ⊆ {ndr(a) ∣ a ∈ VS} such that E = (H ∩ S)∪X is
a conditional answer set of PS1 and H ∩ S¯ is an (E, S)-match of P.
Proof. Thanks to the richer syntax of logic programs compared to AFs, the proof of this result
is conceptually simpler than the one for Theorem 4.28. We sketch the proof which is done in
two main steps.
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First, given a normal program P and S a quasi-splitting of P, define the program PS =[PS1 ]∪ PS2 ∪ {← not b′, b; ← b′, ndr(b) ∣ b ∈ VS} where PS2 results from PS2 by replacing each atom
s ∈ S¯ with a fresh atom s′. One can show that P and PS are equivalent in the following sense:
(1) if E is an answer set of P then X = (E∩ S)∪ {s′ ∣ s ∈ E∩ S¯}∪ {ndr(s) ∣ s ∈ VS ∖ E} is an answer
set of PS; in particular, by the definition of X and VS ⊆ S¯, we have, for each s ∈ VS, s′ ∈ X iff
s ∈ X iff ndr(s) /∈ X; (2) if H is an answer set of PS, then (H ∩ S)∪ {s ∣ s′ ∈ H} is an answer set of
P.
Next, we observe that PS has a proper split T with T = S∪ {ndr(s) ∣ s ∈ VS}. With this result
at hand, it can be shown that after evaluating the bottom part of this split, i.e. (PS)T1 = [PS1 ], the
rules {← not b′, b; ← b′, ndr(b) ∣ b ∈ VS} in PS play exactly the role of the replacements defined
in [PS2 ]E. In other words, we have for each E ∈ AS((PS)T1 ) = AS([PS1 ]), the E-evaluation of(PS)T2 is equal to ([PS2 ]E)′, where ([PS2 ]E)′ denotes [PS2 ]E replacing all atoms s by s′. Together
with the above relation between answer sets of P and PS the assertion is now shown in a quite
straightforward way.
Example 4.35 (Example 4.31 continued). To determine the conditional answer sets of PS1 we
use the program
(1) a ← not b(3) c ← a(1b) b ← not ndr(b)(2b) ndr(b)← not b
This program has two answer sets, namely E1 = {a, c, ndr(b)} and E2 = {b}.
The E1-modification of PS2 consists of the single rule ← b and its single answer set ∅ is an(S, E1)-match. We thus obtain the first answer set of P, namely (E1 ∩ S)∪∅ = {a, c}.
The E2-modification of PS2 is the program:
b← not b
Its single answer set {b} is an (S, E2)-match. We thus obtain the second answer set of P, namely(E2 ∩ S)∪ {b} = {b}.
Of course, the example is meant to illustrate the basic ideas, not to show the potential
computational benefits of our approach. However, if we find a k-splitting with small k for
large programs with hundreds of rules such benefits may be tremendous.
As the thoughtful reader may have recognized our results are stated for normal logic pro-
grams while Lifschitz and Turner define splittings for the more general class of disjunctive
programs. However, our results can be extended to disjunctive programs in a straightforward
way.
4.4 Conclusions and Related Work
Splitting results in nonmonotonic formalisms have a long tradition. On the one hand, these
results can be used to improve existing computational procedures, and on the other hand
they yield deeper theoretical insights into how a nonmonotonic approach works. In the 90’s
splitting results for autoepistemic logic [Gelfond and Przymusinska, 1992], logic programs
[Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] and default theory [Turner, 1996] were established.
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In this chapter we presented similar splitting results for argumentation frameworks and
convey some ideas to normal logic programs generalizing results in [Lifschitz and Turner,
1994]. Most of the presented results are already published in [Baumann, 2011; Baumann
et al., 2011; Baumann et al., 2012]. An unpublished and very exciting result is the general
relation between universally definedness, the splitting property and the directionality principle
as stated in Theorem 4.13. The study of such general relations, i.e. abstracting away from the
concrete semantics, contributes to a better understanding of the universe of argumentation
semantics and continues the line of abstract analysis initiated in [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007].
We mention two works in the line of decomposition-based computation of extensions,
namely [Baroni et al., 2005] and [Liao et al., 2011]. In the first one a general recursive
schema for argumentation semantics were introduced. Furthermore they have shown that
all admissibility-based semantics was covered by this definition. The great benefit of this ap-
proach is that the extensions of an AF F can be incrementally constructed by the extensions
along its strongly connected components. In this sense our results are certainly related to the
SCC-approach but there are some important differences on the technical level. Furthermore,
we generalized our results, such that the parts into which an AF is split may be, but do not
necessarily have to be SCCs. The second work by Liao et al. is very similar to our classical
splitting approach both published in 2011. The paper addresses the problem of reconstructing
the set of extensions of an AF F by computing and combining the extensions of certain subfra-
meworks. They distinguish between “Dung-style sub-frameworks” which are unattacked by
other subframeworks and “quasi sub-frameworks” which are attacked by arguments of other
sub-frameworks. Finally, they group sub-frameworks in layers such that the sub-frameworks
in a given layer are only restricted by sub-frameworks in lower layers and describe how to
evaluate the different layers incrementally such that the extensions of the unpartitioned AF are
reconstructable.
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Notions of Equivalence and
Replacement
In general, equivalence tells us whether two syntactically different objects represent the same
information - which is relevant, for instance, for simplification issues. In monotonic forma-
lisms, there is usually one standard notion of equivalence which serves this purpose as well as
the purpose of “equivalence for replacement”, where one asks whether a replacement of equi-
valent objects within a larger one, does not change the meaning of the latter. For nonmonotonic
formalisms these two purposes require, in general, different notions of equivalence, Take as an
example logic programs under stable model semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988]. The two
programs P1 = {a} and P2 = {a ← not b} have the same stable model, namely {a}. However,
if P1 and P2 are later extended with the fact b, then the stable models will no longer coincide:
we obtain {a, b} for the former, {b} for the latter. This observation led to the investigation of
stronger equivalence notions for logic programs [Lifschitz et al., 2001], and more recently also
for argumentation.
Oikarinen and Woltran introduced the notion of strong equivalence for abstract AFs [Oikari-
nen and Woltran, 2011]. Two AFs F and G are strongly equivalent if for any AF H, F conjoined
with H and G conjoined with H possess the same extensions. From now on, for the sake of
clarity we will use the term expansion equivalence instead of strong equivalence since any kind of
expansions are allowed. The powerful notion of expansion equivalence was the starting point
for our research. However, for several typical argumentation scenarios expansion equivalence
seems too strong a notion. Just like in the case of other nonmonotonic formalisms where
further equivalence notions in-between strong and standard equivalence were motivated, de-
fined and studied (see [Woltran, 2010] for an excellent overview) we looked for corresponding
notions for AFs which take the very nature of argumentation into account. For instance, let
us consider a reasoning process about defeasible information stored in a knowledge base as
illustrated in Figure 1.1. What happens on the abstract level if a new piece of information is
added? It turns out that older arguments and their corresponding attacks survive and only
new arguments which may interact with the previous ones arise. This means, in contrast to
Oikarinen and Woltran which studied equivalence with respect to arbitrary expansions we
are interested in equivalence relations with respect to specific expansions where the attack
relationship between former arguments remains unchanged. Such kinds of dynamic scenarios
correspond to the already defined concepts of normal or strong expansions firstly introduced
in [Baumann and Brewka, 2010].
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As a valuable tool for deciding expansion equivalence, Oikarinen and Woltran introduced
the notion of a kernel of an AF. Informally speaking, kernels are frameworks without redun-
dant attacks. The significant insight of [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] was that expansion
equivalence for most semantics is exactly captured by syntactical equivalence of suitably cho-
sen notions of kernels. All kernels found so far differed only in case where self-loops are
permitted; in other words, if self-loops are omitted it turns out that each framework is its own
kernel (a related observation for graph problems in general was given independently at the
same time in [Lonc and Truszczyn´ski, 2011]).
In this chapter we present characterization theorems with respect to normal and strong ex-
pansion equivalence and the ten prominent semantics considered in this thesis, namely stable,
semi-stable, stage, preferred, admissible, complete, grounded, ideal, eager and naive seman-
tics. Except for naive semantics, we will present kernel-based, i.e. purely syntactical charac-
terizations of the mentioned equivalence notions. Depending on the semantics we either use
already existing kernels or we have to introduce novel and more involved kernel definitions.
Furthermore, we consider local equivalence with respect to stage semantics as well as weak
expansion equivalence for stable and preferred semantics.
One main result is that expansion equivalence coincides with normal expansion equiva-
lence for all considered semantics. Even more surprisingly we will see that stage, stable, semi-
stable, eager and naive semantics do not “distinguish” between normal expansion and strong
expansion equivalence. Both results are quite unexpected since the class of strong (normal)
expansions is obviously a proper subset of the class of normal (arbitrary) expansions.
5.1 Recapitulation: Expansion Equivalence
As already mentioned in Section 2.1.5 as well as illustrated in Example 2.15 standard equi-
valence of two AFs is not sufficient for their mutual replaceability in dynamic argumentation
scenarios. That means, possessing the same extensions does not guarantee to share the same
acceptable sets of arguments with respect to all expansions. Expansion equivalence guarantees
inter-substitutability in any dynamical scenario by definition. We briefly summarize concepts
and results firstly presented in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] since they are frequently used
throughout the whole chapter.
5.1.1 σ-Kernel
One main result in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] is that expansion equivalence can be decided
via so-called kernels. A kernel of an AF F is itself an AF obtained from F by deleting certain
attacks based on the actual structure of the given AF but without computing extensions or
any related semantical objects. This makes kernels a purely syntactical — and thus efficiently
computable — concept.
Here are the relevant kernel definitions.
Definition 5.1. Given a semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad, gr, co} and an AF F = (A, R). We define the
σ-kernel of F as F k(σ) = (A, Rk(σ)) where
1. Rk(stb) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a) ∈ R},
2. Rk(ad) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a) ∈ R,{(b, a), (b, b)}∩ R ≠ ∅},
3. Rk(gr) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (b, b) ∈ R,{(a, a), (b, a)}∩ R ≠ ∅},
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4. Rk(co) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R}.
For the purpose of illustration we present the following minimalistic example.
Example 5.2. Consider the AF F and its corresponding stable-kernel F k(stb) and grounded-
kernel F k(gr).
aF ∶ b aF k(stb) ∶ b aF k(gr) ∶ b
Figure 5.1: Stable and Grounded Kernel of F
We want to mention three simple properties applying to any σ-kernel defined so far (as
well as all novel kernel definitions which will be introduced in the following): First, F andF k(σ) share exactly the same arguments. Second, the attack-relation of F k(σ) is contained in
the attack-relation of F and third, the kernel operation is idempotent, i.e. F k(σ) = (F k(σ))k(σ).
5.1.2 Characterization Theorems
A kernel characterizes an equivalence relation as follows: two AFs are equivalent if and only
if their corresponding kernels are identical. In other words, the kernel detects the redundant
attacks with respect to a certain kind of expansion and semantics.
We list now some non-trivial results showing relations between the syntactical concept
of σ-kernels and semantically defined equivalence relations.1 The main aim of the rest of
the chapter is to develop similar characterization theorems for normal and strong expansion
equivalence with respect to all semantics considered in this thesis.
Lemma 5.3. For any AF F and σ ∈ {stb, ad, gr, co}, F ≡σ F k(σ).
Lemma 5.4. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {stb, ad, gr, co} the following holds:
If F k(σ) = Gk(σ), then (F ∪H)k(σ) = (G ∪H)k(σ) for all AFs H.
Theorem 5.5. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {stb, ad, gr, co}:
F k(σ) = Gk(σ)⇔ F ≡σE G.
Theorem 5.6. For any AFs F and G:
F k(co) = Gk(co)⇔ F k(ad) = Gk(ad) and F k(gr) = Gk(gr).
Theorem 5.7. For any AFs F and G the following holds:
F ≡adE G⇔ F ≡prE G⇔ F ≡idE G⇔ F ≡ssE G⇔ F ≡egE G.
1The following lemmata and theorems are mainly taken from [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. Lemma 5.3 summa-
rizes Lemmata 1, 4, 6 and 10 in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. Likewise, Lemma 5.4 is a summary of Lemmata 2, 5, 7
and 11. Furthermore, Theorem 1 combines Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4. Theorem 5.6 and Theorem 5.7 correspond directly
with Theorem 5 or Theorem 2 in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011], respectively. The last Theorem 5.8 corresponds to
Theorem 2 in [Gaggl and Woltran, 2011].
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Theorem 5.8. For any AFs F and G:
F ≡stbE G⇔ F ≡stgE G.
Consider again Example 5.2. In case of stable semantics we may delete attacks from self-
attacking arguments and still retain the same extensions (F ≡stb F k(stb), Lemma 5.3). Due to
the idempotency of stb-kernel even the same extensional behavior with respect to arbitrary
expansions is guaranteed (F ≡stb⪯ F k(stb), Theorem 5.5). In case of grounded semantics the
conditions under which an attack (a, b) is redundant in the light of dynamics differ, namely:
First, a and b are self-attacking or second, if b is self-defeating and counterattacks a. The latter
is the case in Example 5.2.
5.2 Characterizing Strong Expansion Equivalence
In this section we will characterize strong expansion equivalence with respect to the ten se-
mantics considered in this thesis. Analogously to the characterization of expansion equivalence
(compare Section 5.1.2) we provide syntactical criteria to decide this notion of equivalence. In
some cases we have to introduce more involved kernel definitions, so-called σ-*-kernels which
allow more deletions than their counterparts for expansion equivalence. The main results can
be summarized as follows:
• Strong expansion equivalence with respect to stable and stage semantics coincide and
can be decided by the already defined stb-kernel [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. This
means, in case of these semantics, expansion and strong expansion equivalence coincide.
• In case of semi-stable and eager semantics we observe a similar behaviour. Both notions
coincide and are characterizable via the ad-kernel [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. Thus,
there is no difference between expansion and strong expansion equivalence.
• The concepts of strong expansion equivalence with respect to admissible, preferred and
ideal semantics coincide and can be adequately described by the newly introduced ad-*-
kernel. Expansion equivalence with respect to these semantics implies strong expansion
equivalence but not vice versa.
• The characterization of strong expansion equivalence with respect to grounded and com-
plete semantics was the most difficult part. These notions can be decided by the newly
introduced gr-*- or co-*-kernel, respectively. Both concepts are weaker than their corres-
ponding expansion equivalence notions.
• Finally, possessing the same naive extensions and sharing the same arguments is suffi-
cient and necessary for strong expansion equivalence with respect to naive semantics.
5.2.1 Splitting Results: A Tool for Simplifying Proofs
In Chapter 4 we presented splitting results for argumentation frameworks as well as logic
programs. In general, splitting results are concerned with the question whether it is possible
to divide a formal theory T in disjoint subtheories S1,...,Sn such that the formal semantics of
the entire theory T can be obtained by constructing the semantics of S1,...,Sn. Such results,
especially in nonmonotonic formalisms [Gelfond and Przymusinska, 1992; Lifschitz and Tur-
ner, 1994; Turner, 1996; Baumann, 2011], are of great importance since first, they allow for
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simplification of proofs showing properties of a particular formalism and second, they may
yield more efficient computations. In the following we will use splitting results for AFs as a
tool for simplification.
An ongoing task in this section is the question whether it is possible to find an AF H such
that, given two AFs F and G, the semantics of F ∪H and G ∪H do not coincide. The difficulty
is that we usually have very limited information about the AFs F and G.
Example 5.9. Consider the following AFs F and G. We have A(F) = A(G) = {a, b, c}∪ B where
B is a (possibly empty) set of further arguments. Furthermore, R(F) = {(a, b), (b, b), (b, c)}∪ R
and R(G) = {(a, b), (b, b)}∪S where R and S represent possible but unknown attacks (indicated
by dashed arrows).
aF ∶ b c B aG ∶ b c B
Figure 5.2: Partially Known AFs
Since we have only partial information about the AFs we cannot compute/compare their
extensions. For instance, in case of B = ∅ we deduce Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a, c}}, i.e. they
possess the same preferred extension. Consider now the AFs F ∪H and G ∪H where H =(A(F)∪ {d},{(d, a)}∪ {(d, b) ∣ b ∈ B}). Observe that F ∪H and G ∪H are strong expansions ofF or G, respectively.
aF ∪H ∶ b c
d
B
S1 S2
aG ∪H ∶ b c
d
B
Figure 5.3: Strong Expansion and Classical Splitting
Using splitting results for AFs (Theorem 4.10) we are able to compute the extensions of the
partially known AFs F ∪H and G ∪H in an iterative way. The procedure is as follows (consider
Section 4.1 for detailed information): We split the initial AFs into two subframeworks, namelyF1 = G1 = ({d},∅) and F2 = F or G2 = G, respectively (indicated by the dashed lines S1 and
S2). We then take the unique preferred extension {d} of F1 and G1 to reduce the AFs F2 or G2,
respectively. In this case, “reducing” quite simply means deleting all arguments attacked by d.
The following AFs F{d}2 and G{d}2 illustrate these reducts. Note that these reducts are uniquely
determined!
bF{d}2 ∶ c bG{d}2 ∶ c
Figure 5.4: Uniquely Determined Reducts
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We now compute the preferred extensions of the reduced AFs, namely Epr(F{d}2 ) = {∅} andEpr(G{d}2 ) = {{c}}. Finally, the preferred extensions of F ∪H and G ∪H can be obtained by com-
bining {d} and ∅ or {c}, respectively. That means, {{d}} = Epr(F ∪H) ≠ Epr(G ∪H) = {{c, d}}.
In summary, we have shown that the partially known AFs F and G have strong expansions
which possess different preferred and hence, semi-stable and ideal extensions (Proposition
2.10) as well as admissible and complete extensions (Proposition 2.17).
5.2.2 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Stable and Stage Semantics
In case of stable and stage semantics it is already shown [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011; Gaggl
and Woltran, 2011] that attacks (a, b) where a is a self-attacking argument do not contribute in
the evaluation of an AF F , no matter how F is extended. Furthermore the syntactical equi-
valence of stb-kernels, which “delete” such attacks of a given AF, is necessary and sufficient
for expansion equivalence between two AFs (Theorems 5.5, 5.8). Since the classes of strong
and arbitrary expansions are in a proper subset relation we suspected that there are strong
expansion equivalent AFs which are not expansion equivalent. The construction of such an
example failed and we tried to prove that even strong expansion equivalence between two AFs
is fulfilled if and only if they possess the same stb-kernels. The following theorem proves this
conjecture.
Theorem 5.10. For any AFs F and G,
F k(stb) = Gk(stb)⇔ F ≡stbS G⇔ F ≡stgS G.
Proof. Let σ ∈ {stb, stg}. Throughout the proof we will use that possessing at least one stable
extension is sufficient for the agreement of stable and stage semantics (Proposition 2.9). Mo-
reover, we only have to show that F ≡σS G ⇒ F k(st) = Gk(stb) holds since F k(stb) = Gk(stb) ⇒F ≡σE G ⇒ F ≡σN G ⇒ F ≡σS G is given by Theorems 5.5, 5.8 and statement 1 of Proposition 2.18.
We will prove this implication by contraposition.
Suppose F k(stb) ≠ Gk(stb). 1st case: Consider A (F k(stb)) ≠ A (Gk(stb)). Consequently, wi-
thout loss of generality there exists an argument a ∈ A(F) ∖ A(G). Let c be a fresh argument
and B = A(F ∪G)∖ {a}. We define
H = (B ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ B}) .
If a is contained in some E ∈ Eσ(F ∪H), then E ∉ Eσ(G ∪H) since a ∉ A(G ∪H) was sup-
posed. If not, consider H′ = H ∪ ({a},∅). Then, E = {a, c} is a stable extension in G ∪H′ and
therefore, E ∈ Eσ(G ∪H′). Furthermore, E ∉ Eσ(F ∪H′) since F ∪H′ = F ∪H holds. Conse-
quently, F /≡σS G is shown.
2nd case: Consider A (F k(stb)) = A (Gk(stb)) and R (F k(stb)) ≠ R (Gk(stb)). Hence, there are
a, b ∈ A(F), such that (a, b) ∈ R (F k(stb)) /R (Gk(stb)). Let c be a fresh argument. We define
I = (A(F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A(F)/{a, b}}) .
Case 2.1: Let a = b, therefore (a, a) ∈ R (F k(stb)) /R (Gk(stb)) and consequently, (a, a) ∈
R(F)/R(G) because self-loops remain the same after applying the kernel-operator. Obviously,Estb(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} and thus, {a, c} ∈ Estg(G ∪ I). On the other hand, {a, c} ∉ c f (F ∪ I) and
therefore, {a, c} ∉ Eσ(F ∪ I). This means, F /≡σS G is shown. Thus from now on we assume that
R (F k(stb)) and R (Gk(stb)) contain the same self-loops.
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Case 2.2: Let a ≠ b. Since (a, b) ∈ R (F k(stb)) /R (Gk(stb)), it follows that (a, b) ∈ R(F),(a, a) ∉ R(F), consequently (a, a) ∉ R(G) and (a, b) ∉ R(G). First, we assume (b, b) ∉ R(F).
Thus, (b, b) ∉ R(G). In any case {a, c} ∈ Estb(F ∪ I) and consequently, {a, c} ∈ Estg(F ∪ I). On
the other hand, we state {a, c} ∉ Estg(G ∪ I) because {{a, b, c}} = Estb(G ∪ I) if (b, a) ∉ R(G) and{{b, c}} = Estb(G ∪ I) if (b, a) ∈ R(G). Second, let (b, b) ∈ R(F). Consequently, (b, b) ∈ R(G). In
contrast to the other cases the AF I does not enforce different stage extensions (but it works
for stable semantics since Estb(F ∪ I) = {{a, c}} ≠ ∅ = Estb(G ∪ I)). In particular, Estg(F ∪ I) =Estg(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} independently of the occurrence of the attack (b, a) in F or G. We defineS = (A(F)∪ {c, d},{(e, f ) ∣ e ∈ {c, d}∧ f ∈ A(F)∖ {a, b}}∪ {(c, d), (d, a), (d, c)}) .
For the purpose of illustration we omit further arguments different from a, b, c and d. Bear in
mind that these arguments are attacked by c and d. The dashed arrows reflect the situation
that (b, a) may or not be in R(F) or R(G).
a b
c d
F ∪S ∶ a b
c d
G ∪S ∶
Note that b ∉ R+G∪S(E) for any set E ∈ c f (G ∪S). Since R+G∪S({d}) = A(G ∪S) ∖ {b} we
deduce {d} ∈ Estg(G ∪S). On the other hand, R+F∪S({d}) = A(F ∪S) ∖ {b} ⊂ A(F ∪S) =
R+F∪S({a, c}). Consequently, {d} ∉ Estg(F ∪S) is shown. Thus, F /≡stgS G as well as F /≡stbS G
concluding the proof.
5.2.3 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Semi-Stable and Eager Semantics
Semi-stable semantics is, as the name suggests, very close to stable semantics. It can be shown
that any stable extension is semi-stable and furthermore, if there is at least one stable extension
then the set of stable and semi-stable extensions coincide (compare Propositions 2.7, 2.9). In
spite of these similarities the characterizing kernels of the correspondent expansion equiva-
lence notions differ. Oikarinen and Woltran showed that instead of the stb-kernel the equality
of the more restrictive ad-kernel of two AFs adequately determine expansion equivalence with
respect to semi-stable semantics (compare Theorems 5.5, 5.7). Apart from this, the following
theorem states a similar result to Theorem 5.10, namely that the equality of the ad-kernels of
two AFs is even necessary for their strong expansion equivalence with respect to semi-stable
semantics. Interestingly, in contrast to expansion equivalence the ad-kernel does not serve as a
uniform characterization for strong expansion equivalence with respect to admissible, prefer-
red, ideal, semi-stable and eager semantics. Only semi-stable and eager semantics are captured
by this kernel as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 5.11. For any AFs F and G,
F k(ad) = Gk(ad)⇔ F ≡ssS G⇔ F ≡egS G.
Proof. Let τ ∈ {ss, eg}. Observe that Theorems 5.5, 5.7 and statement 1 of Proposition 2.18
guarantee F k(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇒ F ≡τS G. Hence, it suffices to show that F k(ad) = Gk(ad) is implied
by F ≡τS G. We show the contrapositive.
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Assume F k(ad) ≠ Gk(ad). We have to show F /≡τS G which we do by case analysis. In
almost all cases (except for the case 2.2.4) we even prove that, given the assumption, F /≡σS G
for every σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg}. This can be shown without extra effort.2 1st case: Assume
A (F k(ad)) ≠ A (Gk(ad)). Hence, A (F) ≠ A (G) is implied and without loss of generality there
exists an argument a ∈ A (F) ∖ A (G). Let c be a fresh argument, i.e. c ∉ A(F ∪G) and B =
A(F ∪G)∖ {a}. We define H = (B ∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ B}) .
Given σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg}. If a is contained in some E ∈ Eσ(F ∪H), then E ∉ Eσ(G ∪H)
follows since a ∉ A(G ∪H) was supposed. If not, consider H′ =H∪ ({a},∅). Applying splitting
results (compare Section 5.2.1) it follows that E = {a, c} is the unique preferred extension ofG ∪H′. Consequently, E is admissible in G ∪H′ and the unique semi-stable, ideal and eager
extension of G ∪H′ (Proposition 2.10). On the other hand, E ∉ Eσ(F ∪H′) since F ∪H′ = F ∪H
holds. This means, F /≡σS G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg} is shown since F and G combined with H
or H′ are strong expansions of F and G.
2nd case: Consider now R (F k(ad)) ≠ R (Gk(ad)) and A (F k(ad)) = A (Gk(ad)). Note that
A (F) = A (G) is implied and furthermore, without loss of generality we may assume the
existence of arguments a, b ∈ A (F), such that (a, b) ∈ R (F k(ad)) ∖ R (Gk(ad)). Let c be a fresh
argument, i.e. c ∉ A (F). Furthermore we define
I = (A (F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}) .
Case 2.1: Assume a = b. Therefore (a, a) ∈ R (F k(ad)) ∖ R (Gk(ad)) and consequently (a, a) ∈
R(F) ∖ R(G) by definition of the ad-kernel. It can be checked (splitting results, Section 5.2.1)
that Epr(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} and Epr(F ∪ I) = {{c}}. Hence, F ∪ I /≡σ G ∪ I for σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg}
can be obtained (Propositions 2.10, 2.17) and therefore, F /≡σS G is shown. Thus from now on
we assume that R (F k(ad)), R (Gk(ad)), R(F) and R(G) contain the same self-loops.
Case 2.2: Let a ≠ b. Since (a, b) ∈ R (F k(ad)) ∖ R (Gk(ad)), it follows (a, b) ∈ R(F). Now
we have to distinguish four cases with respect to the presence or absence of the self-loops(a, a) and (b, b). Case 2.2.1: Assume (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F). This case is impossible because the
definition of the ad-kernel (Definition 5.1) enforce the deletion of (a, b) in R (F k(ad)). Case
2.2.2: Consider (a, a) ∈ R(F) and (b, b) ∉ R(F). We observe that (b, a) ∉ R(F) holds by
kernel definition. Hence, Epr(F ∪ I) = {{c}} (splitting results, Section 5.2.1). For G three
cases arise. First, (a, b) ∈ R(G) and consequently (b, a) ∈ R(G) because of the assumption(a, b) ∉ R (Gk(ad)). Second and third, (a, b) ∉ R(G) and (b, a) may or may not be in R(G).
Using splitting results (compare Section 5.2.1) it can be checked that Epr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}
holds. Thus, using Propositions 2.10, 2.17 we obtain F /≡σS G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg}. Case
2.2.3: Let (a, a), (b, b) ∉ R(F). We deduce (a, b) ∉ G since (a, a) ∉ R(G) and (a, b) ∉ R (Gk(ad))
was assumed. We have to distinguish four sub-cases with respect to the presence or absence
of (b, a). Suppose (b, a) ∉ R(F). Hence, Epr(F ∪ I) = {{a, c}}. If (b, a) ∉ R(G), Epr(G ∪ I) ={{a, b, c}}. If not, Epr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}. In both cases Epr(F ∪ I) ≠ Epr(G ∪ I) holds. Consider
now (b, a) ∈ R(F). It can be checked that Epr(F ∪ I) = {{a, c},{b, c}}. Note that these sets
are stable and therefore semi-stable extensions too. Furthermore, {c} is admissible in F ∪ I
and equals {a, c} ∩ {b, c}. This means, Eeg(F ∪ I) = Eid(F ∪ I) = {{c}}. Again, if (b, a) ∉ R(G),Epr(G ∪ I) = {{a, b, c}}. If not, Epr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}. Hence, in all cases F ∪ I /≡σ G ∪ I for
σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg}. Thus, F /≡σS G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, ss, id, eg} is shown. Case 2.2.4: Consider
2We will use these results in Section 5.3.2 to prove that the ad-kernel adequately describes normal expansion
equivalence with respect to admissible, preferred and ideal semantics.
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(a, a) ∉ R(F) and (b, b) ∈ R(F). As described at the very beginning of the proof this sub-case
is the decisive point where only semi-stable and eager semantics behave “well” with respect to
the ad-kernel. This means, we will only show that F and G are not strong expansion equivalent
with respect to semi-stable and eager semantics. In contrast to the other cases the AF I does
not do the trick, i.e. F ∪ I and G ∪ I do not necessarily possess different semi-stable and eager
extensions. We therefore consider the AF S already used in Theorem 5.10.
S = (A (F)∪ {c, d},{(e, f ) ∣ e ∈ {c, d}∧ f ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}∪ {(c, d), (d, a), (d, c)}) .
The following figure illustrates F ∪S and G ∪S . Note that (a, b) ∉ R(G) is implied since (a, b) ∉
R (Gk(ad)) and (a, a) ∉ R(G) is assumed. Remember that we already observed that in this case(b, a) may or not be in R(F) or R(G). The dashed arrows reflect this situation. The capital
letter B is an abbreviation for the arguments in A (F)∖{a, b}. Furthermore we left out possible
attacks between B and {a, b} since they are not important as we will see.
a b
c d
B
F ∪S ∶
a b
c d
B
G ∪S ∶
First notice that Ead(F ∪S) = Ead(G ∪S) = {∅,{a, c},{c},{d}}. Remember that semi-stable ex-
tensions are admissible too. It turns out that {d} ∈ Ess(G ∪S) and {d} ∉ Ess(F ∪S) holds.
This can be seen as follows: In both AFs the ranges of {d} are identical, i.e. R+F∪S({d}) =
R+G∪S({d}) = A(F ∪S) ∖ {b}. Since R+F∪S({a, c}) = A(F ∪S) we deduce {d} ∉ Ess(F ∪S)
by definition of the semi-stable semantics. On the other hand, for any set E ∈ Ead(G ∪S),
b ∉ R+G∪S(E) because b ∉ E and (E, b) ∉ R(G ∪S). Hence, R+G∪S({d}) /⊂ R+G∪S(E). Conse-
quently, {d} ∈ Ess(G ∪S) is shown and thus F /≡ssS G. More generally, one may easily check that{{a, c}} = Ess(F ∪S) and {{c},{d}} = Ess(G ∪S). Thus, Eeg(F ∪S) = {{a, c}} ≠ {∅} = Eeg(G ∪S).
Altogether, F /≡egS G concluding the proof.
5.2.4 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Admissible, Preferred and Ideal
Semantics
A special feature of strong expansions is that a former attack between old arguments will never
become a counterattack to an added attack. In this sense, former attacks do not play a role with
respect to being a potential defender of an added argument. Hence, in contrast to arbitrary
expansions where such attacks might be relevant we may delete them without changing the
behavior with respect to further evaluations. In the last two subsections we proved that in case
of stable, stage, semi-stable and eager semantics there are no further redundant attacks if we
consider strong expansion equivalence. In case of admissible, preferred and ideal semantics
the situation becomes different. Consider the following example.
Example 5.12. The AFs F and G are not expansion equivalent with respect to admissible,
preferred and ideal semantics since their corresponding ad-kernels F k(ad)(= F) and Gk(ad)(= G)
are different.
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aF ∶ b c aG ∶ b c
Figure 5.5: Non-Expansion Equivalent AFs
One possible scenario which makes the predicted different behaviour explicit is the follo-
wing where H = ({b, c, d},{(b, d), (d, c)}). Observe that {{a, d}} = Eσ(F ∪H) ≠ {∅} = Eσ(G ∪H)
for σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}.
aF ∪H ∶ b c
d
aG ∪H ∶ b c
d
Figure 5.6: A Possible Scenario
Note that the already existing attack (a, b) in F becomes a defending attack of the newly
added argument d in the augmented argumentation scenario F ∪H. This means, such attacks
in fact play an important role with respect to further evaluation in case of arbitrary expansions.
It is the main result of this section showing that AFs like F and G are strong expansion
equivalent with respect to admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. This means, in particular,
the attack (a, b) in F is redundant with respect to strong expansions and their evaluations.3
Here is the first novel kernel definition, the so-called admissible-*-kernel which (as we shall
see) adequately describes strong expansion equivalence with respect to admissible, preferred
and ideal semantics.
Definition 5.13. Given a an AF F = (A, R). We define the admissible-*-kernel of F as F k∗(ad) =(A, Rk∗(ad)) where
Rk
∗(ad) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, ((a, a) ∈ R ∧ {(b, a), (b, b)}∩ R ≠ ∅)∨((b, b) ∈ R ∧∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)}∩ R ≠ ∅))}.
The newly introduced kernel “forgets” an attack (a, b) if
1. a is self-attacking and at least one of the attacks (b, a) or (b, b) exists or
2. b is self-defeating and furthermore, for all arguments c which are attacked by b at least
one of the following conditions holds:
i) a attacks c,
ii) c attacks a,
iii) c attacks c or
iv) c attacks b.
3We invite and encourage the reader to try to show that this assertion does not hold.
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The first condition is exactly the same as in case of the ad-kernel (compare Definition 5.1).
The motivation for the second disjunct is the following: At first observe that b cannot be an
element of any conflict-free set. Thus, the attack (a, b) may only be relevant with respect to
the defense of c since we are considering strong expansions. In the first three cases i), ii) and
iii) this relevance becomes unimportant since {a, c} does not even possess conflict-freeness. In
case iv) the redundancy of (a, b) with respect to the defense of c is given by the fact that c
already defends itself against b.
In the following we will prove that two AFs F and G possess the same ad-*-kernel if and
only if they are strong expansion equivalent with respect to admissible, preferred and ideal
semantics. At first we will show that any AF F and its ad-*-kernel possess the same extensions
with respect to the aforementioned semantics.
Lemma 5.14. For any AF F and σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}, F ≡σ F k∗(ad).
Proof. At first we show that F and F k∗(ad) contain the same conflict-free sets, i.e. S ∈ c f (F)
iff S ∈ c f (F k∗(ad)). The if-direction is obvious because R (F k∗(ad)) ⊆ R(F). It suffices to show
that if S ∈ c f (F k∗(ad)), then S ∈ c f (F). Assume not, i.e. there are at least two arguments
a, b ∈ S, such that (a, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(ad)). Consequently, (a, a) ∈ R(F) ∨ (b, b) ∈ R(F) has
to hold. This contradicts the conflict-freeness of S in F k∗(ad) because F k∗(ad) and F share the
same self-loops.
We now prove the result for σ = ad. We have to show that for each S conflict-free in F and
b ∈ S, b is defended by S in F iff b is defended by S in F k∗(ad). Hence, F ≡ad F k∗(ad) is implied.
First, suppose b is defended by S in F , i.e. for each (a, b) ∈ R(F), (S, a) ∈ R(F). Assume now
b is not defended by S in F k∗(ad), i.e. it exists (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(ad)), (S, a) ∉ R (F k∗(ad)). That
means all counter-attacks (c, a) ∈ R(F) have to be deleted. Since S is assumed to be conflict-
free, (c, c) ∉ R(F) and hence, (a, a) ∈ R(F) has to hold. If c = b, then (a, b) ∉ R (F k∗(ad)) because(a, a) ∈ R(F) and (b, a) ∈ R(F) was assumed. Let c ≠ b. It follows {(b, c), (c, b), (b, b), (b, a)} ∩
R(F) ≠ ∅. The first three attacks are impossible because conflict-freeness of S was assumed.
Finally, if (b, a) ∈ R(F), (a, b) ∉ R (F k∗(ad)) follows because (a, a) ∈ R(F) was assumed.
Second, consider b is defended by S in F k∗(ad) and b is not defended by S in F , i.e. it exists(a, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(ad)), (S, a) ∉ R(F). Since (a, b) ∉ R (F k∗(ad)), we deduce (a, a) ∈ R(F)
and (b, b) ∉ R(F) because conflict-freeness of S was assumed. Consequently, (b, a) ∈ R(F)
contradicting the assumption that b is not defended by S in F . This concludes the proof for
admissible semantics. Finally, applying Proposition 2.17, statement 1 the claim is verified for
preferred and ideal semantics.
The following lemma states that, if two AFs F and G possess equal ad-*-kernels, then the
same applies to F ∪H and G ∪H where the latter AFs are strong expansions of the correspon-
ding former ones.
Lemma 5.15. If F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad), then (F ∪H)k∗(ad) = (G ∪H)k∗(ad) for all AFs H which satisfyF ⪯S F ∪H and G ⪯S G ∪H.
Proof. First notice that the assumption F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) implies A (F) = A (F k∗(ad)) =
A (Gk∗(ad)) = A (G). Given an AF H, such that F ⪯S F ∪H and G ⪯S G ∪H is satisfied. Ob-
viously, (F ∪H)k∗(ad) and (G ∪H)k∗(ad) share the same arguments. Hence, it suffices to show
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that R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) = R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Note that F = F ∪H if and only if G = G ∪H.
Hence, in case of equality we have nothing to show because F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) guarantees(F ∪H)k∗(ad) = (G ∪H)k∗(ad). This means, in the following we may assume that F ∪H andG ∪H are indeed strong expansions of F or G. Consequently, R(H)∩ R(F) = R(H)∩ R(G) = ∅
can be assumed (compare Definition 2.13). Let (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)). We will show(a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)) by proof by cases (containedness of a and b in A (F) or A(H)∖A (F)).
Since F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) is assumed, it suffices to consider a ≠ b because the sharing of the same
self-loops of (F ∪H)k∗(ad) and (G ∪H)k∗(ad) is already implied.
1st case: Let a, b ∈ A (F). If (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(ad)), then (a, b) ∈ R (Gk∗(ad)) and (a, b) ∈ R(G) fol-
low. Furthermore (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)) since G ⪯S G ∪H was assumed, i.e. the AF H does
not add relevant (with respect to the deletion of (a,b)) attacks. Assuming (a, b) ∉ R (F k∗(ad))
contradicts (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) because the reason to remove an attack from F ∪H re-
mains untouched. 2nd case: Let a, b ∈ A(H) ∖ A (F). Assume (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)).
Hence, several reasons for removing have to be considered. The first possibility is (a, a) ∈
R(H) ∧ {(b, b), (b, a)} ∩ R(H) ≠ ∅ holds. This implies (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)). The se-
cond one is (b, b) ∈ R(H) ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)} ∩ R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅)
holds. If there is no c in A (G) which is attacked by b we conclude (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad))
contradicting the assumption. So, consider c ∈ A (G) and (b, c) ∈ R(H). Consequently,{(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)}∩R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅ has to hold. The attacks (c, a) and (c, b) are impossible
since G ⪯S G ∪H was assumed. If (a, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (a, c) ∈ R(H) and consequently (a, c) ∈
R(F ∪H) has to hold. If (c, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (c, c) ∈ R(G) and (c, c) ∈ R(F) (since F k∗(ad) =Gk∗(ad) was assumed), therefore (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪H). In all cases, (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)).
3rd case: Let a ∈ A(H) ∖ A (F) and b ∈ A (F). Assume (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Again,
several reasons for removing have to be considered. First consider (a, a) ∈ R(H)∧ (b, b) ∈ R(G).
We conclude (b, b) ∈ R(F) because F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) was assumed, thus (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F ∪H)
holds which contradicts (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)). Note that (a, a) ∈ R(H) ∧ (b, a) ∈ R(G ∪H)
is impossible since G ⪯S G ∪H was assumed. Consider now (b, b) ∈ R(G) ∧ ∀c ((b, c) ∈
R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)} ∩ R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅). We observe (b, b) ∈ R(F). Since (a, b) ∈
R ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) was assumed there exists an argument c ∈ A (F), such that (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧{(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)}∩R(F ∪H) = ∅ holds. Thus, {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩R(G ∪H) = ∅ holds.
Remember that we assumed F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad). If (b, c) ∉ R(G), then (b, c) has to be deleted in
R (F k∗(ad)). But this is impossible since we already concluded (c, c) ∉ R(F) ∧ (c, b) ∉ R(F).
If (b, c) ∈ R(G), then (c, b) ∈ R(G) has to hold since we assumed (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)).
Hence, (b, c) has to be deleted in Gk∗(ad) because (b, b) ∈ R(G) was supposed. This contradicts(b, c) ∈ F k∗(ad) concluding the proof. 4th case: Let a ∈ A (F) and b ∈ A(H) ∖ A (F). Here we
have nothing to show because the assumption (a, b) ∈ R(F ∪H) is impossible since F ⪯S F ∪H
was supposed.
Now we are prepared to show that the syntactical equivalence of ad-*-kernels characterizes
strong expansion equivalence between two AFs F and G with respect to admissible, preferred
and ideal semantics.
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Theorem 5.16. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}:
F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad)⇔ F ≡σS G.
Proof. Let F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad). Given an AF H, such that F ⪯S F ∪H and G ⪯S G ∪H. It
suffices to show that E ∈ Ead(F ∪H) implies E ∈ Ead(G ∪H). Suppose E ∈ Ead(F ∪H). By
Lemma 5.14, E ∈ Ead ((F ∪H)k∗(ad)) and applying Lemma 5.15, E ∈ Ead ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). Finally,
using Lemma 5.14, we derive E ∈ Ead(G ∪H) which concludes the if-direction for admissible
semantics. Proposition 2.17 verifies the result for preferred and ideal semantics too, i.e. F ≡prS G
and F ≡idS G.
We now show that F k∗(ad) ≠ Gk∗(ad) implies F /≡σS G. 1st case: Assume A (F k∗(ad)) ≠
A (Gk∗(ad)). Hence, without loss of generality there exists an argument a ∈ A (F) ∖ A (G).
We define H = ((A (F)∪ A (G))∖ {a},∅). Consider the existence of a set E, such that E ∈Eσ(F ∪H) and a ∈ E. Consequently, E ∉ Eσ(G ∪H) holds. Assume now that for all extensions
E ∈ Eσ(F ∪H), a ∉ E. We define H′ = H ∪ ({a},∅). Hence, F ∪H = F ∪H′ and therefore, for all
extensions E ∈ Eσ(F ∪H′), a ∉ E holds. We observe {a} ∈ Ead(G ∪H′) and furthermore, for each
E ∈ Epr(G ∪H′), a ∈ E holds since a is unattacked in G ∪H′. This implies that a is contained in
the unique ideal extension of G ∪H′. In all cases, F /≡σS G.
2nd case: Consider now R (F k∗(ad)) ≠ R (Gk∗(ad)) and A (F k∗(ad)) = A (Gk∗(ad)) (= A (F) =
A (G)). Hence, without loss of generality there exists a, b ∈ A (F), such that (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(ad))∖
R (Gk∗(ad)). Let c be a new argument, i.e. c ∉ A (F). Furthermore we define
I = (A (F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}) .
Case 2.1: Assume a = b. This means (a, a) ∈ R (F k∗(ad)) ∖ R (Gk∗(ad)) and consequently(a, a) ∈ R(F) ∖ R(G) by the definition of the ad-*-kernel (Definition 5.13). It can be checked
(splitting results, Section 5.2.1) that {a, c} is an admissible and the unique preferred extension
of G ∪ I. Hence, it follows that {a, c} has to be the unique ideal extension of G ∪ I (Proposition
2.10). On the other hand, we have {a, c} ∉ Eσ(F ∪ I) for σ ∈ {ad, pr, id} since (a, a) ∈ R(F)
was assumed. Thus from now on we assume that any self-loop is either contained in both
R (F k∗(ad)) and R (Gk∗(ad)) or in none of them.
Case 2.2: Let a ≠ b, i.e. (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(ad)) ∖ R (Gk∗(ad)) and (a, b) ∈ R(F). Now we
have to distinguish four cases for the presence or absence of attack (a, a) and (b, b). Keep
in mind that R(F), R(G), R (F k∗(ad)) and R (Gk∗(ad)) contain the same self-loops. Case 2.2.1:(a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F). This case is impossible because the definition of the ad-*-kernel enforce
the deletion of (a, b) in R (F k∗(ad)). Case 2.2.2: (a, a), (b, b) ∉ R(F). Note that (a, b) ∉ R(G)
holds because a and b do not exhibit self-loops and (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(ad)) was assumed. The
attack (b, a) may or may not be an element of R(F) or R(G). The following results can be
checked by using splitting results (compare Section 5.2.1). If (b, a) ∉ R(F), then {{a, c}} =Eσ(F ∪ I) for any σ ∈ {pr, id}. If not, i.e. (b, a) ∈ R(F), then {{a, c},{b, c}} = Epr(F ∪ I) and{{c}} = Eid(F ∪ I). On the other hand, if (b, a) ∉ R(G), then {{a, b, c}} = Eσ(G ∪ I) holds for any
σ ∈ {pr, id}. If not, i.e. (b, a) ∈ R(G) it follows {{b, c}} = Eσ(G ∪ I) for any σ ∈ {pr, id}. Thus,
in all possible combinations we obtain different preferred and ideal extensions. Furthermore,
different admissible extensions are implied (Proposition 2.17, statement 1). This means, we
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have shown that for any σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}, F /≡σS G holds. Case 2.2.3: (a, a) ∈ R(F) and (b, b) ∉
R(F). First notice that (b, a) ∈ R(F) cannot hold because (a, a) ∈ R(F) would enforce the
deletion of (a, b) in R (F k∗(ad)) in contrast to the assumption. Using the standard construction
we obtain {{c}} = Eσ(F ∪ I) for each σ ∈ {pr, id}. In the given self-loop constellation AF G may
occur in three configurations with respect to the presence and absence of the attacks (a, b) and(b, a), namely: (a, b), (b, a) ∉ R(G) or (a, b), (b, a) ∈ R(G) or (a, b) ∉ R(G) and (b, a) ∈ R(G). Note
that (a, b) ∈ R(G) and (b, a) ∉ R(G) is impossible since (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(ad)) was assumed. In
all cases we obtain {{b, c}} = Eσ(G ∪ I) for each σ ∈ {pr, id}. By Proposition 2.17 we deduceEad(F ∪ I) ≠ Ead(G ∪ I). Altogether, we have shown that F /≡σS G for each σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}.
Case 2.2.4: (a, a) ∉ R(F) and (b, b) ∈ R(F). Since (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(ad)) is assumed, we deduce the
existence of an argument c ∈ A (F), such that (b, c) ∈ R(F)∧ {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)}∩R(F) =∅ (compare Definition 5.13 of the ad-*-kernel). The following figures show the remaining two
possibilities for AF F . Note that we omit possible other arguments than a, b and c. This means,
the AFs F1 and F2 as well as the subsequent AFs Gi are only representatives illustrating the
relevant parts (consult Section 5.2.1).
aF2 ∶ b caF1 ∶ b c
So far we know (a, a), (c, c) ∉ R(G) and (b, b) ∈ R(G). This means there are 26 = 64 possi-
bilities for the presence and absence of (a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (c, b), (a, c) and (c, a) in R(G). Note
that some of them are impossible since (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(ad)) was assumed. At first we modify
the standard construction in the following way (d is a fresh argument):
I′ = (A (F)∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b, c}}) .
The following extensions can be checked by applying splitting results (compare Section
5.2.1). It can be easily seen that for each σ ∈ {pr, id}, Eσ(F1 ∪ I′) = Eσ(F2 ∪ I′) = {{a, c, d}}
holds. If (a, c) ∈ R(G) or (c, a) ∈ R(G), then for each σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}, {a, c, d} ∉ Eσ(G ∪H′)
holds since {a, c, d} is not conflict-free. Hence, without loss of generality we may assume(a, c), (c, a) ∉ R(G). Thus, 24 = 16 possibilities with respect to the presence or absence of(a, b), (b, a), (b, c) and (c, b) remain. For clarity, we will present all possibilities.
aG2 ∶ b caG1 ∶ b c
aG4 ∶ b caG3 ∶ b c
aG6 ∶ b caG5 ∶ b c
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aG8 ∶ b caG7 ∶ b c
aG10 ∶ b caG9 ∶ b c
aG12 ∶ b caG11 ∶ b c
aG14 ∶ b caG13 ∶ b c
aG16 ∶ b caG15 ∶ b c
First note that G6 (= F2) and G14 (= F1) are impossible since (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(ad)) was assumed.
Furthermore, the cases G2, G9 and G10 can be checked by considering the union with AF I′.
For each σ ∈ {pr, id}, {{a, d}} = Eσ(G2 ∪ I′), {{c, d}} = Eσ(G9 ∪ I′) and {{d}} = Eσ(G10 ∪ I′). For
all other cases we define a slightly different version of I′, namely
I′′ = (A (F)∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {b, c}}) .
At first we have to check the extensions of F1 ∪I′′ and F2 ∪I′′. It turns out that for any σ ∈{pr, id}, {{d}} = Eσ(F1 ∪I′′) = Eσ(F2 ∪I′′) holds. On the other hand we have {{c, d}} = Eσ(Gi ∪I′′) for each σ ∈ {pr, id} and every i ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16}. Remember that different
preferred extensions imply different admissible extensions (Proposition 2.17, statement 1). This
means, finally, we have shown that for each σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}, F /≡σS G holds.
Let us consider again Example 5.12 from the beginning of this section.
Example 5.17 (Example 5.12 continued). According to Theorem 5.16 we have now formally
proven that F ≡σS G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, id} since both possess the same ad-*-kernels, namelyF k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) = G. In consideration of Theorem 5.11 the interested reader may ask for an
example showing that F and G are not strong expansion equivalent with respect to semi-stable
and eager semantics. Here is a counter-example for both semantics. We define
H = ({b, c, d, e},{(d, b), (d, c), (d, e), (e, c), (e, d)}).
The graph representation of F ∪H and G ∪H is as follows.
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aG ∪H ∶ b c
d e
aF ∪H ∶ b c
d e
Figure 5.7: Counter-example for Semi-stable and Eager Semantics
The AFs F ∪H and G ∪H possess different semi-stable and eager extensions. In fact, {a, d}
and {a, e} are semi-stable extensions in F ∪H and furthermore, {a} is not admissible. Conse-
quently, Eeg(F ∪H) = {∅}. In case of G ∪H we observe that {a, d} is the unique semi-stable
extension and thus, Eeg(G ∪H) = {{a, d}}. This means, F /≡σS G for σ ∈ {ss, eg}.
5.2.5 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Grounded Semantics
Now we turn to the grounded semantics. Similarly to the case of admissible, preferred and
ideal semantics we will see that strong expansion equivalence between two AFs is not sufficient
for their expansion equivalence with respect to grounded semantics. We therefore introduce a
novel kernel, the so-called grounded-*-kernel which is defined as follows.
Definition 5.18. Given a an AF F = (A, R). We define the grounded-*-kernel of F as F k∗(gr) =(A, Rk∗(gr)) where
Rk
∗(gr) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, ((b, b) ∈ R ∧ {(a, a), (b, a)}∩ R ≠ ∅)∨((b, b) ∈ R ∧∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R ≠ ∅))}.
The newly introduced kernel “forgets” an attack (a, b) if
1. b is self-attacking and at least one of the attacks (a, a) or (b, a) exists or
2. b is self-defeating and furthermore, for all arguments c which are attacked by b at least
one of the following conditions holds:
i) a attacks c,
ii) c attacks a or
iii) c attacks c.
As explained in Section 5.2.4 a distinguishing feature of strong expansions in contrast to arbi-
trary expansions is that an old argument will never become a defender of a newly introduced
and attacked argument. This means, there is more potential for irrelevant attacks which is
reflected by the definition above.
The first disjunct captures attacks which are even redundant with respect to arbitrary ex-
pansions (compare Definition 5.1 and Theorem 5.5). Similar to the ad-*-kernel (see Definition
5.13) the second disjunct allows the deletions of an attack (a, b) if b is self-attacking and for
all c’s which are attacked by b we have {a, c} is conflicting encoded by i), ii) and iii). In
these cases the potential defense of c by a becomes irrelevant since conflict-freeness is viola-
ted. In contrast to admissible, preferred and ideal semantics the fourth possibility, namely
the presence of the attack (c, b), i.e. c defends itself against b does not justify a deletion of
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(a, b). This can be easily seen by considering the original definition of the grounded seman-
tics introduced in [Dung, 1995]. The grounded extension of an AF F = (A, R) is alternati-
vely given as the least fixpoint of the so-called characteristic function ΓF ∶ 2A → 2A, where
ΓF(S) = {a ∈ A ∣ a is defended by S in F}. In case of finite AFs, this least fixpoint can be
achieved by applying iteratively ΓF on the empty set. Furthermore, ΓF can be shown to be
monotonic [Dung, 1995]. This means, the fourth possibility is excluded because the defense of
c against b by a may be essential for c being an element of the grounded extension, although c
defends itself against b.
The following example shows that we actually need a further kernel definition since the
grounded extensions of an AF F and F k∗(ad) are not necessarily the same.
Example 5.19. Observe that F k∗(ad) = G and F k∗(gr) =H. Hence, F ≡σS G for any σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}
(Theorem 5.16). Furthermore, {∅} = Egr(F) ≠ Egr(G) = {{a, c}} which proves F /≡grS G. Note
that the empty set is also the unique grounded extension of H. We even claim that F ≡grS H
which will be a consequence of Theorem 5.22.
aF ∶ b c aG ∶ b c aH ∶ b c
Figure 5.8: Grounded-*- vs. Admissible-*-Kernel
Analogously to the subsection before we will proceed with two technical lemmata paving
the way for the main theorem.
Lemma 5.20. For any AF F , F ≡gr F k∗(gr).
Proof. It suffices to show that for all i ≥ 1, ΓiF(∅) = ΓiF k∗(gr)(∅) holds. We will prove this by
induction.
First, we show that the sets of unattacked arguments coincide, i.e. Γ1F(∅) = Γ1F k∗(gr)(∅).
Furthermore, Γ1F(∅) ⊆ Γ1F k∗(gr)(∅) is obvious since R (F k∗(gr)) ⊆ R(F) holds. Given a ∈
Γ1F k∗(gr)(∅), then (a, a) ∉ R (F k∗(gr)) and therefore (a, a) ∉ R(F). Assuming that a is atta-
cked in F , i.e. there is an argument b, such that (b, a) ∈ R(F) yields to (b, a) ∈ R (F k∗(gr))
(compare Definition 5.18). This contradicts the assumption that a is unattacked in F k∗(gr).
Suppose now that for all i < k, ΓiF(∅) = ΓiF k∗(gr)(∅) holds. We will show that ΓkF(∅) =
ΓkF k∗(gr)(∅) is implied. (⊆) Assume a ∈ ΓkF(∅) and a ∉ ΓkF k∗(gr)(∅). Hence there is an attack(b, a) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)), such that b is not attacked by Γk−1F k∗(gr)(∅) in F k∗(gr). Since a ∈ ΓkF(∅)
was assumed it follows that there is at least one argument c ∈ Γk−1F (∅) (⊆ ΓkF(∅)), such
that (c, b) ∈ R(F) holds (note that b ∉ Γk−1F (∅) is implied). Consequently, all these attacks
have to be deleted in F k∗(gr). We have to consider several reasons for deletion. First notice
that (b, b) ∈ R(F) (thus (b, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr))) has to hold. Furthermore none of the attacks(a, a), (a, c), (c, a) ∈ R(F) are possible since (a, c) ∈ ΓkF(∅) has to be conflict-free. Hence, all
arguments c ∈ Γk−1F (∅) with the property (c, b) ∈ R(F) has to be counterattacked by b itself, i.e.
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(b, c) ∈ R(F) (compare Definition 5.18). Note that all these (b, c)’s survive in R (F k∗(gr)) be-
cause c ∈ Γk−1F (∅) guarantees (c, c) ∉ R(F). By inductive hypothesis we get c ∈ Γk−1F k∗(gr)(∅) and
finally with (b, c) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) and the observation that all counter-attacks to b are deleted we
contradict the admissibility of Γk−1F k∗(gr)(∅) in F k∗(gr). (⊇) Given a ∈ ΓkF k∗(gr)(∅), i.e. a is defen-
ded by Γk−1F k∗(gr)(∅) in F k∗(gr). Furthermore (a, a) ∉ R (F k∗(gr)) (thus (a, a) ∉ R(F)) holds since
ΓkF k∗(gr)(∅) is conflict-free in F k∗(gr). This means, (b, a) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) iff (b, a) ∈ R(F). Hence,
using Γk−1F k∗(gr)(∅) = Γk−1F (∅) (inductive hypothesis) and the observation above we deduce that
a is defended by Γk−1F (∅) in F . Thus, a ∈ ΓkF(∅).
Lemma 5.21. If F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr), then (F ∪H)k∗(gr) = (G ∪H)k∗(gr) for all AFs H which satisfyF ⪯S F ∪H and G ⪯S G ∪H.
Proof. Assume F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr). Consequently, A (F) = A(F k∗(gr)) = A(Gk∗(gr)) = A (G) holds.
Consider now an AF H satisfying the specified properties (strong expansion or equality). Note
that in case of equality there is nothing to show since F = F ∪H implies G = G ∪H and vice
versa and hence, (F ∪H)k∗(gr) = (G ∪H)k∗(gr) is implied. From now on we may suppose thatF ∪H and G ∪H are indeed strong expansions of F or G. Thus, R(H)∩ R(F) = ∅ and R(H)∩
R(G) = ∅ can be assumed (compare Definition 2.13). Let (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)), therefore(a, b) ∈ R(F ∪H). We will show (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(gr)) by proof by cases (containedness of
a and b in A (F) or A(H) ∖ A (F)). Again we suppose a ≠ b for all cases (containedness of
self-loops is obvious).
1st case: Let a, b ∈ A (F). If (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)), then (a, b) ∈ R (Gk∗(gr)) and (a, b) ∈ R(G)
follow. Furthermore (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(gr)) is implied because G ∪H was assumed to be
a strong expansion of G and so, no relevant attacks are added. The assumption (a, b) ∉
R (F k∗(gr)) contradicts (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) because the reason to remove an attack re-
mains untouched in F ∪H. 2nd case: Let a, b ∈ A(H) ∖ A (F). Hence, (a, b) ∈ R (G ∪H) is
implied. Assume now (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(gr)). This means, several reasons for removing
have to be considered. Observe that (b, b) ∈ R(H) has to hold. If (a, a) or (b, a) are contained
in R(H) we deduce (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) in contrast to the assumption. Assume now that∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅) holds. If there is no c in A (G)
which is attacked by b we conclude (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)). So, consider c ∈ A (G) and(b, c) ∈ R(H). We obtain {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅. The attack (c, a) ∈ R(G ∪H) is
impossible since G ⪯S G ∪H was assumed. If (a, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (a, c) ∈ R(H) and conse-
quently (a, c) ∈ R(F ∪H) has to hold. If (c, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (c, c) ∈ R(G) and (c, c) ∈ R(F)
(since F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) was assumed), therefore (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪H). In all cases we get (a, b) ∉
R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) in contrast to the assumption. 3rd case: Let a ∈ A(H)∖ A (F) and b ∈ A (F).
Hence, (a, b) ∈ R (G ∪H) is implied. Assume now (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(gr)). Again, several
reasons for removing have to be considered. First, notice that (b, b) ∈ R(G) (thus (b, b) ∈ R(F))
has to hold. If (a, a) ∈ R(H) holds we deduce (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F ∪H) which contradicts (a, b) ∈
R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)). Note that (b, a) ∈ R(G ∪H) is just impossible since G ⪯S G ∪H was assumed.
Assume now that ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅) holds. Since(a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(gr)) was assumed there exists an argument c ∈ A (F), such that (b, c) ∈
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R(F)∧ {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R(F ∪H) = ∅. We observe that {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R(G ∪H) = ∅
is implied and hence, if (b, c) ∈ R(G), then (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(gr)) follows contradicting the
assumption. Remember that F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) has to hold. Hence, if (b, c) ∉ R(G), then (b, c) has
to be deleted in R (F k∗(gr)). This is impossible because (c, c) ∉ R(F ∪H) (thus (c, c) ∉ R(F)) is
already shown. 4th case: Let a ∈ A (F) and b ∈ A(H)∖ A (F). This case is impossible because(a, b) ∈ R(F ∪H) cannot hold if F ⪯S F ∪H is fulfilled.
With the help of the two lemmata above we will prove now that syntactical equivalence
of gr-*-kernels of two AFs characterizes their strong expansion equivalence with respect to
grounded semantics.
Theorem 5.22. For any AFs F , G:
F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr)⇔ F ≡grS G.
Proof. The if-direction, namely F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) ⇒ F ≡grS G follows by applying Lemmata
5.20 and 5.21 (similarly to Theorem 5.16). We will show the only-if-direction by proving the
contrapositive, i.e. F k∗(gr) ≠ Gk∗(gr) ⇒ F /≡grS G.
1st case: Assume A (F k∗(gr)) ≠ A (Gk∗(gr)). Hence, without loss of generality there exists
an argument a ∈ A (F)∖ A (G). We define H = ((A (F)∪ A (G))∖ {a},∅). Let E be the unique
grounded extension of F ∪H. If a ∈ E, E ∉ Egr(G ∪H) follows. Consider now a ∉ E. We defineH′ = H ∪ ({a},∅). Hence, F ∪H = F ∪H′ and therefore, E is the unique grounded extension
of F ∪H′. Furthermore we observe that a is unattacked in G ∪H′ and so, a is contained in the
unique grounded extension E′ of G ∪H′. Hence, F /≡grS G follows.
2nd case: Consider R (F k∗(gr)) ≠ R (Gk∗(gr)) and A (F k∗(gr)) = A (Gk∗(gr)) (= A (F) =
A (G)). Hence, without loss of generality there exists a, b ∈ A (F), such that (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr))∖
R (Gk∗(gr)). Let c be a new argument, i.e. c ∉ A (F). Furthermore we define
I = (A (F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}) .
Case 2.1: Let a = b. This means (a, a) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) ∖ R (Gk∗(gr)) and consequently (a, a) ∈
R(F) ∖ R(G) by Definition 5.18 of the gr-*-kernel. It is easy to see (splitting results, Section
5.2.1) that {{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) ≠ Egr(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}} holds. From now on we suppose that any
self-loop is either contained in both R (F k∗(gr)) and R (Gk∗(gr)) or in none of them.
Case 2.2: Consider now a ≠ b, i.e. (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) ∖ R (Gk∗(gr)) and (a, b) ∈ R(F). We
have to distinguish four cases for the presence or absence of attack (a, a) and (b, b). Keep
in mind that R(F), R(G), R (F k∗(gr)) and R (Gk∗(gr)) contain the same self-loops. Case 2.2.1:(a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F). This case is impossible because (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) cannot hold (Definition
5.18). Case 2.2.2: (a, a), (b, b) ∉ R(F). Note that (a, b) ∉ R(G) holds because (b, b) ∉ R(G)
and (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(gr)) was assumed. The attack (b, a) may or may not be an element of
R(F) or R(G). If (b, a) ∉ R(F), {{a, c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) follows. If not, i.e. (b, a) ∈ R(F), then{{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) holds. Furthermore, if (b, a) ∉ R(G) we deduce {{a, b, c}} = Egr(G ∪ I) and
if not, i.e. (b, a) ∈ R(G) it follows {{b, c}} = Egr(G ∪ I). Thus, in all possible combinations
we obtain different grounded extensions, i.e. F /≡grS G. 2.2.3: (a, a) ∈ R(F) and (b, b) ∉ R(F).
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Again, it is impossible that (a, b) ∈ R(G) holds since (b, b) ∉ R(G) and (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(gr)) was
assumed. The attack (b, a) may or may not be an element of R(F) and R(G). Either way,{{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) ≠ Egr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}} follows. Hence, F /≡grS G. 2.2.4: (a, a) ∉ R(F) and(b, b) ∈ R(F). Since (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) is assumed, we deduce (b, a) ∉ R(F) and furthermore
the existence of an argument c ∈ A (F) ∶ (b, c) ∈ R(F)∧{(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩R(F) = ∅ (compare
Definition 5.18). The following figures show the remaining two possibilities for AF F . Note
that we omit possible other arguments than a, b and c.
aF2 ∶ b caF1 ∶ b c
Up to now we know (a, a), (c, c) ∉ R(G) and (b, b) ∈ R(G). Hence, there are 26 = 64 possibi-
lities for the presence and absence of (a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (c, b), (a, c) and (c, a) in R(G). We will
show that some of them are impossible since (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(gr)) was assumed. Again, we use
the slightly different version of the standard construction I, namely
I′ = (A (F)∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b, c}}) .
It can be checked that Egr(F1 ∪I′) = Egr(F2 ∪I′) = {{a, c, d}}. If (a, c) ∈ R(G) or (c, a) ∈ R(G),
then {{a, c, d}} ≠ Egr(G ∪I′) because a grounded extension has to be conflict-free. From now on
we assume (a, c), (c, a) ∉ R(G). This means, 24 = 16 possibilities with respect to the presence or
absence of (a, b), (b, a), (b, c) and (c, b) remain. These sixteen remaining possibilities are listed
in Theorem 5.16 . G6 (= F2) and G8 (= F1) are impossible since (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(gr)) was assumed.
The cases G2, G4, G9, G10, G12, G13, G14 and G16 can be checked by considering the union with
AF I′. For every i ∈ {2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16}, {{a, c, d}} ≠ Egr(Gi ∪ I′) holds. For all other cases
we use I′′ = (A (F)∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {b, c}}) .
Combining F1 and F2 with I′′ we get {{d}} = Egr(F1 ∪ I′′) = Egr(F2 ∪ I′′). Furthermore
we have {{c, d}} = Egr(Gi ∪ I′′) for every i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 11, 15}. Hence, F /≡grS G concluding the
proof.
Finally, we will give a counter-example showing that strong expansion equivalence is not
sufficient for expansion equivalence with respect to grounded semantics as stated at the very
beginning of this section.
Example 5.23. The AFs F and G are strong expansion equivalent since they possess equal
gr-*-kernels, namely F k∗(gr) = Gk∗(gr) = G (Theorem 5.22).
aG ∶ b caF ∶ b c
Figure 5.9: Strong Expansion Equivalent AFs
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Furthermore, they are not expansion equivalent with respect to grounded semantics which
can be demonstrated by the following expansions F ∪H of F and G ∪H of G, where H =({b, d},{(b, d)}).
aG ∪H ∶
d
b caF ∪H ∶
d
b c
Figure 5.10: Non-coincidence of Expansion and Strong Expansion Equivalence
One may easily identify different grounded extensions for F ∪H and G ∪H, namely {a, d}
or {a}, respectively.
5.2.6 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Complete Semantics
We now turn to complete semantics. Remember that any preferred extension is a complete one
and furthermore, any complete extension is admissible (compare Proposition 2.7). Moreover,
the ad-kernel serves as a uniform characterization for expansion equivalence with respect to
complete and admissible semantics (see Theorems 5.5, 5.7). Similarly, we have already shown
that the ad-*-kernel characterizes both semantics with respect to strong expansion equivalence
(Theorem 5.16). In the light of these relations it is quite surprising or at least interesting that
neither in case of arbitrary expansions (Theorem 5.5) nor in case of strong expansions (as we
will see) complete semantics agree with preferred or admissible semantics.
We now introduce a further novel kernel definition, the so-called complete-*-kernel which
characterizes strong expansion equivalence with respect to complete semantics. Here is the
formal definition.
Definition 5.24. Given an AF F = (A, R). We define the complete-*-kernel of F as F k∗(co) =(A, Rk∗(co)) where
Rk
∗(co) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, ((a, a), (b, b) ∈ R)∨((b, b) ∈ R ∧ (b, a) ∉ R ∧∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R ≠ ∅))}.
The newly introduced kernel “forgets” an attack (a, b) if
1. a and b are self-attacking or
2. b is self-defeating, b does not attack a and furthermore, for all arguments c which are
attacked by b at least one of the following conditions holds:
i) a attacks c,
ii) c attacks a or
iii) c attacks c.
The first disjunct describes attacks which are even redundant with respect to arbitrary ex-
pansions (compare co-kernel, Definition 5.1). The additional part, namely the second disjunct
of the co-*-kernel is very similar to the gr-*-kernel (Definition 5.18). The difference is that the
deletion of an attack (a, b) requires the additional precondition that b does not attack a. This is
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due to the fact that the attack (a, b) may be crucial for the acceptance of the argument a if (b, a)
is established. Roughly speaking, the argument a may justify its acceptance itself in contrast to
grounded semantics where the reason for being a member of the unique grounded extension
has to come from the outside, i.e. former accepted arguments have to defend a. Consider the
following example.
Example 5.25. The AFs F and G (= F k∗(gr)) are strong expansion equivalent with respect
to grounded semantics (Theorem 5.22). In particular, the deletion of (a, b) is irrelevant with
respect to the grounded extensions of F and G. Observe that in case of complete semantics(a, b) is essential since {a} is no longer complete in G.
aG ∶ b caF ∶ b c
Figure 5.11: Grounded-*- vs. Complete-*-Kernel
We proceed with some useful properties of the newly introduced kernel. The following
lemma shows that any AF F and its co-*-kernel possess the same complete extensions.
Lemma 5.26. For any AF F , F ≡co F k∗(co).
Proof. The first step is to show that F and F k∗(co) contain the same conflict-free sets, i.e.
S ∈ c f (F) iff S ∈ c f (F k∗(co)). The if-direction is obvious because R (F k∗(co)) ⊆ R(F) holds
(compare Definition 5.24). Assume now S ∈ c f (F k∗(co)) and S ∉ c f (F). Consequently, there
are two arguments a and b in S with the property (a, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(co)). In any case,(b, b) ∈ R(F) has to hold. The same applies to R (F k∗(co)) which contradicts the assumption
S ∈ c f (F k∗(co)).
We now prove that E ∈ Eco(F) implies E ∈ Eco (F k∗(co)). At first we will show that E is
admissible in F k∗(co). Assume E ∈ Eco(F) and E does not defend all its elements in F k∗(co).
This means, there is an argument a ∈ E and an argument b ∉ E (conflict-freeness) such that(b, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) and (E, b) ∉ R (F k∗(co)). Since R (F k∗(co)) ⊆ R(F) and Eco(F) ⊆ Ead(F)
hold, we deduce the existence of an argument c ∈ E, such that (c, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(co)).
There are two possibilities for the deletion of (c, b) in R (F k∗(co)). First, (c, c), (b, b) ∈ R(F)
and second, (b, b) ∈ R(F), (b, c) ∉ R(F) and at least {(a, c), (c, a), (a, a)} ∩ R(F) ≠ ∅. Due to
the conflict-freeness of E in F and the membership of a and c in E both options fail. Assume
now E ∈ Eco(F) but E does not contain all defended elements in F k∗(co). Hence, there is an
argument a ∉ E, such that for all arguments c with (c, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) , (E, c) ∈ R (F k∗(co)).
Since E is assumed to be complete in F and a ∉ E we deduce the existence of an argument
c with the property (c, a) ∈ R(F) and (E, c) ∉ R(F). Combining both conclusions we get(c, a) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(co)). In any case, (a, a) ∈ R(F) and thus, (a, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)). Since a is
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defended by E in F k∗(co), (E, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) has to hold. Finally, (E, E) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) follows
contradicting the conflict-freeness of E in F k∗(co).
We now prove that E ∈ Eco (F k∗(co)) implies E ∈ Eco(F). First of all, we show the admissi-
bility of E in F . Given E ∈ Eco (F k∗(co)), we assume the existence of an argument a ∈ E and
an argument b ∉ E (conflict-freeness), such that (b, a) ∈ R(F) and (E, b) ∉ R(F) holds. Due to
the relations R (F k∗(co)) ⊆ R(F) and Eco (F k∗(co)) ⊆ Ead (F k∗(co)), (b, a) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(co))
follows. Consequently, (a, a) ∈ R(F) has to hold contradicting the conflict-freeness of E inF . Assume now that E does not contain all defended elements in F , i.e. it exists an argu-
ment a ∉ E, such that for all arguments c with the property (c, a) ∈ R(F), (E, c) ∈ R(F)
holds. Since E is assumed to be complete in F k∗(co) and a ∉ E holds, we deduce the exis-
tence of an argument c, such that (c, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) and (E, c) ∉ R (F k∗(co)). Altogether,(c, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) and (E, c) ∈ R(F)∖ R (F k∗(co)). Let d be the argument in E which attacks
c, i.e. (d, c) ∈ R(F)∖R (F k∗(co)). We observe that (d, d) ∈ R(F) is impossible because E ∈ c f (F)
is assumed. Hence, (c, c) ∈ R(F), (c, d) ∉ R(F) and {(a, a), (a, d), (d, a)} ∩ R(F) ≠ ∅ follows.
The cases (a, a) ∈ R(F) and (d, a) ∈ R(F) contradict the conflict-freeness of E in F because a is
assumed to be defended by E in F . In case of (a, d) ∈ R(F) we use the already shown admis-
sibility of E in F to infer (E, a) ∈ R(F). Again, we get a contradiction to the conflict-freeness
of E in F if we apply that a is defended by E in F .
The next lemma proves the robustness of the co-*-kernel. That means, if two AFs F andG possess the same co-*-kernel, then the same applies for any compositions F ∪H and G ∪H
under the condition that the latter are strong expansions of their initial frameworks F and G,
respectively.
Lemma 5.27. If F k∗(co) = Gk∗(co), then (F ∪H)k∗(co) = (G ∪H)k∗(co) for all AFs H which satisfyF ⪯S F ∪H and G ⪯S G ∪H.
Proof. First notice that the assumption F k∗(co) = Gk∗(co) implies A (F) = A (F k∗(co)) =
A (Gk∗(co)) = A (G). Consider now an AF H satisfying the specified properties (strong expan-
sion or equality). If F = F ∪H, then G = G ∪H is implied and vice versa. Consequently, in this
case it is nothing to show because (F ∪H)k∗(co) = (G ∪H)k∗(co) follows immediately. Without
loss of generality we may assume that F ∪H and G ∪H are indeed strong expansions of F orG. Thus, R(H)∩R(F) = ∅ and R(H)∩R(G) = ∅ can be assumed. Let (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)),
therefore (a, b) ∈ R(F ∪H). We will show (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(co)) by proof by cases (contai-
nedness of a and b in A (F) or A(H) ∖ A (F)). For all cases we will suppose a ≠ b since the
self-loop case is obvious.
1st case: Let a, b ∈ A (F). Assuming (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) implies (a, b) ∈ R (Gk∗(co)) and
therefore (a, b) ∈ R(G). Consequently (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(co)) holds since G ∪H was assu-
med to be a strong expansion of G and so, no relevant attacks are added. The assump-
tion (a, b) ∉ R (F k∗(co)) contradicts (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)) because the reason to remove
an attack remains untouched in F ∪H. 2nd case: Let a, b ∈ A(H) ∖ A (F). Thus, (a, b) ∈
R (G ∪H) is implied. Suppose now (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(co)). This means, several reasons
for removing have to be checked. The assumption (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(H) is inconsistent with
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(a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)). Thus, (b, b) ∈ R(H), (b, a) ∉ R(H) and ∀c ((b, c) ∈ R(G ∪H) →{(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅) has to hold. If there is no c in A (G) which is attacked by b
we deduce (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)). Thus, consider an argument c ∈ A (G) with the property(b, c) ∈ R(H). Hence, {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)} ∩ R(G ∪H) ≠ ∅ has to hold. In the first case, namely(a, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), (a, c) ∈ R(H) and consequently (a, c) ∈ R(F ∪H) follows. The second case,
i.e. (c, a) ∈ R(G ∪H), is just impossible since G ∪H was assumed to be a strong expansion of G.
If (c, c) ∈ R(G ∪H), then (c, c) ∈ R(G) and (c, c) ∈ R(F) (since F k∗(co) = Gk∗(co) was assumed),
therefore (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪H). In all cases we deduce (a, b) ∉ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)) contradicting the
assumption. 3rd case: Let a ∈ A(H) ∖ A (F) and b ∈ A (F). Consequently, (a, b) ∈ R (G ∪H)
holds. Assume now (a, b) ∉ R ((G ∪H)k∗(co)). Again, several reasons for removing have to be
considered. We observe that (b, b) ∈ R(G) (thus (b, b) ∈ R(F)) has to hold. If (a, a) ∈ R(H) holds
we deduce (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F ∪H) contrary to (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)). Furthermore, we ob-
serve (b, a) ∉ R(F ∪H), R(G ∪H) because F ∪H and G ∪H are assumed to be strong expansions
of F and G respectively. Together with the assumption (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(co)) we deduce the
existence of an argument c ∈ A (F), such that (b, c) ∈ R(F)∧{(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩R(F ∪H) = ∅.
Hence, (c, c) ∉ R(F) (therefore (c, c) ∉ R(G)) and (a, c), (c, a) ∉ R(H) is implied. Consequently,
if (b, c) ∈ R(G), then (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(co)) contradicting the assumption. Remember thatF k∗(co) = Gk∗(co) has to hold. Hence, if (b, c) ∉ R(G), then (b, c) has to be deleted in R (F k∗(co)).
This is impossible because (c, c) ∉ R(F) is already shown. 4th case: Let a ∈ A (F) and
b ∈ A(H)∖ A (F). Here is nothing to show because (a, b) ∈ R(F ∪H) cannot hold if F ⪯S F ∪H
is fulfilled.
Now we are prepared to show the main theorem for the case of complete semantics. The
notion of co-*-kernel is suitable to describe strong expansions equivalence with respect to
complete semantics.
Theorem 5.28. For any AFs F , G:
F k∗(co) = Gk∗(co)⇔ F ≡coS G.
Proof. The first direction, namely F k∗(co) = Gk∗(co) ⇒ F ≡coS G can be shown by applying
Lemmata 5.26 and 5.27 (similarly to Theorem 5.16). We will prove the only-if-direction by
showing the contrapositive, i.e. F k∗(co) ≠ Gk∗(co) ⇒ F /≡coS G.
1st case: Suppose A (F k∗(co)) ≠ A (Gk∗(co)). Thus, without loss of generality there exists an
argument a ∈ A (F)∖ A (G). We define H = ((A (F)∪ A (G))∖ {a},∅). Consider the existence
of an extension E ∈ Eco(F ∪H), such that a ∈ E holds. Consequently, E ∉ Eco(G ∪H) and
therefore F /≡coS G. Hence, we may assume that for all extensions E ∈ Eco(F ∪H), a ∉ E holds.
We define H′ = H ∪ ({a},∅). Observe that a is unattacked in H’. Since G ∪H′ = H′ we deduce
that for any extension E ∈ Eco(G ∪H′), a ∈ E holds. Remember that the existence of a complete
extension is guaranteed. Finally, since Eco(F ∪H) = Eco(F ∪H′) obviously holds we are done.
2nd case: Assume R (F k∗(co)) ≠ R (Gk∗(co)) and A (F k∗(co)) = A (Gk∗(co)) (= A (F) = A (G)).
Thus, without loss of generality there exist some arguments a, b ∈ A (F) with the property(a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) ∖ R (Gk∗(co)). Let c be a fresh argument, i.e. c ∉ A (F). Furthermore we
define I = (A (F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}) .
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Case 2.1: Let a = b (self-loop case). Hence, (a, a) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) ∖ R (Gk∗(co)) and therefore(a, a) ∈ R(F) ∖ R(G) follows. We obtain {{c}} = Egr(F ∪ I) ≠ Egr(G ∪ I) = {{a, c}}. From now
on we suppose that any self-loop is either contained in both R (F k∗(co)) and R (Gk∗(co)) or in
none of them.
Case 2.2: Assume a ≠ b. This means, (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) ∖ R (Gk∗(co)) and (a, b) ∈ R(F).
We will distinguish four cases for the presence or absence of the self-loops (a, a) and (b, b).
Remember that R(F), R(G), R (F k∗(co)) and R (Gk∗(co)) contain the same self-loops. Case 2.2.1:(a, a), (b, b) ∈ R(F). This case contradicts the assumption because (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(co)) cannot
be fulfilled (compare co-*-kernel, Definition 5.24). Case 2.2.2: (a, a), (b, b) ∉ R(F). Observe that(a, b) ∉ R(G) holds because (b, b) ∉ R(G) and (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(co)) was assumed. The attack (b, a)
may or may not be an element of R(F) or R(G). In any case, {a, c} ∈ Eco(F ∪ I). This can be
checked by applying splitting results (compare Section 5.2.1). In the following we will leave
this comment out. If (b, a) ∉ R(G), then {{a, b, c}} = Eco(G ∪ I) follows and if not, we deduce{{b, c}} = Eco(G ∪ I). Thus, F /≡coS G is shown. Case 2.2.3: (a, a) ∈ R(F) and (b, b) ∉ R(F).
Again, it is impossible that (a, b) ∈ R(G) holds since (b, b) ∉ R(G) and (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(co)) was
assumed. The attack (b, a) may be contained in R(F), R(G) or not. In any case, {c} ∈ Eco(F ∪ I)
and Eco(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}} holds. Hence, F /≡coS G. Case 2.2.4: (a, a) ∉ R(F) and (b, b) ∈ R(F).
Since (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(gr)) is assumed, we have to consider two sub-cases: First, (b, a) ∈ R(F)
and second, (b, a) ∉ R(F)∧∃c ∈ A (F) ∶ (b, c) ∈ R(F)∧ {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R(F) = ∅ (compare
co-*-kernel, Definition 5.24). If (b, a) ∈ R(F), then {{c},{c, a}} = Eco(F ∪ I) follows. Since(a, b) ∉ Gk∗(co) is assumed, we deduce that if (a, b) ∈ R(G), then (b, a) ∉ R(G) has to hold. In
this case we obtain {{c, a}} = Eco(G ∪ I). Let (a, b) ∉ R(G). Hence, (b, a) may or may not be
an element of R(G). If (b, a) is contained in R(G), {{c}} = Eco(G ∪ I) and if not, {{a, c}} =Eco(G ∪ I). Altogether, we have shown that in the first sub-case F /≡coS G is implied. Consider
now (b, a) ∉ R(F) ∧ ∃c ∈ A (F) ∶ (b, c) ∈ R(F) ∧ {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)} ∩ R(F) = ∅. Just like in
case of grounded semantics, two possibilities for AF F remain. Again, we omit possible other
arguments than a, b, and c.
aF2 ∶ b caF1 ∶ b c
So far we know (a, a), (c, c) ∉ R(G) and (b, b) ∈ R(G). Thus, there are 26 = 64 combinations
with respect to the presence and absence of (a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (c, b), (a, c) and (c, a) in R(G).
Let d be a fresh argument. We define
I′ = (A (F)∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b, c}}) .
Observe that Eco(F1 ∪ I′) = Eco(F2 ∪ I′) = {{a, c, d}} holds. If (a, c) ∈ R(G) or (c, a) ∈ R(G),
then {a, c, d} ∉ Eco(G ∪I′) because complete extensions are conflict-free. Hence, we may assume(a, c), (c, a) ∉ R(G). This means, 24 = 16 possibilities with respect to the presence or absence of(a, b), (b, a), (b, c) and (c, b) remain. These sixteen AFs are already listed in Theorem 5.16. G6 (=F2) and G8 (= F1) as well as G13, G14, G15 and G16 are impossible because (a, b) ∉ R (Gk∗(co)) was
assumed. Remember that different grounded extensions imply different complete extensions
(Proposition 2.17, statement 2). Thus, the counter-examples presented in the proof of Theorem
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5.22 also serve to show that the remaining possibilities and F1 respectively F2 are not strong
expansion equivalent with respect to the grounded semantics.
For the sake of completeness we present the counter-examples again. The cases G2, G4, G9,G10 and G12 can be checked by considering the union with AF I′. For every i ∈ {2, 4, 9, 10, 12},{a, c, d} ∉ Eco(Gi ∪ I′) holds. The other cases can be proven by taken the union withI′′ = (A (F)∪ {d},{(d, c′) ∣c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {b, c}}) .
Combining F1 and F2 with I′′ we get {d} ∈ Eco(F1 ∪ I′′),Eco(F2 ∪ I′′). Furthermore we have{{c, d}} = Eco(Gi ∪ I′′) for every i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 11}. Hence, F /≡coS G concluding the proof.
We finish this section by giving an example showing that strong expansion equivalence and
expansion equivalence with respect to complete semantics do not coincide.
Example 5.29. On the one hand, the AFs F and G are strong expansion equivalent with respect
to complete semantics because F k∗(co) = Gk∗(co) = G (Theorem 5.28). On the other hand,
they are not equivalent with respect to arbitrary expansions which can be made explicit by
conjoining them with H = ({a, b},{(b, a)}). We have {a} ∈ Eco(F ∪H) and {a} ∉ Eco(G ∪H).
aF ∶ b aG ∶ b aF ∪H ∶ b aG ∪H ∶ b
Figure 5.12: Non-coincidence of Expansion and Strong Expansion Equivalence
5.2.7 Strong Expansion Equivalence for Naive Semantics
Finally, in this last subsection we will prove that strong expansion equivalence with respect
to naive semantics can be characterized by the following two conditions: First, possessing the
same naive extensions and second, sharing the same arguments. This means, in contrast to the
other semantics considered in this thesis the characterization of strong expansion equivalence
in case of naive semantics is not purely syntactical. We mention that in [Gaggl and Woltran,
2012] it was already shown that expansion and local expansion equivalence are characterizable
by the two properties listed above. This means, one consequence of the theorem we will show
below is that in case of naive semantics expansion, normal expansion, strong expansion and
local expansion equivalence coincide.
Theorem 5.30. For any AFs F , G:
Ena(F) = Ena(G) and A(F) = A(G)⇔ F ≡naS G.
Proof. It suffices to prove that F ≡naS G implies Ena(F) = Ena(G) and A(F) = A(G). The converse
direction is given by Theorem 5.13 [Gaggl and Woltran, 2012] and Proposition 2.18. First,
assuming Ena(F) ≠ Ena(G) immediately entails F /≡naS G (Proposition 2.18). Consider now
A(F) ≠ A(G) and Ena(F) = Ena(G). Without loss of generality there exists an argument a ∈
A(F)∖ A(G). Obviously, for any E ∈ Ena(G), a ∉ E. Consider H = ({a},∅). We have a ∈ E′, for
any E′ ∈ Ena(G ∪H). Furthermore, E′ ∉ Ena(F ∪H) since F ∪H = F . Observe that G ∪H is a
strong expansion of G because we added an isolated argument. Consequently, F /≡naS G.
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5.3 Characterizing Normal Expansion Equivalence
The main aim of this section is the characterization of normal expansion equivalence with
respect to all semantics considered in this thesis. Remember that any arbitrary expansion can
be split into a normal and local part (compare Definition 2.13). So one natural conjecture is
that normal and local expansion equivalence jointly imply expansion equivalence. Using the
results presented in this section we will not only verify the addressed conjecture but even a
significantly stronger result. In fact, the main and quite surprisingly result for the considered
semantics can be briefly and concisely presented in the following “equality”:
normal expansion equivalence = expansion equivalence
This means, if two AFs F and G are proven to be normal expansion equivalent, then the
requirement that F and G are equivalent when conjoined with any further framework H is
fulfilled too. This is quite surprising since the class of normal expansions is obviously a proper
subset of the class of arbitrary expansions. In other words, if different implicit information of
two AFs F and G is made explicit by conjoining them with an AF H which adds further
attacks between former arguments, then there exists an AF H’ showing this difference without
changing the former attack-relations of F and G. Consider the following example.
Example 5.31 (Example 5.29 continued). In Figure 5.12 we showed that F and G are not expan-
sion equivalent with respect to complete semantics. This property can be shown by conjoining
them with H′ = ({a, b, c, d},{(b, d), (c, a), (d, c)}) which do not add further attacks between the
old arguments a and b. Note that {a, d} ∈ Eco(F ∪H′) and {a, d} ∉ Eco(G ∪H′).
aF ∶ b aG ∶ b aF ∪H′ ∶ b
c d
aG ∪H′ ∶ b
c d
Figure 5.13: Unchanged Attack-relation
5.3.1 Normal Expansion Equivalence for Stable and Stage Semantics
At first we consider stable and stage semantics. In Section 5.2.2 we have already shown that the
notion of stb-kernel not only characterizes expansion equivalence but also strong expansion
equivalence with respect to stable and stage semantics. In consideration that the class of
normal expansions lie inbetween (with respect to subset-relation) the classes of arbitrary and
strong expansions the following theorems follow immediately.
Theorem 5.32. For any AFs F , G,
F k(stb) = Gk(stb)⇔ F ≡stbN G⇔ F ≡stgN G.
Proof. Combine Theorems 5.5, 5.8 and 5.10 and Proposition 2.18.
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5.3.2 Normal Expansion Equivalence for Semi-Stable, Eager, Admissible,
Preferred and Ideal Semantics
In [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] it was shown that the ad-kernel serves as a uniform characte-
rization for expansion equivalence with respect to semi-stable, eager, admissible, preferred and
ideal semantics. The following theorem proves that this result carries over to normal expansion
equivalence. Remember that we have already proven that a similar uniform behaviour of the
five mentioned semantics with respect to strong expansion equivalence is not given (compare
Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4).
Theorem 5.33. For any AFs F , G and σ ∈ {ss, eg, ad, pr, id},
F k(ad) = Gk(ad)⇔ F ≡σN G.
Proof. In case of semi-stable and eager semantics the assertion follows by combining Theorems
5.5, 5.7, 5.11 and Proposition 2.18.
Let us turn to admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. Note that Theorems 5.5, 5.7 and
Proposition 2.18 imply F k(ad) = Gk(ad) ⇒ F ≡σN G for any σ ∈ {ad, pr, id}. This means, it suffices
to show that F k(ad) ≠ Gk(ad) ⇒ F /≡σN G. Almost all cases are already proven in Theorem 5.11
(compare remarks at the beginning of the proof). We will prove now the remaining case 2.2.4.
The case 2.2.4 is based on the following assumptions: A (F k(ad)) = A (Gk(ad)) and R (F k(ad))≠ R (Gk(ad)). Hence, there are two arguments a, b ∈ A (F), such that (a, b) ∈ R (F k(ad)) ∖
R (Gk(ad)). Furthermore, we assume a ≠ b and b is self-defeating, i.e. (a, a) ∉ R(F) and(b, b) ∈ R(F). Using the following AF J we will prove that the AFs F and G are not normal
expansion equivalent with respect to admissible, preferred and ideal semantics. Let c be a
fresh argument and B = A (F)∖ {a, b}, then
J = (A (F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣ c′ ∈ B}∪ {(b, c)}) .
The following figure illustrates F ∪J and G ∪J . Note that (b, a) may or not be in R(F)
or R(G) (indicated by dashed arrows). Furthermore, (a, b) ∉ R(G) since (a, a) ∉ R(G) and(a, b) ∉ R (Gk(ad)) was assumed. For reasons of clarity we left out possible attacks between the
arguments in B and {a, b}.
a b
c
B
F ∪J ∶
a b
c
B
G ∪J ∶
Whether (b, a) is in R(F) or not we obtain Epr(F ∪J ) = {{a, c}}. If (b, a) ∈ R(G) we observe
that apart from the empty set no other set is admissible in G ∪J . Hence, Epr(G ∪J ) = {∅}.
Consider now (b, a) ∉ R(G). The preferred extension of G ∪J depends on whether a defends
itself in G (and so in G ∪J ) or not. If so, we have Epr(G ∪J ) = {{a}}. If not, we get Epr(G ∪J ) ={∅}. In all cases the preferred extension of G ∪J is unique and differs from {a, c}. Thus, the
same holds for admissible (Proposition 2.17, statement 1) and ideal semantics (Proposition
2.10). Hence, F /≡σN G for σ ∈ {ad, pr, id} concluding the proof.
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5.3.3 Normal Expansion Equivalence for Grounded Semantics
Expansion equivalence with respect to the very cautious grounded semantics can be captured
by the gr-kernel which “identifies” attacks (a, b) as redundant if both a and b are self-attacking
or there is an attack (b, a) and b is self-defeating. The latter condition is a unique feature of the
grounded semantics and reflects its subset-minimality among the complete extensions. The
following theorem shows that the gr-kernel is even suitable to characterize normal expansion
equivalence with respect to grounded semantics.
Theorem 5.34. For any AFs F and G,
F k(gr) = Gk(gr)⇔ F ≡grN G.
Proof. The if-direction, namely F k(gr) = Gk(gr) ⇒ F ≡grN G is a consequence of the Theorems
5.5 and 5.6 as well as Proposition 2.18. Hence, it suffices to show the only-if-direction, i.e.F ≡grN G ⇒ F k(gr) = Gk(gr). We will prove the contrapositive.
Suppose F k(gr) ≠ Gk(gr). We skip the consideration of different arguments, i.e. 1st case:
A(F k(gr)) ≠ A (Gk(gr)) as well as the occurrence of different self-loops, i.e. case 2.1: (a, b) ∈
R(F k(gr)) ∖ R (Gk(gr)) where a = b holds since the proofs of them are exactly the same as in
Theorem 5.22. In the following we assume A (F k(gr)) = A (Gk(gr)) and any self-loop is either
contained in both R (F k(gr)) and R (Gk(gr)) or none of them.
Case 2.2: Consider (a, b) ∈ R (F k(gr)) ∖ R (Gk(gr)) with a ≠ b. Note that (a, b) ∈ R(F) is
implied. Consequently, at least one of the following two statements has to hold: (b, b) ∉ R(F);(a, a) ∉ R(F) and (b, a) ∉ R(F). We will use the standard construction I to prove some cases
(c is a fresh argument).
I = (A (F)∪ {c},{(c, c′) ∣ c′ ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}) .
Case 2.2.1: Let (b, b) ∉ R(F). Consequently, (b, b) ∉ R(G) and hence, (a, b) ∉ R(G) since(a, b) ∉ R (Gk(gr)) holds. The following extensions can be obtained by applying splitting results
(compare Section 5.2.1). If (b, a) ∈ R(F) or (a, a) ∈ R(F), then Egr(F ∪ I) = {{c}} holds. If not,
we get Egr(F ∪ I) = {{a, c}}. On the other hand, if (b, a) ∈ R(G) or (a, a) ∈ R(G) holds, we obtainEgr(G ∪ I) = {{b, c}}. If not, we conclude Egr(G ∪ I) = {{a, b, c}}. This means, for all possible
combinations Egr(F ∪ I) ≠ Egr(G ∪ I) follows. Case 2.2.2: Let (b, b) ∈ R(F) and furthermore,(a, a) ∉ R(F) and (b, a) ∉ R(F). Note that the attacks in F with respect to the arguments a
and b are uniquely determined. The union of F and I yields {a, c} as the unique grounded
extension. The AF G may occur in three configurations (remember that (a, a) ∉ R(G) and(b, b) ∈ R(G) is already assumed), namely i) (a, b), (b, a) ∈ R(G), ii) (a, b) ∉ R(G), (b, a) ∈ R(G)
and iii) (a, b), (b, a) ∉ R(G). In the first two cases Egr(G ∪H) = {{c}} is implied. The third
possibility establishes the grounded extension {a, c} too. Hence, we have to find another
AF K, such that Egr(F ∪K) ≠ Egr(G ∪K) is implied. Let c and d be fresh arguments and
B = A (F)∖ {a, b}. We define
K = (A (F)∪ {c, d},{(b, d)}∪ {(c, c′) ∣ c′ ∈ B}) .
The following figure illustrates F ∪K and G ∪K. We left out possible attacks between the
arguments in B and {a, b} since they can be “ignored” in case of evaluating the AFs with
respect to grounded semantics .
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a b
c d
B
a b
c d
B
F ∪K ∶ G ∪K ∶
The grounded extensions of F ∪K and G ∪K differ, namely {{a, c, d}} = Egr(F ∪K) ≠Egr(G ∪K) = {{a, c}}. This can be seen as follows: The argument c is unattacked in F ∪K
and G ∪K. Furthermore, in both AFs a is defended by {c} and hence, {a, c} has to be a subset
of the grounded extension in both AFs. We observe that d has to belong to the grounded
extension of F ∪K since it is defended by {a, c}. This does not apply to G ∪K. Consequently,F /≡grN G concluding the proof.
5.3.4 Normal Expansion Equivalence for Complete Semantics
We now turn to complete semantics. Similarly to the other semantics considered in this thesis
we will show that a different semantical behaviour of two AFs with respect to arbitrary ex-
pansions and complete semantics is sufficient for not being normal expansion equivalent with
respect to complete semantics. This claim is illustrated in Example 5.31 from the beginning
of this section and will be a consequence of the following theorem showing that the co-kernel
adequately describes normal expansion equivalence with respect to complete semantics.
Theorem 5.35. For any AFs F and G,
F k(co) = Gk(co)⇔ F ≡coN G.
Proof. The if-direction, namely F k(co) = Gk(co) ⇒ F ≡coN G can be obtained by combining Theo-
rem 5.5 and Proposition 2.18. Hence, it suffices to show that F ≡coN G ⇒ F k(co) = Gk(co) holds. By
Theorem 5.6 the latter implication is equivalent to F ≡coN G ⇒ F k(ad) = Gk(ad) and F k(gr) = Gk(gr).
Using Theorems 5.33 and 5.34 we may replace the kernel-equalities by normal expansion equi-
valence with respect to preferred or complete semantics. Thus, we obtain the implication we
have to prove, F ≡coN G ⇒ F ≡prN G and F ≡grN G. If F /≡prN G (or F /≡grN G), then there exists an AF H
with the property F ⪯N F ∪H and G ⪯N G ∪H, such that F ∪H /≡pr G ∪H (or F ∪H /≡gr G ∪H).
Hence, in both cases F ∪H /≡co G ∪H by applying the contrapositive of Proposition 2.17, state-
ment 2. Consequently, F /≡coN G is shown concluding the proof.
5.3.5 Normal Expansion Equivalence for Naive Semantics
Finally, we consider naive semantics. As already stated in Section 5.3.5 normal expansion equi-
valence with respect to naive semantics can be characterized by the following two conditions:
First, possessing the same naive extensions and second, sharing the same arguments.
Theorem 5.36. For any AFs F , G:
Ena(F) = Ena(G) and A(F) = A(G)⇔ F ≡naN G.
Proof. Combine Theorem 5.13 in [Gaggl and Woltran, 2012] as well as Theorem 5.30 and Pro-
position 2.18 of this thesis.
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5.4 Characterizing Local and Weak Expansion Equivalence
In this section we establish characterization theorems for weak expansion equivalence in case of
stable and preferred semantics, arguably the most important semantics for Dung frameworks.
The characterization will not be purely syntactical as we will see. Furthermore we provide an
alternative characterization for local equivalence with respect to stage semantics in terms of a
kernel. Remember that stage and stable semantics behave in the same manner with respect to
the characterization of expansion, normal expansion and strong expansion equivalence. This
means, all mentioned equivalence notions are captured by the stb-kernel (compare Theorems
5.5, 5.8, 5.10 and 5.32). In case of local expansion equivalence we observe a certain difference.
Consider therefore the following example.
Example 5.37. The AFs F and G are local expansion equivalent with respect to stable se-
mantics. This can be seen by checking that Estb(F ∪H) = Estb(G ∪H) for any H, such that
A(H) ⊆ {a, b, c}.4
aF ∶ b c aG ∶ c
Figure 5.14: Non-coincidence of Stable and Stage Semantics
Obviously, F and G are not local expansion equivalent with respect to stage semantics
because {{b}} = Estg(F) ≠ Estg(G) = {∅}. Let us consider now two further AFs F ′ and G′
slightly different to F and G.
aF ′ ∶ b c aG′ ∶ b c
Figure 5.15: Local Expansion Equivalent AFs
We state that F ′ and G′ are not local expansion equivalent with respect to stable semantics.
One possible scenario which makes the predicted different behaviour explicit is the following
where H = ({b, c},{(b, c)}). Obviously, {{b}} = Estb(F ′ ∪H) ≠ Estb(G′ ∪H) = ∅. It is one main
result of this section showing that AFs like F ′ and G′ are local expansion equivalent with
respect to stage semantics because they possess identical stage-*-kernels.5
5.4.1 Weak Expansion Equivalence for Stable Semantics
Weak expansions are normal expansions which add weak arguments only, i.e. the added
arguments never attack the previous ones and furthermore the former attack relation remain
4More precisely, local expansion equivalence is due to the fact that Estb(F) = Estb(G) = ∅, A (F) ∖ A (G) = {b},{(b, b), (b, c)}∩ R(F ∪G) = ∅ and (c, c) ∈ R(F ∪G) (compare [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Theorem 8]).
5Note that a characterization theorem for local expansion equivalence with respect to stage semantics is already
given in [Gaggl and Woltran, 2011, Theorem 6]. In this thesis we will present a kernel-based characterization. We
want to mention that both results were found independently.
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unchanged. We already mentioned that weak expansions naturally occur in case of Value
Based AFs [Bench-Capon, 2003]. Former arguments may be arguments which advance higher
values than the further arguments. Consequently, the new arguments cannot attack the former.
The following theorem characterizes weak expansion equivalence for stable semantics.
Theorem 5.38. For any AFs F and G we have:
F ≡stbW G ⇔ i) A(F) = A(G) and Estb(F) = Estb(G) or ii) Est(F) = Est(G) = ∅.
Proof. (⇐) Given an AF H such that F ⪯W F ∪H and G ⪯W G ∪H holds. We show that
E ∈ Estb(F ∪H) implies E ∈ Estb(G ∪H) (and vice versa). 1st case: Let us assume A(F) = A(G)
and Estb(F) = Estb(G). Consequently, if F = F ∪H, then G = G ∪H is implied because F and G
share the same arguments. Thus, Estb(F ∪H) = Estb(G ∪H) has to hold. From now on we may
assume that F ∪H and G ∪H are indeed weak expansions of F or G. In consideration of Pro-
position 4.2 we are able to apply splitting results. This means, (F ,A2, R3) and (G,A2, R3) are
splittings of F ∪H or G ∪H, whereas A2 = (A(H)/A(F), R(H)∩ (A(H)/A(F)× A(H)/A(F)))
and R3 = R(H) ∩ (A(F) × A(H)/A(F)). Assume E ∈ Estb(F ∪H). Thus, statement 2 of the
splitting theorem 4.10 implies 1. E ∩ A(F) ∈ Estb(F) and 2. E ∩ (A(H)/A(F)) ∈Estb (modUE∩A(F),R3 (AE∩A(F),R32 )). Thus, E ∩ A(G) ∈ Estb(G) since A(F) = A(G) and Estb(F) =Estb(G) was assumed. Furthermore, applying Proposition 4.9, statement 1 we deduce E ∩(A(H)/A(F)) ∈ Estb (AE∩A(F),R32 ) since E ∩ A(F) is a stable extension of F . Moreover, using
that A(F) equals A(G) we derive E ∩ (A(H)/A(G)) ∈ Estb (AE∩A(G),R32 ). Again, by state-
ment 1, Proposition 4.9 it follows E ∩ (A(H)/A(G)) ∈ Estb (modUE∩A(G),R3 (AE∩A(G),R32 )) be-
cause E ∩ A(G) ∈ Estb(G) is already shown. Finally, statement 1, splitting theorem 4.10 justifies(E ∩ A(G)) ∪ (E ∩ (A(H)/A(G))) = E ∈ Estb (F ∪H). We omit the other direction, i.e. E ∈Estb(G ∪H) implies E ∈ Estb(F ∪H), since it can be shown in a similar way. 2nd case: SupposeEstb(F) = Estb(G) = ∅. Thus, Estb(F ∪H) = Estb(G ∪H) = ∅ because assuming E ∈ Estb(F ∪H)
yields to E ∩ A(F) ∈ Estb(F) (splitting theorem 4.10, statement 1) contradicting Est(F) = ∅.
Hence, E ∈ Estb(F ∪H) implies E ∈ Estb(G ∪H). The converse direction can be shown in a simi-
lar way.
(⇒) We show the contrapositive, i.e. (Estb(F) ≠ Estb(G)∨ A(F) ≠ A(G))∧ (Estb(F) ≠ Estb(G)∨Estb(G) ≠ ∅) implies the existence of an AF H, such that F ⪯W F ∪H, G ⪯W G ∪H andEstb(F ∪H) ≠ Estb(G ∪H). First, assume Estb(F) ≠ Estb(G). Without loss of generality we
assume the existence of a set E, such that E ∈ Estb(F) ∧ E ∉ Estb(G). Let a be a fresh argu-
ment and consider H = ({a},∅). We immediately derive that E ∪ {a} is a stable extension ofF ∪H. Furthermore it is impossible that E ∪ {a} ∈ Estb(G ∪H) since E ∉ Estb(G) was assumed
(statement 2, splitting theorem 4.10). Second, let Estb(F) = Estb(G)∧ Estb(G) ≠ ∅∧ A(F) ≠ A(G).
Without loss of generality let a ∈ A(F) ∖ A(G). Observe that for all stable extensions E of F
and G, a ∉ E since Estb(G) ≠ ∅ was supposed. Assume E ∈ Est(G) and define H = ({a},∅).
Hence, E′ = E ∪ {a} ∈ Estb(G ∪H) (statement 1, splitting theorem 4.10). On the other hand,
E′ ∉ Estb(F ∪H) because of F = F ∪H and a ∈ E′ concluding the proof.
We close this section with an example.
Example 5.39. Consider the following AFs F and G.
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a3F ∶ a2 a1a3G ∶ a2 a1
Figure 5.16: Weak Expansion Equivalent AFs
Obviously, A(F) = A(G) and Estb(F) = Est(G) = {{a1}}. Thus, applying the characterization
theorem 5.38 we obtain F ≡stbW G.
5.4.2 Weak Expansion Equivalence for Preferred Semantics
How does the characterization look if we turn to the more relaxed notion of preferred seman-
tics? It turns out that the characterization is very similar but not identical to stable semantics,
namely: two AFs are weak expansion equivalent with respect to preferred semantics if and
only if they share the same arguments, possess the same preferred extensions and further-
more, for any extension E the set of arguments which are not in the extension without being
refuted has to coincide in both AFs.
Theorem 5.40. For any two AFs F , G we have: F ≡prW G iff A(F) = A(G), Epr(F) = Epr(G) and for
each E ∈ Epr(F) ∶ UFE = UGE where UAE = {a ∈ A(A) ∣ a ∉ E ∧ (E, a) ∉ R(A)}.
Proof. (⇐) Given an AF H, such that F ⪯W F ∪H and G ⪯W G ∪H. We have to show thatEpr(F ∪H) = Epr(G ∪H). If F = F ∪H, then G = G ∪H since A(F) = A(G) is assumed. In
consideration of Epr(F) = Epr(G) the assertion follows. Assume now that F ≠ F ∪H. Using
splitting theorem 4.10 one may easily show that E ∈ Epr(F ∪H) implies E ∈ Epr(G ∪H) and vice
versa (compare Theorem 5.38).
(⇒) We will show the contrapositive, i.e. if A(F) ≠ A(G) or Epr(F) ≠ Epr(G) or there exists
an E ∈ Epr(F), such that UFE ≠ UGE , then F /≡prW G. Consider E ∈ Epr(F) and E ∉ Epr(G).
Consequently, E ∪ {d} ∈ Epr(F ∪H) and E ∪ {d} ∉ Epr(G ∪H) where H = ({d},∅) and d is a
fresh argument, i.e. d ∉ A(F)∪ A(G). Assume now A(F) ≠ A(G) and Epr(F) = Epr(G). W.l.o.g.
let a ∈ A(F) ∖ A(G). Consequently, there is no preferred extension E, such that a ∈ E. IfH = ({a},∅), then F ∪H = F and thus, there is no E ∈ Epr(F ∪H), such that a ∈ E. On the other
hand, since a is unattacked in G ∪H we deduce that a is contained in the grounded extension
of G ∪H. Thus, Epr(F ∪H) ≠ Epr(G ∪H) is shown. Finally, we consider A(F) = A(G) andEpr(F) = Epr(G) but there exists an E ∈ Epr(F), such that UFE ≠ UGE . W.l.o.g. let a ∈ UGE ∖UFE .
This means, a ∉ E, (E, a) ∉ R(G) and (E, a) ∈ R(F), i.e. a is attacked by E in F . Consider nowH = ({a, b},{(a, b)}) where b is a fresh argument. One can easily see that E ∪ {b} ∈ Epr(F ∪H)
(b is defended by E) but E ∪ {b} ∉ Epr(G ∪H) (b is not defended by E). Altogether, F /≡prW G is
shown.
5.4.3 Local Expansion Equivalence for Stage Semantics
We already know that expansion equivalence implies local expansion equivalence for any
semantics σ (compare Proposition 2.18). Furthermore, there are certain semantics where local
expansion equivalence is even sufficient for expansion equivalence. This is, for example, the
case if we consider semi-stable semantics [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Theorem 8]. In case
of stage semantics an analogous result does not hold, i.e., for this semantics, local expansion
equivalence is a properly weaker concept than expansion equivalence. We will see that the
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characterization of local expansion equivalence with respect to stage semantics can be done by
comparing a newly introduced stage-*-kernel which is defined as follows.
Definition 5.41. Given a an AF F = (A, R). We define the stage-*-kernel of F as F k∗(stg) =(A, Rk∗(stg)) where
Rk
∗(stg) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a) ∈ R ∨∀c (c ≠ a → (c, c) ∈ R)}.
The first disjunct allows the deletion of an attack (a, b) if a is self-attacking. These at-
tacks are even redundant with respect to arbitrary expansions (compare [Gaggl and Woltran,
2012, Theorem 5.11]). The second disjunct reflects the intuition that an attack (a, b) becomes
irrelevant with respect to local expansions and the evaluation given by stage semantics if all
arguments different from a are self-attacking. Given the latter scenario we observe that only
two sets may be a stage extension, namely ∅ or {a}. In particular, the conflict-freeness of {a}
is sufficient for being the unique stage extension.
At first we will prove two technical lemmata paving the way for the main theorem showing
that the syntactical equivalence of stage-*-kernels characterizes local expansion equivalence
between two AFs with respect to stage semantics.
Lemma 5.42. If F k∗(stg) = Gk∗(stg), then (F ∪H)k∗(stg) = (G ∪H)k∗(stg) for any AF H, such that
A(H) ⊆ A(F ∪G).
Proof. First notice that the assumption F k∗(stg) = Gk∗(stg) implies that R(F) and R(G) contain
the same self-loops. Furthermore, A (F) = A (G) and thus, A (F) = A ((F ∪H)k∗(stg)) =
A ((G ∪H)k∗(stg)). Hence, it suffices to show that R ((F ∪H)k∗(stg)) = R ((G ∪H)k∗(stg)). As-
sume (a, b) ∈ R ((F ∪H)k∗(stg)) ∖ R ((G ∪H)k∗(ad)). It suffices to consider a ≠ b since the
sharing of the same self-loops of (F ∪H)k∗(stg) and (G ∪H)k∗(stg) is implied. We deduce(a, b) ∈ R(F ∪H) and furthermore, (a, a) ∉ R(F), R(H) and thus, (a, a) ∉ R(G). Additionally,
there exists an argument c, such that c ≠ a and (c, c) ∉ R(F ∪H). Thus, (c, c) ∉ R(F), R(H)
and consequently, (c, c) ∉ R(G). We have to consider two cases. If (a, b) ∈ R(H), then(a, b) ∈ R(G ∪H). If (a, b) ∈ R(F), then (a, b) ∈ R(G) because F k∗(stg) = Gk∗(stg) is assumed
and (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(stg)) can be derived since neither (a, a) nor (c, c) are included in R(F).
In both cases, (a, b) ∈ R(G ∪H). Furthermore, (a, b) ∈ R ((G ∪H)k∗(stg)) (in contrast to the
assumption) since neither (a, a) nor (c, c) are included in R(G ∪H).
We have shown that the notion of an stage-*-kernel is robust with respect to local expan-
sions. The next technical lemma shows that evaluation given by stage semantics is insensitive
with respect to transitions to the associated stage-*-kernel.
Lemma 5.43. For any AF F , F ≡stg F k∗(stg).
Proof. First we show that F and F k∗(stg) contain the same conflict-free sets, i.e. S ∈ c f (F) iff
S ∈ c f (F k∗(stg)). The if-direction is given by R (F k∗(stg)) ⊆ R(F). It suffices to show that if
S ∈ c f (F k∗(stg)), then S ∈ c f (F). Assume not, i.e. there are two arguments a, b ∈ S, such that(a, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(ad)). without loss of generality a ≠ b. Consequently, (a, a) ∈ R(F) or at
least (b, b) ∈ R(F) has to hold. This contradicts the conflict-freeness of S in F k∗(stg) becauseF k∗(stg) and F share the same self-loops.
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We show now that Estg(F) = Estg (F k∗(stg)). Assume E ∈ Estg(F) ∖ Estg (F k∗(stg)). Hence,
E ∈ c f (F) and thus, E ∈ c f (F k∗(stg)). Furthermore, there exists a conflict-free set E′, such that
R+F k∗(stg)(E) ⊂ R+F k∗(stg)(E′). We deduce E′ ∈ c f (F) and E′ /⊆ E. Since R (F k∗(stg)) ⊆ R(F) and
E ∈ Estg(F) ∖ Estg (F k∗(stg)) we deduce the existence of at least two arguments a and b, such
that a ∈ E, b ∉ E and (a, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(stg)) because E cannot maintain the same range inF k∗(stg). Observe that (a, a) ∈ R(F) yields a contradiction since E ∈ c f (F) is already deduced.
On the other hand, (c, c) ∈ R(F) for any c ≠ a implies that E = {a} and E′ ⊆ E in contradiction
to E′ /⊆ E.
Assume now E ∈ Estg (F k∗(stg))∖ Estg(F). Thus, E is conflict-free in F k∗(stg) and F . We de-
duce the existence of a conflict-free set E′, such that R+F(E) ⊂ R+F(E′). Hence, E′ ∈ c f (F k∗(stg))
and furthermore, E /⊆ E′ because E ∈ Estg (F k∗(stg)) is assumed. Since R (F k∗(stg)) ⊆ R(F) and
E ∈ Estg (F k∗(stg)) ∖ Estg(F) we deduce the existence of at least two arguments a and b, such
that a ∈ E′, b ∉ E′ and (a, b) ∈ R(F) ∖ R (F k∗(stg)) since E′ has to reduce its range in F k∗(stg).
Again, (a, a) ∈ R(F) yields a contradiction because E′ ∈ c f (F) is already shown. Furthermore,
if (c, c) ∈ R(F) for any c ≠ a we deduce E′ = {a} and E ⊆ E′ in contrast to E /⊆ E′.
We are now prepared to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.44. For any AFs F and G,
F k∗(stg) = Gk∗(stg)⇔ F ≡stgL G.
Proof. Let F k∗(stg) = Gk∗(stg) and given an AF H, such that A(H) ⊆ A(F ∪G). It suffices to
show that E ∈ Estg(F ∪H) if, and only if E ∈ Estg(G ∪H). Suppose E ∈ Estg(F ∪H). By Lemma
5.43, E ∈ Estg ((F ∪H)k∗(stg)) and applying Lemma 5.42, E ∈ Estg ((G ∪H)k∗(stg)). Finally, using
Lemma 5.43, we derive E ∈ Estg(G ∪H) concluding this case. Showing that E ∈ Estg(G ∪H)
implies E ∈ Estg(F ∪H) can be done in a similar way. Consequently, F ≡stgL G is shown.
Assume now F k∗(stg) ≠ Gk∗(stg). We will show that F /≡stgL G is implied. Without loss of
generality we may assume A (F) = A (G) and (a, a) ∈ R(F)⇔ (a, a) ∈ R(G) (compare [Gaggl
and Woltran, 2012, Lemmata 5.3, 5.4]). Consider a ≠ b and (a, b) ∈ R (F k∗(stg)) /R (Gk∗(stg)).
It follows that (a, b) ∈ R(F), (a, a) ∉ R(F) and consequently, (a, a) ∉ R(G). Now we have to
distinguish two cases with respect to the presence or absence of the self-loop (b, b).
1st case: Assume (b, b) ∉ R(F). Thus, (b, b) ∉ R(G) and consequently, (a, b) ∉ R(G). Note
the attack (b, a) may or may not be in R(F) or R(G). We define
K = (A (F) ,{(a, c), (b, c), (c, c) ∣ c ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b}}) .
In any case, {a} ∈ Est(F ∪K) and consequently, {a} ∈ Estg(F ∪K). On the other hand, we
state {a} ∉ Estg(G ∪K) because {{a, b}} = Estg(G ∪ I) if (b, a) ∉ R(G) and {{b}} = Estg(G ∪K) if(b, a) ∈ R(G).
2nd case: Consider (b, b) ∈ R(F). Thus, (b, b) ∈ R(G) and furthermore, there exists an
argument c, such that (c, c) ∉ R(F). Consequently, (c, c) ∉ R(G) and therefore, (a, b) ∉
R(G). Unfortunately, there are 25 = 32 possibilities with respect to the presence or absence
of (b, a), (b, c), (c, b), (a, c) and (c, a) in R(F) and R(G). Consequently, there are 210 = 1024
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combination possibilities of F and G with respect to to the aforementioned attacks. Fortuna-
tely, we do not have to consider every single possibility because we have already shown that
if two AFs possess the same stg-*-kernel, then local expansion equivalence of them is implied.
Since (b, b) ∈ R(F) and consequently, (b, b) ∈ R(G) is assumed we may omit the consideration
of (b, a) and (b, c) in R(F) and R(G). Thus, for both AFs 23 = 8 possibilities with respect
to the presence or absence of (c, b), (a, c) and (c, a) remain. For clarity, we will present all
possibilities.
cG1 ∶ a bcF1 ∶ a b
cG2 ∶ a bcF2 ∶ a b
cG3 ∶ a bcF3 ∶ a b
cG4 ∶ a bcF4 ∶ a b
cG5 ∶ a bcF5 ∶ a b
cG6 ∶ a bcF6 ∶ a b
cG7 ∶ a bcF7 ∶ a b
cG8 ∶ a bcF8 ∶ a b
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In order to prove that any pair of AFs (Fi,Gj) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8 can be distinguished by a
local expansion we present the following table. An empty cell (Fi,Gj) in the table means thatEstg(Fi ∪L) ≠ Estg(Gj ∪L) where
L = (A (F) ,{(a, d), (c, d), (d, d) ∣ d ∈ A (F)∖ {a, b, c}}) .
Furthermore, an entry “(a, b)” means that Estg(Fi ∪L′) ≠ Estg(Gj ∪L′) is fulfilled if we considerL′ = L∪ ({a, b},{(a, b)}). For instance, Estg(F8 ∪L′) = {{a},{c}} ≠ {{a}} = Estg(G4 ∪L′)
dG1 p dG2 p dG3 p dG4 p dG5 p dG6 p dG7 p dG8 p
(c, a) (c, a)
(a, c)(c, a) (a, c)(c, a) (a, c)(c, a)(a, c)(c, a) (a, c)(c, a) (a, c)(c, a)(a, c)(c, a) (a, c)(c, a) (a, c)(c, a)(a, c)(c, b) (a, c)(c, b)
(c, b)
(a, b) (a, c) (a, c)
(a, b) (a, b)
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6
F7
F8
Finally, we have shown that F /≡stgL G concluding the proof.
We want to conclude this section by providing an example showing that equivalence classes
with respect to local expansion equivalence and stage semantics may be very huge sets in the
presence of self-loops.
Example 5.45. The following figure represents 64 different AFs (any combination of dashed
arrows is suitable). All of them are local expansion equivalent with respect to stage semantics.
aF1−64 ∶ b c
Figure 5.17: A Huge Equivalence Class
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5.5 Summary of Results and Implications
5.5.1 Overview: “Strength” of Kernels
In our results the notions of a kernel played a crucial role. Indeed, kernels are interesting from
several perspectives: First, they allow to decide the corresponding notion of equivalence by a
simple check for topological (i.e. syntactical) equality. Moreover, all kernels we have obtained
so far can be efficiently constructed from a given argumentation framework.
In this subsection we want to provide a quick overview of the considered kernels as well
as their potential with respect to characterizing equivalence notions. In the following we recall
the resulting attack-relation of the σ-kernel or σ-*-kernel of an AF F = (A, R). Remember that
the considered kernels do not change the initial set of arguments, i.e. F k(σ) = (A, Rk(σ)) orF k∗(σ) = (A, Rk∗(σ)), respectively.
1. Rk(stb) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a) ∈ R},
2. Rk
∗(stg) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a) ∈ R ∨∀c (c ≠ a → (c, c) ∈ R)}.
3. Rk(ad) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a) ∈ R,{(b, a), (b, b)}∩ R ≠ ∅},
4. Rk
∗(ad) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, ((a, a) ∈ R ∧ {(b, a), (b, b)}∩ R ≠ ∅)∨((b, b) ∈ R ∧∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c), (c, b)}∩ R ≠ ∅))}
5. Rk(gr) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (b, b) ∈ R,{(a, a), (b, a)}∩ R ≠ ∅},
6. Rk
∗(gr) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, ((b, b) ∈ R ∧ {(a, a), (b, a)}∩ R ≠ ∅)∨((b, b) ∈ R ∧∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R ≠ ∅))},
7. Rk(co) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, (a, a), (b, b) ∈ R},
8. Rk
∗(co) = R ∖ {(a, b) ∣ a ≠ b, ((a, a), (b, b) ∈ R)∨((b, b) ∈ R ∧ (b, a) ∉ R ∧∀c ((b, c) ∈ R → {(a, c), (c, a), (c, c)}∩ R ≠ ∅))}.
The following table provides a comprehensive overview of the potential of the above men-
tioned kernels. For the sake of completeness we also mentioned local expansion equivalence
(second line) since Oikarinen and Woltran have shown that the ad-kernel even characterizes
local expansion equivalence with respect to semi-stable, eager, admissible, preferred and ideal
semantics (Theorem 8 in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]). The entry “k(σ)” in line X and co-
lumn τ indicates that the σ-kernel characterizes ≡τX . The entry “[m]n” indicates two facts: First,
the characterization problem is already solved in [m] (Theorem n), but there is no kernel provi-
ded so far and second, none of the considered kernels serve as a characterization. Hereby, we
use [1] as a shorthand for [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] as well as [2] for [Gaggl and Woltran,
2012]. A red-highlighted entry indicates a new result.
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dstgp dstbp dssp degp dadp dprp didp dgrp dcop dnap
k∗(stg) [1]9 k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) [1]10 [1]11 [2]5.13
k(stb) k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co) [2]5.13
k(stb) k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(ad) k(gr) k(co) [2]5.13
k(stb) k(stb) k(ad) k(ad) k∗(ad) k∗(ad) k∗(ad) k∗(gr) k∗(co) [2]5.13
L
E
N
S
Figure 5.18: The Whole Landscape of Characterizations
Figure 5.18 shows the entire collections of characterizations for local expansion, expansion,
normal expansion and strong expansion equivalence with respect to the ten semantics studied
in this theses. The fact that different notions of equivalence might or might not coincide is
interesting from a conceptual point of view. To illustrate this let us have a look at normal and
strong expansion equivalence. Recall that normal expansions add new arguments and possibly
new attacks which involve at least one of the fresh arguments, while strong expansions (a
subclass of normal expansions) restrict the possible attacks between the new arguments and
the old ones to a single direction. In dynamic settings, both concepts can be justified in the
sense that new arguments might be raised but this will not influence the relation between
already existing arguments. For strong expansions, only strong arguments will be raised, i.e.
arguments which cannot be attacked by existing ones. The corresponding equivalence notions
now check whether two AFs are “equally robust” to such new arguments, and indeed, normal
expansion equivalence always implies strong expansion equivalence but the other direction
is only true for some of the semantics, namely stage, stable, semi-stable, eager and naive
semantics. One interpretation is that when two AFs are not normal expansion equivalent, then
this can be made explicit by only posing strong arguments (not attacked by existing ones),
while for the other semantics this is not the case. For this particular example, it seems that the
notion of admissibility which is more “explicit” in the admissible, preferred, ideal, grounded
and complete semantics is responsible for the fact that frameworks might be strong expansion
equivalent but not normal expansion equivalent.
5.5.2 Relations Between Different Notions of Equivalence
In Section 2.1.5 we considered preliminary relations between several notions of equivalence
which hold for any semantics (compare Figure 2.9). Using the characterization theorems pre-
sented in this thesis we may provide a more fine-grained picture for the considered semantics.
We will present the results in one single theorem. For a better understanding we provide
arrowed diagrams just like in Figure 2.9. The obtained relations hardly need a proof since
they are simply combinations of former theorems. For this reason we only list the involved
statements instead of providing full proofs.
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Theorem 5.46. For any AFs F and G,
1. F ≡stgE G⇔ F ≡stgN G⇔ F ≡stgS G ⇒ F ≡stgL G,F ≡stgW G ⇒ F ≡stg G
2. F ≡stbE G⇔ F ≡stbN G⇔ F ≡stbS G ⇒ F ≡stbL G ⇒ F ≡stbW G ⇒ F ≡stb G
3. F ≡ssE G⇔ F ≡ssN G⇔ F ≡ssS G⇔ F ≡ssL G ⇒ F ≡ssW G ⇒ F ≡ss G
4. F ≡egE G⇔ F ≡egN G⇔ F ≡egS G⇔ F ≡egL G ⇒ F ≡egW G ⇒ F ≡eg G
5. F ≡adE G⇔ F ≡adN G⇔ F ≡adL G ⇒ F ≡adS G,F ≡adW G ⇒ F ≡ad G
6. F ≡prE G⇔ F ≡prN G⇔ F ≡prL G ⇒ F ≡prS G,F ≡prW G ⇒ F ≡pr G
7. F ≡idE G⇔ F ≡idN G⇔ F ≡idL G ⇒ F ≡idS G,F ≡idW G ⇒ F ≡id G
8. F ≡grE G⇔ F ≡grN G ⇒ F ≡grL G,F ≡grS G,F ≡grW G ⇒ F ≡gr G
9. F ≡coE G⇔ F ≡coN G ⇒ F ≡coL G,F ≡coS G,F ≡coW G ⇒ F ≡co G
10. F ≡naE G⇔ F ≡naN G⇔ F ≡naS G⇔ F ≡naL G ⇒ F ≡naW G ⇒ F ≡na G
Proof. We only list the involved statements.
ad 1.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.5, 5.8, 5.10, 5.32, 5.44
ad 2.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.5, 5.10, 5.32, 5.38 and Theorem 9 in [Oikarinen
and Woltran, 2011]
ad 3.-4.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.5, 5.7, 5.11, 5.33 and Theorem 8 in [Oikarinen
and Woltran, 2011]
ad 5.-7.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.5, 5.7, 5.16, 5.33, 5.40 and Theorem 8 in [Oika-
rinen and Woltran, 2011]
ad 8.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.5, 5.7, 5.22, 5.34
ad 9.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.5, 5.7, 5.28, 5.35
ad 10.) Combine Proposition 2.18, Theorems 5.36, 5.30 and Theorem 5.13 in [Gaggl and Wol-
tran, 2012]
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Figure 5.19: Relations for Stage Semantics
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Figure 5.20: Relations for Stable Semantics
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Figure 5.21: Relations for Semi-stable and Eager Semantics
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Figure 5.22: Relations for Admissible, Preferred and Ideal Semantics
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Figure 5.23: Relations for Grounded and Complete Semantics
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Figure 5.24: Relations for Naive Semantics
In our point of view, the most remarkable relations are those of stable, semi-stable, eager
and naive semantics since their corresponding equivalence relations are totally ordered with
respect to subset-relation. Bearing in mind that strong, weak and local expansions are com-
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pletely different concepts the containedness or coincidence of their corresponding equivalence
relations is unexpected.
5.5.3 The Role of Self-loop-free AFs
If we take a closer look at the definitions of the σ-kernel or σ-*-kernel of an AF F we observe
that in case of self-loop-free AFs nothing changes, i.e. F and its corresponding kernel are
identical. Consequently, any equivalence notion on the set of AFs characterizable through
kernels presented in this thesis collapses to identity if we restrict ourselves to self-loop-free
AFs. Consequently, known and the new results in this paper lead to the following observation:
Proposition 5.47. For any self-loop-free AFs F , G, any Φ ∈ {E, N, S}, and any semantics σ ∈{stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co}: F = G iff F ≡σΦ G.
Moreover, for σ ∈ {stg, ss, eg, ad, pr, id}
F = G iff F ≡σL G.
This means, self-loop-free AFs are redundancy-free or in other words, all attacks may play
a crucial role with respect to further evaluations provided that the expansions are normal or
strong. In the introductory part of this thesis we noted that such kinds of expansions natu-
rally occur if Dung-style AFs are (re-)instantiated by a deductive argumentation system where
a new piece of information was added to the underlying knowledge base (compare Figure
1.1). We want to mention that there are some formalisms like classical logic-based frameworks
where self-attacking arguments do not occur (cf. Theorem 4.13 in [Besnard and Hunter, 2001]).
Other argumentation systems like ASPIC [Prakken, 2009] or a very simple formalism presen-
ted in [Caminada, 2005] “allow” self-defeating arguments. We refer the reader to [Prakken,
2009, Section 7] and [Caminada, 2005, Section 3] for examples of self-defeating arguments
or [Gabbay, 2013, Chapter 18] for a detailed discussion of loops in argumentation.
As an aside, the result stated in Proposition 5.47 cannot be conveyed to local and weak
expansion equivalence with respect to any considered semantics. This means, there are syn-
tactically different and self-loop-free AFs which are local expansion equivalent (cf. Example
16 in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]) or weak expansion equivalent (cf. Example 5.39).
Another particular property of all kernels obtained so far is that the same arguments have
to be present and self-looping in either both or none of the compared frameworks.
Proposition 5.48. For any AFs F and G, any relation Φ ∈ {E, N, S}, and any semantics σ ∈{stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co, na}:
if F ≡σΦ G , then A(F) = A(G),
and moreover, for each a ∈ A(F),
(a, a) ∈ R(F) iff (a, a) ∈ R(G).
The same proposition can be given for σ ∈ {stg, ss, eg, ad, pr, id} and local expansion equivalence.
Note that therefore the statements of Proposition 5.47 already hold if at least one of the two
compared frameworks is self-loop-free.
Finally, in contrast to the statements of Proposition 5.47, we mention that for AFs with
self-loops, many different AFs can have the same kernel, and thus are equivalent to each other.
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For instance, consider expansion equivalence w.r.t. stable semantics which is characterized by
the stb-kernel (see Definition 5.1). Furthermore, let F be an AF possessing n arguments and m
self-loops. Then there exist 2m(n−1) − 1 different AFs which are all expansion equivalent to F
with respect to stable semantics. An AF possessing a huge number of equivalent AFs is given
in Example 5.45.
5.6 Conclusions and Related Work
Studying equivalence notions between argumentation frameworks has gained increasing in-
terest recently (see also [Wooldridge et al., 2006; Amgoud and Vesic, 2011]). In fact, due to the
inherently nonmonotonic nature of argumentation frameworks, strong notions of equivalence
give a handle to decide whether two frameworks represent the same knowledge even if this
knowledge is not captured by the actual extensions, but can be made explicit by augmenting
the framework under consideration. In contrast to other nonmonotonic formalisms where a
huge number of equivalence notions inbetween standard and strong equivalence were studied,
e.g. query equivalence [Shmueli, 1987] and uniform equivalence [Eiter and Fink, 2003] in case
of logic programs, we are not aware of further studies apart from [Oikarinen and Woltran,
2011; Gaggl and Woltran, 2011] devoted to abstract argumentation.
In this chapter we mainly studied two new equivalence relations for AFs, namely normal
and strong expansion equivalence which lie in-between standard equivalence and the recently
proposed expansion equivalence [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011]. The majority of the presented
results was already published in [Baumann, 2012a]. Smaller pieces of the puzzle were pu-
blished in [Baumann, 2011; Baumann and Woltran, 2013; Baumann and Brewka, 2013a]. We
provided characterization theorems for ten prominent semantics, namely stage, stable, semi-
stable, eager, admissible, preferred, ideal, grounded, complete and naive semantics. In parti-
cular, we showed that for any considered semantics, normal expansion equivalence coincides
with expansion equivalence. Even more surprisingly we showed that stage, stable, semi-stable,
eager and naive semantics do not “distinguish” between normal expansion and strong expan-
sion equivalence. This was quite surprising as well as unexpected since the class of strong
(normal) expansions is obviously a proper subset of the class of normal (arbitrary) expansions.
Except for naive semantics, the obtained characterization theorems are based on syntactical
criteria. To determine whether two AFs are expansion, normal expansion or strong expansion
equivalent with respect to a certain semantics σ it suffices to compare certain kernels of them
(see Figure 5.18). A kernel of an AF F is itself an AF obtained from F by deleting certain
attacks depending on the considered semantics σ. It has been shown that, if two AFs possess
identical kernels under a certain semantics σ then they are inter-substitutable with respect to
further evaluations in dynamic scenarios satisfying the concept of arbitrary, normal or strong
expansions, respectively. Such replacement properties are essential for logical approaches in
general, particularly for nonmonotonic logics where this question becomes a non-trivial task.
Furthermore, we devote particular attention to the special role of self-loops with respect to
characterizing equivalence notions. Roughly speaking, the presence of self-loops seems to be
the crucial feature which separates syntactic equivalence from strong notions of equivalence. In
other words, self-loop-free AFs are redundancy-free, i.e. all attacks may play a crucial role with
respect to further evaluations provided that the expansions are normal or strong. Recent work
by Lonc and Truszczyn´ski [Lonc and Truszczyn´ski, 2011] investigates equivalence relations on
graphs in a very general setting. As part of future work we want to study to which extend the
results of [Lonc and Truszczyn´ski, 2011] can be applied to abstract argumentation.
In [Amgoud and Vesic, 2011] different notions of equivalence with respect to stable seman-
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tics of two logic-based argumentation systems is studied. More precisely, they studied the
question when two systems, not necessarily built over the same knowledge base and/or not
necessarily using the same attack definition, produce the same output with respect to stable
semantics. Our results as well as the characterization theorems in [Oikarinen and Woltran,
2011; Gaggl and Woltran, 2011] are in some sense useless for their aim. The reason is that
the authors concentrated on classical logic-based argumentation systems where self-attacking
arguments provably do not occur (cf. Theorem 4.13 in [Besnard and Hunter, 2001]). Note
that the results presented in this thesis are not restricted to a special instantiation like Tars-
kian logics but rather to any underlying logic. For instance, in case of ASPIC [Prakken, 2009]
self-defeating arguments may occur and thus, identifying redundant attacks may simplify the
evaluation of such systems.
Another mentionable work dealing with various notions of equivalence with regard to de-
ductive argumentation is [Wooldridge et al., 2006]. Due to the use of a very basic definition
of an argument the presented complexity results holds for a whole range of argumentation
systems. They showed, for instance, that checking equivalence of argument sets is not compu-
tationally harder than checking equivalence of arguments. Both are co-NP-complete.
In [Baroni et al., 2012] so-called input/output argumentation frameworks are introduced,
an approach to characterize the behavior of an argumentation framework as sort of a black box
with a well-defined external interface. The paper defines the notion of semantics decomposa-
bility and analyzes complete, stable, grounded and preferred semantics in this regard. It turns
out that, under grounded, complete, stable and credulous preferred semantics, input/output
argumentation frameworks with the same behavior can be exchanged without affecting the
results of the evaluation of other interacting arguments. Since replaceability is one of the
main motivations for studying equivalence notions, we plan to explore connections between
equivalence and decomposability in the near future.
For other future directions, we mention further semantics which have not investigated
with respect to normal and strong expansion equivalence. One example is c f 2 semantics [Ba-
roni et al., 2005], and the recently introduced variant, stage2 semantics [Dvorˇák and Gaggl,
2012]. For both, expansion equivalence has been shown to coincide with syntactical equiva-
lence [Dvorˇák and Gaggl, 2012; Gaggl and Woltran, 2012]) even if self-loops are permitted.
It would be interesting to check whether this behaviour carries over to weaker notions of
equivalence. A prominent semantics which has not been considered in terms of equivalence
checking at all is the resolution-based grounded semantics [Baroni et al., 2011c]. Likewise, as we
have done for stable and preferred semantics, characterizing weak expansion equivalence is
on our agenda.
In [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007] several general criteria for comparing and evaluating se-
mantics were introduced. This paper was an important step to classify semantics because until
its publication comparisons between semantics were almost exclusively example driven. The
results presented in this thesis motivate further criteria to compare argumentation semantics
on an abstract level, for example, coincidence, containedness or incomparability (with res-
pect to subset-relation) of equivalence relations. The study of such equivalence-based criteria
as well as their relations to the criteria proposed in [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007] will be part
of future work. Finally, the related notions of succinctness [Gaggl and Woltran, 2012] and
regularity [Baumann, 2012b] deserve further attention.
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Cardinality Results
Stable extensions constitute one of the most important and well-researched semantics for abs-
tract argumentation frameworks. Dung used the stable extension semantics in his original pa-
per to relate AFs to Reiter’s default logic, different forms of logic programming, and to solve
the stable marriage problem, among others [Dung, 1995]. Alas, there are some fundamental
questions to be asked about stable extension semantics which have yet remained unanswered.
Given an abstract argumentation framework for which the only thing we know is that it
has n arguments and x attacks, how many stable extensions does it have at most? How many
on average? For x = 0, without attacks, the case is quite clear – there will be exactly one
stable extension, the set of all arguments. For x = n2, the AF contains all possible attacks, in
particular all self-attacks, and there will be no stable extension. But what happens in between,
when 0 < x < n2? This chapter takes a step towards analytical and empirical answers to these
questions.
In the considerable zoo of semantics for abstract argumentation, stable extension semantics
is the only one for which extension existence is not guaranteed for finite AFs. While this is
usually regarded as a weakness, there is an obvious benefit to it when AFs are used to model
NP-complete problems, that do not necessarily possess a solution. In this setting, the fact that
an NP problem instance encoded as an AF has no stable extension elegantly reflects the fact
that the problem instance has no solution. Using other semantics, unsolvability would have to
be represented by introducing new (meta-)language constructs.
NP problems typically have elements that are generating (that is, generate possible solution
candidates) and elements that are constraining (that is, eliminate possible solution candidates).
The classical example of an NP-complete problem is of course deciding the satisfiability of a
given propositional formula in conjunctive normal form, the SAT problem. There, the propo-
sitional variables are the generating elements (since solution candidates are among all inter-
pretations for the variables) while the disjunctive clauses are the constraining elements (they
remove those interpretations not satisfying some clause). Can the same be said about argu-
ments and attacks? Surely, arguments are generating, since extension candidates are sets of
arguments. But are attacks always constraining?
Example 6.1. Consider the following scenario. The AFs G and H represent two specific ways
to add an attack to the AF F , namely adding an attack from a2 to a1 or adding an attack from
a1 to itself, respectively. Observe that Estb(F) = {{a1}}, Estb(G) = {{a1},{a2}} and Estb(H) = ∅.
Thus, adding attacks to an AF may in general both increase or decrease the number of stable
extensions.
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a1F ∶ a2 a1G ∶ a2 a1H ∶ a2
Figure 6.1: Generating vs. Constraining
The reason for this behavior is of course to be found in the definition of stable extensions:
Roughly, to be a stable extension, a set has to satisfy two properties. It has to be conflict-
free, and has to attack all arguments not in the set. Intuitively, the number of attacks in
an AF correlates negatively with the number of conflict-free sets – the more attacks (that is,
conflicts) there are, the less conflict-free sets are found. At the same time, the number of attacks
correlates positively with the number of sets which attack all outsiders. So how will these two
interleaved and counteracting forces come to terms in general?
In this chapter we present an analytical and empirical study of the maximal and average
numbers of stable extensions in abstract argumentation frameworks. As one of the analytical
main results, we prove a tight upper bound on the maximal number of stable extensions that
depends only on the number of arguments in the framework. More interestingly, our empirical
results indicate that the distribution of stable extensions as a function of the number of attacks
in the framework seems to follow a universal pattern that is independent of the number of
arguments.
The obtained results can be used to provide lower bounds for the minimal realizability
of certain sets of extensions. Furthermore, counting techniques may yield upper bounds for
algorithms computing extensions. Finally, the average number gives some guidance on how
many extensions a given AF with n arguments and x attacks will have.
6.1 Background
Throughout the chapter we assume some familiarity with standard analysis, combinatorics
and statistics. We start with the formal foundation, i.e. we introduce some well-known graph
theoretical concepts and technical tools which are needed to prove the cardinality results.
For a set X, a (binary) relation over X is any set R ⊆ X × X. Special among these relations
is the identity idX = {(x, x) ∣ x ∈ X}. A relation R over X is irreflexive iff R ∩ idX = ∅, that is, for
each x ∈ X we have (x, x) ∉ R. It is symmetric iff for each (x, y) ∈ R we have (y, x) ∈ R. The
inverse of a relation R is given by R−1 = {(y, x) ∣ (x, y) ∈ R}.
A directed graph is a pair (V, E) where V is a finite set and E a binary relation over V. The
elements of V are called nodes and those of E are called edges. A directed graph is symmetric
iff its edge relation E is symmetric. For a directed graph G = (V, E), we denote by sym(G) =(V, E ∪ E−1) its symmetric version. Similarly, the irreflexive version of a graph G = (V, E) is
defined as irr(G) = (V, E ∖ idV).
An undirected graph is a pair (V, F) where V is as above and F ⊆ (V2)∪ (V1) is a set of 2- and
1-element subsets of V, which represent the undirected edges. For a directed graph G = (V, E),
we denote by und(G) = (V,{{u, v} ∣ (u, v) ∈ E}) its associated undirected graph. An undirected
graph (V, F) is simple iff F ⊆ (V2). We denote by Gn the set of all simple graphs with n nodes.
For a simple graph G = (V, F), a set M ⊆ V is independent iff for all u, v ∈ M we have{u, v} ∉ F. A set M ⊆ V is maximal independent iff it is independent and there is no proper
superset of M which is independent. The set of all maximal independent sets of a simple
graph G is denoted by MIS(G).
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Example 6.2. The following graphs illustrate the concepts of irreflexive, symmetric and undi-
rected graphs. Observe that MIS(und(sym(irr(F)))) = {{a1, a4},{a2, a4},{a1, a3, a5},{a2, a5}}.
a1F ∶ a2 a3 a4 a5
a1irr(F) ∶ a2 a3 a4 a5
a1sym(irr(F)) ∶ a2 a3 a4 a5
a1und(sym(irr(F))) ∶ a2 a3 a4 a5
Figure 6.2: Different Operators on Graphs
For the purposes of this paper, we denote by An the set of all AFs with n arguments, and byAn,x the set of all AFs with n arguments and x attacks. There, not the precise arguments are of
interest to us but only the number of arguments; we will implicitly assume that the n arguments
can be numbered by 1, . . . , n. Once the arguments are fixed, however, we consider two AFs
the same if and only if they have the same attack relation. So the AF with two arguments 1, 2
where 1 attacks 2 is different from the AF with two arguments 1, 2 where 2 attacks 1, although
the two are isomorphic in a graph theoretic sense. This guarantees that all possible scenarios,
that is, any arrangement of attacks for fixed numbers of arguments and attacks is considered.
A full AF is of the form (A, A × A) for some set A. Furthermore, we call an argumentation
framework a y-AF iff it has exactly y stable extensions. Consider again Example 6.2. The AFF is a 2-AF since F has two stable extensions, namely Est(F) = {{a1, a4},{a2, a4}}. Moreover,
we state that F ∈ A5,7 and consequently, F ∈ A5.
6.2 Analytical Results
In [Baroni et al., 2010] it was shown that counting the number of stable extensions of an argu-
mentation framework is a computationally hard problem. The analysis of counting techniques
may yield upper bounds for algorithms computing extensions. Furthermore, a fast counting
algorithm gives a first advice on how controversial the information represented in an AF is. In
this section, we contribute some analytical results to this direction of research.
For a fixed number n of arguments there are ∣An∣ = 2n2 different AFs, since any attack
relation whatsoever is possible and significant. Furthermore, if we additionally know that the
AF in question possesses x attacks, then the total number of possibilities equals ∣An,x ∣ = (n2x ),
the number of x-element subsets of an n2-element set. This means that in principle, one may
obtain numerically precise results by brute force for classes of AFs possessing a certain number
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of arguments and attacks. For example, specific classes of AFs could be enumerated and each
element analyzed separately. But obviously, such an approach cannot provide a solution which
is parametric in the numbers of arguments and attacks.
6.2.1 Maximal Number of Stable Extensions
What is the maximal number of stable extensions given an AF F = (A, R) with ∣A∣ = n argu-
ments? Since argumentation semantics choose their extensions from the set of subsets of A,
we have Est(F) ⊆ 2A. This yields an immediate upper bound on the number of extensions for
any semantics, namely ∣Est(F)∣ ≤ ∣2A∣ = 2n. Can this quite naive bound be improved? In case
of semantics satisfying I-maximality the answer is “yes.” For short, I-maximality is fulfilled if
no extension can be a proper subset of another (compare Definition 2.11). In other words, the
cardinality of one of the largest ⊆-antichains S being a subset of an n-element set gives a fur-
ther upper bound on the number of extensions.1 The maximal cardinality of such antichains
is given by Sperner’s theorem [Sperner, 1928], namely ∣S∣ = ( n⌊ n2 ⌋). By a straightforward calcu-
lation one may show that ( n⌊ n2 ⌋) ≤ 2
n
n
. Without any further knowledge about the considered
semantics it is impossible to find better bounds.
Let us turn to stable semantics. In any case, we can achieve a high number of stable
extensions by grouping. For instance, the maximal number of stable extensions for an AF
possessing an even number n = 2m of arguments is at least 2m = 2 n2 . Such a framework is given
by grouping the arguments in pairs that mutually attack each other:
F = ({ai, bi ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ,{(ai, bi), (bi, ai) ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ m})
Is grouping in pairs the best we can do?
Assume we group not in pairs but in groups of arbitrary size k such that all members of a
single group attack each other. Then for n arguments the number of stable extensions is given
by the following function:
f ∶N→N where f (k) = k⌊ nk ⌋
To approximate the maximum of f (k) we calculate the extrema of the associated real-valued
function
g ∶ R→ R where g(k) = k nk = e nk ⋅ln(k)
For that, we have to solve the following equation:
k
n
k (− n
k2
⋅ ln(k)+ n
k2
) = k nk ⋅ n
k2
⋅ (1− ln(k)) = 0
The only solution for this equation is that k equals Euler’s number e. Of course, it is very
difficult to arrange in groups of e when dealing with arguments. Nevertheless, the obtained
result provides an upper bound for the initial problem – namely the value g(e) = e ne – assuming
that grouping is the best. We will see that the exact value is not far away.
On the path to the main theorem we start with two simple observations which hardly need
a proof. Being aware of this fact, we still present them in the form of a proposition to be able
1A ⊆-antichain is a set of sets of which any two are mutually ⊆-incomparable.
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to refer to them later on. For one, whenever a set E is a stable extension of F , then E is also a
stable extension in the symmetric and self-loop-free version of F . Observe that the converse is
not true in general.
Proposition 6.3. For any AF F = (A, R) and any E ∈ Estb(F) we have E ∈ Estb(sym(irr(F)).
For another, the second proposition establishes a simple relationship between stable ex-
tensions in symmetric AFs without self-loops and maximal independent sets in undirected
graphs.
Proposition 6.4. For any symmetric and irreflexive AF F = (A, R) we have:
E ∈ Estb(F) iff E ∈ MIS(und(F)).
Now we turn to the main theorem which is mainly based on a graph theoretical result
by J.W. Moon and L. Moser from 1965 [Moon and Moser, 1965].2 The theorem establishes a
tight upper bound for the number of stable extensions of an AF with n arguments. The upper
bound is obtained as a function σmax of n.
Theorem 6.5. For any natural number n, it holds that
maxF∈An ∣Est(F)∣ = σmax(n)
where the function σmax ∶N→N is defined by
σmax(n) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if n = 0 or n = 1,
3s, if n ≥ 2 and n = 3s,
4 ⋅ 3s−1, if n ≥ 2 and n = 3s + 1,
2 ⋅ 3s, if n ≥ 2 and n = 3s + 2.
Proof. The cases n = 0 and n = 1 are obvious; let n ≥ 2.
“≤”: We already observed that for any AF F we have Est(F) ⊆ Estb(sym(irr(F))) (Proposi-
tion 6.3). Consequently, ∣Estb(F)∣ ≤ ∣Estb(sym(irr(F))∣ follows and
maxG∈An ∣Est(G)∣ ≤ maxG∈An ∣Estb(sym(irr(G))∣
In the light of Proposition 6.4 we get
maxG∈An ∣Estb(sym(irr(G)))∣ = maxG∈An ∣MIS(und(sym(irr(G))))∣
Observe that the functions irr(⋅), sym(⋅) and und(⋅) do not change the number of nodes
(respectively arguments). Consequently, we may estimate thus:
maxG∈An ∣MIS(und(sym(irr(G))))∣ ≤ maxU∈Gn ∣MIS(U)∣ .
This means, the value σmax(n) does not exceed the maximal number of maximal inde-
pendent sets of simple undirected graphs of order n. Due to Theorem 1 in [Moon and
Moser, 1965] these values are exactly given by the last three lines of the claimed value
range of σmax(n).
2Note that the original work deals with maximal cliques. The result can be equivalently formalized in terms of
maximal independent sets as done in [Wood, 2011].
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“≥”: We define the following AFs.
● A2(i) = {ai, bi} and A3(i) = {ci, di, ei},● F2(i) = irr(A2(i), A2(i)× A2(i)) and F3(i) = irr(A3(i), A3(i)× A3(i)).● For n = 3s consider F3s = ⋃si=1F3(i).● For n = 3s + 1 consider F3s+1 = (⋃2i=1F2(i))∪ (⋃s−1i=1 F3(i)).● Finally, in case of n = 3s + 2 consider F3s+2 = F2(1)∪ (⋃si=1F3(i)).
It is straightforward to verify that ∣Estb(F3s)∣ = 3s, ∣Estb(F3s+1)∣ = 4 ⋅ 3s−1 and∣Estb(F3s+2)∣ = 2 ⋅ 3s.
For illustration we present here an instantiation of the presented prototypes, namely F10 =F3⋅3+1 = (⋃2i=1F2(i))∪ (⋃2i=1F3(i)) which is graphically represented by the following figure:
a1 b1 a2 b2 c1 d1
e1
c2 d2
e2
Figure 6.3: The AF F3⋅3+1
Observe that ∣Estb(F10)∣ = ∣Estb(F3⋅3+1)∣ = 4 ⋅ 32. In general, the function σmax looks more
complicated than it is, because the numbers are slightly different depending on the remainder
of n on division by 3. Here is a much simpler version.
Corollary 6.6 (Upper bound short cut). For any natural number n, we find:
σmax(n) ≤ 3 n3 ≤ 1, 4423n.
As a final note we want to mention that it does not make much sense to ask for the minimal
number of stable extensions, since for any n > 0 and 0 < x ≤ n2 there are always AFs without
stable extensions.
6.2.2 Average Number of Stable Extensions
What is the average number of stable extensions of argumentation frameworks with n argu-
ments and x attacks? As in the case of the maximal number of stable extensions, the precise
value is computable in principle. This is immediate from its formal definition:
Definition 6.7. The function σ¯(n, x) returns the average number of stable extensions of all AFs
with n arguments and x attacks, and is defined thus:
σ¯ ∶N×N→ R where σ¯(n, x) = ∑F∈An,x ∣Est(F)∣(n2x )
While this definition makes it precise what we mean by “average number of stable exten-
sions”, computing this number for a given AF still remains as hard as computing all stable
extensions of that AF.
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But we are looking for a way to compute the number σ¯(n, x) without actually inspecting the
AF except for determining the parameters n and x. This would be useful since the number
n of arguments and the number x of attacks can be determined in linear time, and knowing
σ¯(n, x) gives some guidance on how many extensions a given AF F ∈ An,x will have.
The best-case scenario would be the specification of a closed-form function that returns the
exact values of σ¯(n, x). Unfortunately, the combinatorial blowup even in case of small numbers
of attacks turns this endeavor into a challenging task. Nevertheless, we were able to specify
certain values. The following proposition presents some exact values of σ¯(n, x) given that the
number of attacks x is close to 0 or close to n2.
Proposition 6.8. For any n ∈N, we have
σ¯(n, 0) = 1 σ¯(n, n2 − 3) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
3⋅(n2−n−1)(n+1)⋅(n2−2) , if n ≥ 3,
1− 1n , if n = 2
0, otherwise
σ¯(n, 1) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1−
1
n , if n ≥ 1,
0, otherwise
σ¯(n, n2 − 2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
2
n+1 , if n ≥ 2,
0, otherwise
σ¯(n, 2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1−
2n−2
n2+n , if n ≥ 2,
0, otherwise
σ¯(n, n2 − 1) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
n , if n ≥ 1,
0, otherwise
σ¯(n, n2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1, if n = 0,0, otherwise
Proof. The values of σ¯(n, 0) and σ¯(n, n2) are obvious. Consider σ¯(n, 1) = 1− 1n . This can be seen
as follows: If the associated attack is a self-loop, then we have no extensions. If it is not, then
we have exactly one extension which is the union of all unattacked arguments. Obviously, we
have ∣An,1∣ = (n21 ) = n2 and furthermore, there are n different AFs in An,1 possessing exactly
one loop. Thus σ¯(n, 1) = n2−nn2 = 1− 1n . Analogously one may prove σ¯(n, n2 − 1) = 1n .
We want to emphasize that the other values are non-trivial. To get an idea of the complexity
of the remaining proofs we consider the value σ¯(n, n2 − 3). Without loss of generality we may
assume n ≥ 2 since the number of attacks has to be non-negative. Furthermore we may even
assume that n ≥ 3 because if n = 2, then σ¯(n, n2 − 3) = σ¯(n, 1) which is already solved. An AFF ∈ An,n2−3 can be seen as the result of the following process: One starts with a full AF with
n arguments. We then stepwise delete 3 attacks which are either loops or non-loops. We list
now the probabilities to end up in an AF where k loops are deleted.
P(k = 3) = 1 ⋅ n
n2
⋅ n − 1
n2 − 1 ⋅ n − 2n2 − 2
P(k = 2) = 3 ⋅ n
n2
⋅ n − 1
n2 − 1 ⋅ n2 − nn2 − 2
P(k = 1) = 3 ⋅ n
n2
⋅ n2 − n
n2 − 1 ⋅ n2 − n − 1n2 − 2
We omit the consideration of P(k = 0) since such kind of frameworks do not possess an exten-
sion and thus does not contribute anything to σ¯(n, n2 − 3). We list now the average number of
extensions of AFs in An,n2−3 where k loops are deleted.
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av(k = 3) = 3
av(k = 2) = 1 ⋅ 2(n − 1)
n2 − n + 2 ⋅ (n2 − n)− 2(n − 1)n2 − n= 2 ⋅ (1− 1
n
)
av(k = 1) = 1− ( n − 1
n2 − n + (n2 − n)− (n − 1)n2 − n ⋅ n − 1n2 − n − 1)
= n2 − 3n + 2
n2 − n − 1
The average numbers can be seen as follows. If we delete exactly three loops we end
up in an AF with 3 stable extensions, namely the singletons of the non-looping arguments.
Consequently, av(k = 3) = 3. If we delete 2 loops and 1 non-loop we either end up with 1
extension, namely if the deleted non-loop starts by a self-loop-free argument or 2 extensions
otherwise. The probability of the former is 2(n−1)n2−n . Since both cases are mutual exclusive and
exhaustive we derive a probability of (n2−n)−2(n−1)n2−n for the latter case proving the claimed value
of av(k = 2).
Consider now av(k = 1). Observe that the maximal number of extensions equals 1 because
only 1 self-loop is deleted. In the following we call this argument arg. We specify now the
probability that we end up in AF with zero stable extension. This is the case if at least one
deleted non-loop starts by arg. The probability for the “first” non-loop is n−1n2−n . Furthermore,
the probability for the “second” deleted non-loop to start by arg providing that the first one
does not started by arg is given by (n2−n)−(n−1)n2−n ⋅ n−1n2−n−1 . Thus, the claimed value for av(k = 1)
follows. Finally, we have to sum up, that is,
σ¯(n, n2 − 3) = 3∑
i=1 P(k = i) ⋅ av(k = i) = 3 ⋅ n
2 − n − 1(n + 1)(n2 − 2)
We omit the consideration of σ¯(n, 2) and σ¯(n, n2 − 2) since their treatment is similar in style to
the above proof.
It can be seen that the values of σ¯(n, 1) and σ¯(n, 2) do not give any indication on how
σ¯(n, 3) could look like, not even qualitatively. The same holds for σ¯(n, n2 − 2) and σ¯(n, n2 − 3),
and potential informed guesses about σ¯(n, n2 − 4). But having these exact values at hand we
may consider the limit values for AFs with an increasing number of arguments. We have
lim
n→∞ σ¯(n, 0) = limn→∞ σ¯(n, 1) = limn→∞ σ¯(n, 2) = 1
On the other hand, we obtain
lim
n→∞ σ¯(n, n2) = limn→∞ σ¯(n, n2 − 1) = limn→∞ σ¯(n, n2 − 2) = limn→∞ σ¯(n, n2 − 3) = 0
This means that for increasing numbers of arguments, the average number of stable extensions
in the case of very small numbers of attacks approaches from below to 1. In the case of very
large numbers of attacks we have a convergence to 0 from above. So far, so good; but it is
still unclear how many extensions there usually are in between. With an increasing number of
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attacks, does the average number of stable extensions just decrease in a monotone fashion? It
turns out that this is a really hard problem.
Of course, we can look at simple special cases. For example, for n = 2, Proposition 6.8 yields
the precise values for all possible numbers of attacks 0 ≤ x ≤ n2 = 4: an AF with 2 arguments
and 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 attacks will have an average number of 1, 12 ,
2
3 ,
1
2 , 0 stable extensions, respecti-
vely. So while the number of attacks linearly increases, the average number of extensions first
decreases, then increases and then decreases again. Qualitatively speaking, this means that for
a fixed number of arguments, there are certain numbers of attacks where the average number
of extensions is locally maximal or minimal, respectively.
We have seen in the proofs of the results above that already the closed-form solutions for
values of σ¯(n, 2) and σ¯(n, n2 − 3) are quite hard to obtain. To nevertheless get an inkling of
the characteristic distribution of stable extensions, we have set out to study the problem in an
empirical way.
6.3 Empirical Results
As we have seen, combinatorial explosion stood in our way of mathematically analyzing the
average number of stable extensions. While the same combinatorial explosions prevent us
from an exhaustive empirical analysis of the average number of stable extensions, we can still
use methods from descriptive statistics to draw some meaningful conclusions. The basic idea
is simple: instead of computing the average number of stable extensions for all AFs in some
class such as An,x, we only analyze a uniformly drawn random sample S ⊆ An,x of a fixed size∣S∣. We thereby obtain a point estimation of the actual (hidden) parameter σ¯(n, x).
6.3.1 Experimental Setup
We wrote a program that randomly samples AFs with specific parameters and determines
how many stable extensions they have. To create a random AF, we first set A = {1, . . . , n}. To
create attacks we then randomly select x elements from the set A × A with equal probability
for each pair. Thus we obtain an AF F = (A, R) ∈ An,x. For a given n, this process is repeated
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ n2. Now for each AF thus created, we determine the number of stable extensions
as follows: We use the translation of Dung [Dung, 1995, Section 5] to transform the AF into
a logic program. By [Dung, 1995, Theorem 62], the stable models of this logic program and
the stable extensions of the AF are in one-to-one-correspondence. Using the answer set solver
clingo [Gebser et al., 2011], we determine the number of stable models of the program and
thus the number of stable extensions of the AF. So for a given n, we can empirically estimate
the average number of stable extensions in each sample set of AFs with n arguments and x
attacks for all 0 ≤ x ≤ n2.
6.3.2 Average Number of Stable Extensions
To check the experimental setup, we first ran the experiment with n = 2 and observed that
the empirical results agreed with the predictions of Section 6.2.2. The results for n = 20 are
depicted in a scatter plot, in Figure 6.4 on page 118; the results for n = 50 are plotted likewise
in Figure 6.5, page 119.
The empirical data clearly vindicate our analytical predictions for very small and very
large numbers of attacks. In between, the data furthermore confirm our predictions about
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Figure 6.4: Average number of stable extensions of AFs with n = 20 arguments. The values have been
obtained from a random sample of size 2500 for each possible number 0 ≤ x ≤ 400 of attacks. (So the
total sample size is 1 002 500.) We can see that there is a significant local minimum at xmin ≈ 330 and
a local maximum at xmax ≈ 380.
the emergence of local minima and maxima. In addition to the experiments that are graphi-
cally depicted, we present the positions of these empirically obtained minima and maxima for
several additional small n in Table 6.1.
For the local minimum and for small n, an approximation of the position xmin of the local
minima from below is given by n2 − n ⋅√n. More precisely – and astonishingly –, the position
of the local maximum always coincides with n2 − n. On an intuitive level, this suggests that
removing n attacks from a full AF with n arguments quite probably leads to AFs for which
both adding and removing attacks leads to a decrease in the number of stable extensions. To
investigate this issue somewhat deeper, we next analyzed how the average number of stable
extensions came about.
6.3.3 Number of AFs with at most one Stable Extension
The point estimator sample mean we used for approximating σ¯(n, x) does not per se tell us
anything about the distribution of 0-AFs, 1-AFs, . . . , y-AFs among the AFs sampled. Recall
that a y-AF is an AF with exactly y stable extensions. In principle, an average number of 0.5
stable extensions could be obtained by a 50/50-ratio of 0-AFs to 1-AFs, or likewise by a 75/25-
ratio of 0-AFs to 2-AFs. To find out what is the case, we extracted the absolute frequency
of 0-AFs and 1-AFs from our results for n = 50 and plotted them in the stacked histogram
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Figure 6.5: Average number of stable extensions of AFs with n = 50 arguments and sample
size 400 for each 0 ≤ x ≤ 2500. Again, there are significant extrema: a local minimum at
xmin ≈ 2250 and a local maximum at xmax ≈ 2450. It even seems that there is another local
maximum at x′max ≈ 2000 and another local minimum before that, but the data are unreliable.(Recall that for x = 2000 the number of AFs to sample from is ∣A50,2000∣ = (25002000) ≥ ( 25002000)2000 ≈
6.6 ⋅ 10193.)
(Figure 6.6) on page 121.
The stacked histogram for n = 20 looks alike, indeed as much as the scatterplots in Figures
6.4 and 6.5 do. This suggests that there are certain recurring features in this distribution that
are independent of the number n of arguments. It cannot be seen in the histogram, but we also
observed that for any set of sampled AFs from A50,x with 0 ≤ x ≤ 502, there are typically more
1-AFs than 2-AFs, more 2-AFs than 3-AFs, and so on. This gives some hints about the sizes of
the subclasses of 1-AFs, 2-AFs, . . . in a given class An,x.
We close the empirical section by presenting two conjectures supported by the obtained
results. The first one is concerned with the cardinality of y-AFs for a fixed number n of
arguments.
Conjecture 6.9. For any natural numbers n, k and l with 0 < k < l ≤ n we have:
∣{F ∣ F ∈ An, F is a k-AF}∣ ≥ ∣{G ∣ G ∈ An, G is an l-AF}∣ .
The second conjecture claims that the average number of stable extensions of AFs is always
located in between 0 and 1. Here is the precise formulation.
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d2p d3p d4p d5p d6p d7p d8p d9p d10p
1 4 9 15 23 32 45 57 73
1.17 3.80 8 13.82 21.30 30.48 41.37 54 68.38
0.17 0.2 1 1.18 1.7 1.52 3.63 3 4.62
0.17 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06
2 6 12 20 30 42 56 72 90
2 6 12 20 30 42 56 72 90
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n
xmin
n2 − n ⋅√n
eabs
erel
xmax
n2 − n
eabs = erel
Table 6.1: Positions (at a specific number x of attacks) of empirically observed local minima and maxima
(denoted by xmin or xmax, respectively) of the average number of stable extensions of AFs with n
arguments. We additionally present the values of our analytical estimations. To approximate the position
of the minima, we devised the function n2 − n ⋅√n; for the maxima we obtained n2 − n. The rows labelled
by eabs and erel show the absolute and relative error of these estimates.
Conjecture 6.10. For any natural numbers n and x with 0 < x < n2 we have:
0 < σ¯(n, x) < 1.
6.4 Conclusions and Related Work
We have conducted a detailed analytical and empirical study on the maximal and average
numbers of stable extensions in abstract argumentation frameworks. The presented results are
already published in [Baumann and Strass, 2013]. First of all, we have proven a tight upper
bound on the maximal number of stable extensions. For specific numbers of attacks, we have
also given the precise average number of stable extensions in terms of closed-form expressions.
As the calculation of these analytical values tends to be quite complex, we turned to studying
the problem empirically. There, we obtained data about the distribution of stable extensions in
samples of AFs which were randomly drawn with a uniform probability. Our empirical results
offer new insights into the average number and also the distribution of stable extensions for
AFs, given only the parameters n (number of arguments) and x (number of attacks).
We could not provide exhaustive theoretical explanations for the many empirical observa-
tions we have made, and consider this as one of the major future directions of this research.
First and foremost we consider it important to work on proving or disproving the conjectures
we explicitly formulated at the end of the previous section. Also the conjectured local maxi-
mum of the average number of stable extensions at n2 − n attacks deserves some attention.
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Figure 6.6: Absolute frequencies of 0-AFs (gray) and 1-AFs (black) among all AFs with n = 50 argu-
ments and x attacks for 0 ≤ x ≤ n2 = 2500 with a total sample size of 1 000 400. It is obvious from the
histogram that the majority (at least two thirds) of all sampled AFs have no stable extension. Additio-
nally, almost all AFs have at most one stable extension. The white area at the top consequently depicts
the y-AFs for y ≥ 2. For x ≈ 100 = 2n, there is a meaningful number of such y-AFs, which however
decreases with increasing x. (Note that the extremal graphs defined in Theorem 6.5 have n arguments
and 2n attacks.) At x ≈ 2250, where the average number of stable extensions has a local minimum,
the absolute frequency of 0-AFs has a local maximum; furthermore at this position there are almost no
y-AFs for y ≥ 2. Conversely, at x ≈ 2450 where the average number of stable extensions has a local
maximum, the absolute frequency of 0-AFs has a local minimum; furthermore there are yet again y-AFs
for y ≥ 2.
A possible way to tackle these conjectures may be to look at subclasses of AFs with special
structural properties, such as having no self-loops, or more generally no cycles, those being
symmetric, or the ones with a specific average connectivity. Finally, it is clear that many of the
questions we asked about stable extension semantics can be asked about the other standard
semantics.
Note that our results are not only of interest to the argumentation community: We have
seen in the proof of Theorem 6.5 that there is a close relationship between stable extensions
of AFs and maximal independent sets of undirected graphs. Indeed, maximal independent
sets are sometimes called “stable sets” in the graph theory literature. In a sense, stable exten-
sions represent a directed generalization of maximal independent sets, where the ⊆-maximality
condition has been replaced by the condition that all nodes not in the set must be reached by
a directed edge from the set. So there is also a graph theoretical significance to our results.
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6.4. Conclusions and Related Work
For abstract argumentation, our results show that – in the context of stable semantics –
attacks cannot simply be thought of as constraining: adding an attack may sometimes increase
and sometimes decrease the number of stable extensions. Although this might be obvious in
general to argumentation researchers (AFs are, after all, a nonmonotonic formalism), for the
first time we were able to present some precise numerical figures around this phenomenon.
The present work is also related to recent work on realizability in abstract argumenta-
tion [Dunne et al., 2013]. Realizability addresses the following question: given a set X of sets
of arguments, is there an argumentation framework whose set of extensions exactly coincides
with X? From the results, we immediately know that the answer is “no” if X involves n distinct
arguments and the cardinality of X is greater than 3
n
3 . I-maximality and Sperner’s theorem do
not tell us that much: with n = 6 arguments, for example, I-maximality only guarantees that
at least 2
6
2 = 8 extensions can be realized, while our construction shows that 3 n3 = 9 is perfectly
possible and more than that is impossible. Conversely, the cardinality of the extension-set X gives
an indication of the minimal number of arguments needed to realize the extensions in X. For
example, if there are 10 extensions to realize, we immediately know that we will need at least
7 arguments for that.
Our current results on the average number of stable extensions regard all possible AFs to
occur equally likely. In future research, we want to look at AFs that occur “in practice,” that
is, from instantiations of more concrete argumentation languages. In [Modgil et al., 2013, Sec-
tion 1.5], the authors acknowledge the need for a benchmark library in abstract argumentation.
In particular, they mention that the library should contain benchmarks “that arise from real-
world instantiations of argumentation.” We consider the development of such a benchmark
collection an important prerequisite for analyzing empirical properties of their instances.
A further related work is [Baroni et al., 2010]. Here the problem of counting without expli-
citly enumerating extensions was studied from a computational point of view. It was shown
that in general counting the number of stable extensions of an argumentation framework is a
computationally hard problem.
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More recently several problems regarding dynamic aspects of abstract argumentation have been
addressed in the literature [Boella et al., 2009; Cayrol et al., 2010; Bisquert et al., 2011; Liao et al.,
2011]. One much cited problem among these concerns the acceptability of certain arguments
and is called enforcing problem [Baumann and Brewka, 2010]. This is, in brief, the question
whether it is possible, given a specific set of allowed operations, to modify a given AF such that
a desired set of arguments becomes an extension or a subset of an extension of the modified
AF. Several sufficient conditions under which enforcements are (im)possible were identified.
Consider the following snapshot of a dialogue among agents A and B depicted in Fi-
gure 7.1. Assume it is A’s turn and his desired set of arguments is E = {a1, a2, a3}. Further-
more, A and B are discussing under preferred semantics, which selects maximal conflict-free
and self-defending sets of arguments.
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
c
jkj jkjklll
c b2 b3
d
?
Figure 7.1: Snapshot of a Dialogue
In order to enforce E agent A may come up with new arguments which interact with the old
ones (for example through introducing an argument which attacks b2 and b3) and/or question
old arguments or attacks between them, respectively (for example through questioning the
self-attack of c). Please note that firstly, in this scenario enforcing is possible and secondly,
there are at least two different possibilities to achieve that. This observation leads us to the
more general problem of minimal change [Baumann, 2012b]. To be more precise, we are not
only interested whether enforcements are possible, but also in the effort needed to enforce a set
of arguments. The numerical measure we will use for this effort corresponds to the number
of modifications needed to transform the given AF into an AF in which E is enforced. The
minimal number of additions or removals of attacks to reach such an enforcement is the so-
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called characteristic of E. Quite surprisingly, it was shown that, in case of certain semantics
and modification types, there are local criteria to determine the minimal number, although
infinitely many possibilities to modify a given AF exist.
The term minimal change traditionally concerns belief change, in particular belief revision
(cf. the AGM approach [Alchourrón et al., 1985]). Our investigation shares some common
ground with this area, in particular the central role of theories or knowledge bases which
are most similar to the initial one. Nevertheless, there are important differences. First of all,
completely different formalisms are used, e.g. classical logic in AGM and AFs here. Secondly,
while belief revision aims at incorporating new beliefs, we are interested in enforcing already
given but not yet accepted sets of arguments through adding new information. For an excellent
elaboration of the relationships between argumentation and belief revision we refer the reader
to [Falappa et al., 2009].
A further interesting and important question is the mutual replaceability or similarity bet-
ween AFs in the light of achieving goals (i.e. enforcing desired sets). Without doubt being able
to identify such similarities among argumentation scenarios is a big advantage for an agent.
For instance, he may safely accept more counterattacks to his arguments knowing that they
do not make it more difficult at all to reach his goals. How to decide whether two AFs are
mutually replaceable with respect to minimal changes? Consider the following AFs which
might stem from modeling the same scenario but where the underlying notions of attack are
different or, putting it less abstract, the attack (a3, a1) is in question.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
Figure 7.2: Minimal Change Equivalence
The frameworks F and G are on a par in a static, non-dynamical sense since both possess
the unique preferred extension {a2}. If we assume that the agents desired set of arguments
is E = {a1} the situation becomes different because although, F and G are equivalent in the
standard sense, the effort needed to getting a1 accepted is different. To be more precise, using
the results presented in this chapter it can be verified that the characteristic of E with respect
to arbitrary expansions equals 1 in F and 2 in G. This leads us towards novel dynamic no-
tions of equivalence which guarantee equal minimal efforts needed to enforce certain subsets,
namely minimal-D-equivalence and the more general minimal change equivalence. We present
characterization theorems for several Dung semantics and furthermore, we show the relations
to standard and expansion equivalence in general as well as a complete picture for stable and
preferred semantics.
Further motivations or theoretical and practical applications of our work are the following:
• dialogue strategies: Given an abstract argumentation scenario, assume that one agent
reaches his goal if he enforces at least one of several desired sets of arguments. With
the help of characteristics he may figure out which set is the closest one to being accep-
ted in the current scenario. Furthermore, he may develop strategies which decrease or at
least do not increase the characteristic.
• monotonic vs. non-monotonic behaviour: Argumentation is non-monotonic. Since every
extension possesses a characteristic of zero, one may analyze and characterize dynamic
scenarios where former extensions or at least accepted arguments survive, i.e. the cha-
racteristic remains zero. The characterization of monotonic parts contributes to a better
understanding of the inherent non-monotonic formalism.
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• implicit vs. explicit information: As demonstrated by the AFs depicted in Figure 7.2, know-
ledge about the extensions alone does not make explicit the implicit information with
respect to minimal efforts needed to enforce certain subsets. In this sense minimal change
equivalent AFs are insensitive to dynamics; in other words, they share the same implicit
information.
A further, at first glance more theoretical problem we study in this chapter is the so-called
spectrum problem [Baumann and Brewka, 2013b]. The name was chosen because of its similarity
with the famous Spektralproblem1 in model theory [Scholz, 1952]. Given a certain semantics σ
and a modification type Φ, we study whether there is, for a given natural number n, an AFF and a set of arguments E such that n is the (σ,Φ)-characteristic of E with respect to F . In
other words, we want to determine the set of all natural numbers which may occur as (σ,Φ)-
characteristics, the so-called (σ,Φ)-spectrum. This yields interesting insights into particular
semantics. To mention one result, we will show that in case of semi-stable semantics and the
addition of weak arguments (arguments which do not attack previous arguments) not each
natural number may arise as the minimal effort needed to enforce a certain set E. In particular,
the characteristic cannot be 1.
What makes our study even more interesting, as we believe, is the fact that it provides
useful and at times surprising new insights into the interrelationships among the studied
semantics. To this end, we perform our analysis in parallel for a whole group of semantics
which we consider as some of the most important semantics for Dung frameworks. Rather
than sets of values, spectra thus become sets of tuples of values.
7.1 Enforcing Problem
7.1.1 Conservative and Liberal Enforcements
As stated at the very beginning of this chapter enforcing an extension E means modifying an
argumentation framework in such a way that E becomes one of its extensions or at least a
subset of an extension. The modifications we are interested in here are normal expansions and
changes in the semantics. The former correspond to additional arguments that are brought into
play together with the attack relations among them and older arguments. The latter can be
viewed as a switch in the applied proof standard, for instance a switch from stable semantics
to the more cautious grounded semantics.
Definition 7.1. Let F , G be AFs and σ, τ semantics. A pair (G, τ) is called an (F ,σ)-enforcement
of E if (1) F ⪯N G, and (2) there is a E′, such that E ⊆ E′ and E′ ∈ Eτ(G). (G, τ) is called
1. strict if E ∈ Eτ(G),
2. conservative if σ = τ,
3. liberal if σ ≠ τ,
4. strong (resp. weak) if F ⪯S G (resp. F ⪯W G).
Whenever F and σ are clear from context we simply speak of enforcements of E. A strict
enforcement explicitly demands that the desired set of arguments becomes an extension. Fur-
thermore, if the considered semantics remains constant we call an enforcement conservative.
1Roughly speaking, Scholz investigated the possible sizes finite models of a first-order sentence may have.
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Almost all existing papers dealing with belief revision consider a fixed semantics. Liberal en-
forcements change the semantics. As mentioned earlier, this may be interpreted as a change of
proof standard or paradigm shift. Imagine a judicial proceeding. It is vitally important whe-
ther you are accused on the base of criminal or civil law. The required evidence is different
and hence the acceptable sets of arguments differ.
Note that more general modifications like leaving out previous attack relations or adding
further attacks between previous arguments are excluded by our definition. If these types of
manipulation are allowed the problem becomes trivial because one may add or delete argu-
ments and attack relations at will.
To familiarize the reader with enforcements we give two examples.
Example 7.2. Consider the following AF F :
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Figure 7.3: Liberal Enforcement
Let σ be stable semantics and E = {a1, a3} the desired set of arguments. Obviously, Estb(F) ={{a1, a4}}. How to enforce E? Define an enforcement (G, τ) of E with F = G and τ = pr. Indeed,
E becomes preferred in G and thus, E is enforced. The considered enforcement is strict and
liberal.
Example 7.3. Consider the AF F = (A, R) = ({a1, a2, a3} ,{(a1, a2), (a2, a1), (a2, a3)}) depicted
below:
a1 a2 a3b1
Figure 7.4: Conservative Enforcement
Let σ be grounded semantics and E = {a2} the desired set of arguments. The set E is
not accepted because Egr(F) = {∅}. How to enforce E? Define an enforcement with G =(A∪{b1} , R∪{(b1, a1)}). Now, {{b1, a2}} = Egr(F) and therefore E is enforced. The considered
enforcement is non-strict, conservative and strong.
7.1.2 Impossibility Results
The two Examples 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the possibility to enforce a desired set of arguments. In
this subsection we study scenarios where strict enforcing is impossible. Instead of considering
particular semantics we will use abstract principles like admissibility and reinstatement (com-
pare Definition 2.11 and Figure 2.4 for an overview). Consequently, our results are general
enough to cover even semantics which may be defined in the future.
We now show some useful interrelations between subsets of an AF, its normal expansions
and abstract principles of semantics. The following properties are pretty obvious and hardly
need any proof. Being aware of this fact, we still present them in the form of a proposition to
be able to refer to them later on.
Proposition 7.4. Given an AF F = (A, R) and a semantics σ.
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1. If σ satisfies admissibility and E ⊆ A does not defend all its elements in F , then there is no strict
conservative enforcement of E.
2. If σ satisfies reinstatement and E ⊆ A does not contain all defended elements in F , then there is
no strict conservative weak enforcement of E.
3. If σ satisfies conflict-freeness and E ⊆ A is conflicting, i.e. (E, E) ∈ R, then there is no conservative
enforcement of E.
Proof. 1. For any AF G, such that F ⪯N G we observe that E does not defend all its elements
in G since normal expansions remain the former attack relation unchanged. Thus, E ∉ Eσ(G)
since σ satisfies admissibility.
2. Assume that E does not contain all defended arguments in F . Without loss of generality
let a be such an argument. Furthermore, let G be a weak expansion of F . Thus, we deduce
that all possible attackers of a are already elements of A. Consequently, E does not contain all
defended arguments in G either. Thus, E ∉ Eσ(G) since σ satisfies reinstatement.
3. Obvious. Any superset of a conflicting set is conflicting.
The proposition above presents obvious necessary conditions for the enforcing problem.
The following impossibility theorems are more sophisticated than the mentioned proposition.
The first one shows limitations for exchanging believed with unattacking arguments.
Theorem 7.5. (exchanging arguments) Given an AF F = (A, R) and
1. a semantics σ satisfying reinstatement,
2. a semantics τ, satisfying admissibility and conflict-freeness,
3. a set E such that E ∈ Eσ(F) and
4. two sets E′, C such that E′ ⊆ E, C ⊆ A ∖ E, C ≠ ∅, (C, A ∖ {E′ ∪C}) ∉ R and E∗ ∶= E′ ∪C ∉Eσ(F),
then there is no pair (G, τ), such that (G, τ) is a strict (F ,σ)-enforcement of E∗.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that F ⪯N G and E∗ ∈ Eτ(G). Since C is non-empty
subset of A ∖ E we deduce the existence of an argument c, such that c ∈ C ∧ c ∉ E. Using
that σ satisfies reinstatement and E ∈ Eσ(F) we deduce that c is not defended by E in F .
This means, there is an argument b, such that b ∈ A, (b, c) ∈ R and (E, b) ∉ R (*). Since τ
satisfies admissibility and E∗ ∈ Eτ(G) is assumed we conclude (E∗, b) ∈ R ∪ R(G). Note that(E∗, b) ∈ R(G) is impossible since new attacks have to involve at least one new argument.
Thus, (E∗, b) ∈ R has to hold. Consequently, (E′, b) ∈ R or (C, b) ∈ R. The former disjunct is
impossible because of (*) and the assumption E′ ⊆ E. This means, (C, b) ∈ R (+) has to hold.
Obviously b ∉ E∗ because τ satisfies conflict-freeness and E∗ ∈ Eτ(G) is assumed. This means,
b ∈ A∖{E′ ∪C}. Consequently, in contrast to (+) we deduce (C, b) ∉ R since (C, A∖{E′ ∪C}) ∉ R
is assumed.
Intuitively, the theorem says the following: if the involved semantics satisfy the specified
properties, then it is impossible to find a normal expansion which possesses an extension E∗
composed of a subset of an old extension E and some formerly unaccepted arguments C, given
no element of C attacks some element which is not in the new extension.
The second impossibility theorem demonstrates limitations for eliminating arguments of
existing extensions.
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Theorem 7.6. (eliminating arguments) Given an AF F = (A, R) and
1. a semantics σ satisfying admissibility and conflict-freeness,
2. a semantics τ satisfying reinstatement,
3. a set E such that E ∈ Eσ(F) and
4. a set C such that C ⊂ E, (C, A ∖ E) ∉ R and E∗ ∶= E ∖C ∉ Eσ(F),
then there is no pair (G, τ), such that (G, τ) is a strict weak (F ,σ)-enforcement of E∗.
Proof. To obtain a contradiction, we suppose that F ⪯W G and E∗ ∈ Eτ(G). Observe that C has
to be non-empty since E ∈ Eσ(F) and E∗ ∉ Eσ(F) are assumed. Thus, we deduce the existence
of an argument c, such that c ∈ C ∧ c ∉ E∗. Using that τ satisfies reinstatement and E∗ ∈ Eτ(G)
we state that c is not defended by E∗ in G. This means, there is an argument b, such that
b ∈ A ∪ A(G), such that (b, c) ∈ R ∪ R(G) and (E∗, b) ∉ R ∪ R(G). Therefore, (E∗, b) ∉ R (*).
Furthermore, b ∈ A and (b, c) ∈ R since G is assumed to be a weak expansion of F . On the
other hand, we deduce (E, b) ∈ R because c ∈ E, E ∈ Eσ(F) and σ satisfies admissibility. Thus,
b ∈ A ∖ E (+) since σ also fulfillls conflict-freeness. Note that (E, b) ∈ R can be equivalently
formulated as (E∗, b) ∈ R ∨ (C, b) ∈ R. The former disjunct contradicts (*) and furthermore, in
the light of the assumption (C, A ∖ E) ∉ R the latter disjunct is inconsistent with (+).
Intuitively, the theorem says the following: if the involved semantics satisfy the specified
properties, then it is impossible to find a weak expansion possessing an extension which is a
proper subset of an old extension and not already an extension of the original AF, unless one
of the arguments left out in the new extension attacks an element which was not in the old
extension.
We want to point out that both Theorems 7.5 and 7.6 are not necessarily restricted to liberal
enforcements although both refer to two semantics. Remember that stable, semi-stable, prefer-
red, complete, grounded and ideal semantics fulfill reinstatement, admissibility and conflict-
freeness simultaneously (compare Figure 2.4). Thus, for these semantics the impossibility of
exchanging arguments as well as eliminating arguments apply to conservative enforcements.
7.1.3 Possibility Result
Consider the following simple AF F :
a1 a2
Figure 7.5: Strict- vs. Non-strict Enforcements
Statement 1 of Proposition 7.4 as well as Theorem 7.6 imply that there is no strict conser-
vative enforcement of E = {a2} given that the considered semantics satisfies admissibility. This
means, if we do not change the considered semantics, then it is impossible that E becomes an
extension of an AF G being a normal expansion of F . What about the following weaker claim:
Is there a non-strict enforcement of E, i.e. is there a normal expansion G of F such that E is a
subset of an extension of G? In the following theorem we will prove the positive answer for all
semantics considered in this thesis.
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Theorem 7.7. Given σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co, na}. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and C ⊆ A.
If C is conflict-free in F , then there is a pair (G,σ) being a strong conservative (F ,σ)-enforcement of
C. Moreover, in case of σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, pr, id, gr, co} there exists a pair (G,σ) such that ∣Eσ(G)∣ =∣{E}∣ = 1 and ∣E ∖C∣ = 1.
Proof. Let A = {a1, ..., an}. Furthermore, C ⊆ A and C ∈ c f (F). The only non-trivial case is
C ∉ Eσ(F). In this case we conclude that C = {a1, ..., ai} for some integer i < n. We define the
following strong expansion G of F :G = (A ∪ {b}, R ∪ {(b, ai+1), ..., (b, an)})
We will show now that E = C ∪ {b} ∈ Eσ(G) for any σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co, na}.
Note that E ∈ c f (G) is given by construction. Observe that E ∈ Estb(G) since any argu-
ment not contained in E is attacked by E. By Proposition 2.7 we conclude E ∈ Eσ(G) for
σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, ad, pr, co, na}. We now prove that ∣Eco(G)∣ = ∣Estg(G)∣ = 1. First, ∣Eco(G)∣ = 1.
Assume not, thus there is an E′ ∈ Eco(G), such that E ≠ E′. Observe that b ∈ E′ since b is unat-
tacked in G. Furthermore, all elements of C are defended by {b} in G. Consequently, E ⊆ E′.
Moreover, E ⊂ E′ is impossible since any superset of E is conflicting in G. Thus, E = E′ in
contrast to the assumption. Second, ∣Estg(G)∣ = 1. Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that there
is an E′ ∈ Estg(G), such that E ≠ E′. Since R+G(E) = A(G) we conclude the same range for E′ ∈ G,
i.e. R+G(E′) = A ∪ {b}. Furthermore, b ∈ E′ since b is unattacked in G. Since any stage extension
is naive, i.e. maximal conflict-free (Proposition 2.7) we conclude E ⊆ E′. Again, E ⊂ E′ is
impossible since any superset of E is conflicting in G by construction. Thus, E = E′ contradic-
ting the assumption. Now, combining Propositions 2.7 and 2.8 we obtain E ∈ Eσ(G) for any
σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co, na} and ∣Eτ(G)∣ = 1 for any τ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, pr, id, gr, co}
concluding the proof.
The theorem shows that whenever a set C is conflict-free we may enforce it by adding one
additional argument b and certain attacks so that the union of C and b is the extension of the
constructed AF. Moreover, C ∪ {b} is the unique extension in case of stage, stable, semi-stable,
eager, preferred, ideal, grounded and complete semantics. We want to mention that in [Booth
et al., 2013, Theorem 1] a similar result is proven. The authours consider the enforcing problem
via formulas expressible in a certain logical labeling language.
It is important to emphasize that in special cases the enforcement of the desired set may be
reached with less additional attack relations. Our construction shows the potential possibility
only. To exemplify the standard construction consider the following example.
Example 7.8. Consider the black subframework F = (A, R) and the desired set of arguments
C = {a2, a4}. Obviously, C is conflict-free in F and thus, Theorem 7.7 is applicable. Consider
therefore the standard construction, namely the AF G = (A ∪ {b}, R ∪ {(b, a1), (b, a3), (b, a5)})
being a strong expansion of F .
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
b
Figure 7.6: Standard Construction
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We observe C ∪ {b} = {a2, a4, b} ∈ Eσ(G) for σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co, na} and fur-
thermore, ∣Eσ(G)∣ = 1 in case of σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, pr, id, gr, co} in accordance with Theorem 7.7.
7.2 Minimal Change Problem
In the last section we studied the so-called enforcing problem in argumentation, i.e. the ques-
tion whether it is possible to modify a given AF in such a way that a desired set of arguments
becomes an extension or a subset of an extension. In particular, Theorem 7.7 gives a positive
answer for all semantics considered in this thesis provided that the considered set of arguments
is conflict-free. In this section we go an important step further. We are not only interested whe-
ther enforcements are possible, but also in the effort needed to enforce a set of arguments. In a
nutshell, the minimal change problem [Baumann, 2012b] corresponds to the mathematical pro-
blem of determining the minimal number of modifications (additions or removals of attacks)
needed to enforce a certain set.
Example 7.9 (Example 7.8 continued). Consider again the black subframework F = (A, R) and
the desired set of arguments C = {a2, a4}. In Example 7.8 we have shown that enforcing is
impossible via G = (A ∪ {b}, R ∪ {(b, a1), (b, a3), (b, a5)}).
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
b
Figure 7.7: Alternative Construction
The attentive reader will have noticed that the dashed attacks (b, a3) and (b, a5) are not
necessarily needed to enforce E. In particular, C ∪ {b} = {a2, a4, b} ∈ Eσ(G′) for any semantics
σ ∈ {stg, stb, ss, eg, ad, pr, id, gr, co, na} where G′ = (A ∪ {b}, R ∪ {(b, a1)).
The example above shows that in special cases the enforcement of a desired set C may be
reached with less additional attack relations in comparison to the standard construction. We
want to emphasize that there is an infinite number of possibilities to modify a given argu-
mentation scenario. Consequently, there is no brute force method solving the minimal change
problem.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Formalizing and characterizing the minimal change problem for weak, strong, normal,
arbitrary expansions as well as arbitrary modifications for the stable, preferred, complete
and admissible semantics.
• The most remarkable result is that the characteristic (representing the minimal change
problem formally) does not change if we switch simultaneously between strong, normal
or arbitrary expansions and preferred, complete or admissible semantics.
• For semi-stable semantics we show that its characteristic lies between the stable and
preferred characteristic for all mentioned modification types.
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7.2.1 Characteristics - A Formal Representation
To formalize the minimal change problem we have to introduce a numerical measure which
indicates how far apart two argumentation scenarios are. We decided to count only added
and removed attacks for a simple reason: the very nature of argumentation is the treatment of
conflicting arguments. Adding or removing an isolated argument does not contribute at all to
solving or increasing a given conflict, i.e. the conflicting information remains the same. This
means, the decrease or increase of a conflict is directly linked to upcoming or disappearing
attacks. The following definition takes this idea into account and can be formalized by the
well-known symmetric difference A∆B =de f (A ∖ B)∪ (B ∖ A).
Definition 7.10. The distance between two AFs F and G is a natural number defined by the
following function
d ∶ A ×A →N (F ,G)↦ ∣R(F) ∆ R(G)∣ .
The following proposition states that the class of all AFs A together with the above defi-
ned distance d constitute a pseudometric space. Remember that in pseudometric spaces two
distinct elements may have distance zero.
Proposition 7.11. (A , d) is a pseudometric space.
Proof. We have to prove the following three conditions: Let F ,G,H ∈ A , then
1. d(F ,F) = 0 (vanishing self-distance)
2. d(F ,G) = d(G,F) (symmetry)
3. d(F ,H) ≤ d(F ,G)+ d(G,H) (triangle inequality)
We only prove the triangle inequality. Given F ,G,H ∈ A . Observe that
R(F) ∆ R(H) = (R(F)∖ R(H))∪ (R(H)∖ R(F))⊆ (R(F)∖ R(G))∪ (R(G)∖ R(H))∪ (R(H)∖ R(G))∪ (R(G)∖ R(F))= (R(F) ∆ R(G))∪ (R(G) ∆ R(H)).
Consequently,
d(F ,H) = ∣R(F) ∆ R(H)∣≤ ∣(R(F) ∆ R(G))∪ (R(G) ∆ R(H))∣≤ ∣(R(F) ∆ R(G))∣+ ∣(R(G) ∆ R(H))∣= d(F ,G)+ d(G,H).
Example 7.12. The distances between the following three AFs are: d(F ,G) = 2, d(F ,H) = 3 and
d(G,H) = 5.
F ∶
a
b
c
G ∶
a
b
c
H ∶
a
b
c
d
e
Figure 7.8: Distances
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Now we are prepared to describe the minimal change problem formally. We define the-
refore a function, the so-called (σ,Φ)-characteristic2. The σ indicates the considered semantics
and Φ describes the possible modifications.
Definition 7.13. Given a semantics σ, a binary relation Φ ⊆ A ×A and an AF F . The (σ,Φ)-
characteristic of a set C ⊆ A(F) is a natural number or infinity defined by the following function
NFσ,Φ ∶ ℘(A(F))→N∞ C ↦
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, ∃C′ ∶ C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Eσ(F)
k, k = min{d(F ,G) ∣ (F ,G) ∈ Φ, NGσ,Φ(C) = 0}∞, otherwise.
The following proposition constitutes a first relation between different characteristics if
certain subset properties between the considered semantics and/or the kinds of modifications
are fulfilled.
Proposition 7.14. Let σ, τ be semantics and Φ,Ψ binary relations over A , such that σ ⊆ τ and Φ ⊆ Ψ.
For any AF F , NFσ,Φ ≥ NFτ,Ψ.
Proof. We have to show that for every C ∈ ℘(A(F)), NFσ,Φ(C) ≥ NFτ,Ψ(C). Let NFσ,Φ(C) = k with
k ∈N∞. If k =∞ nothing needs to be shown. Let 0 < k <∞. Thus, there is an AF G, such that(F ,G) ∈ Φ, NGσ,Φ(C) = 0 and d(F ,G) = k. Since Φ ⊆ Ψ was assumed we observe (F ,G) ∈ Ψ.
NGσ,Φ(C) = 0 implies the existence of a set C′, such that C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Eσ(G). Hence, C′ ∈ Eτ(G)
because σ ⊆ τ was assumed. We thus have found an AF G, such that d(F ,G) = k, (F ,G) ∈ Ψ
and NGτ,Ψ(C) = 0. Consequently, min{d(F ,G) ∣ (F ,G) ∈ Ψ and NGτ,Ψ(C) = 0} ≤ k which proves
k ≥ NFτ,Ψ(C). In case of k = 0, NFτ,Ψ(C) = 0 follows immediately since σ ⊆ τ was assumed.
It is well-known that the considered semantics satisfy the following subset relation, stb ⊆
ss ⊆ pr ⊆ co ⊆ ad (compare Proposition 2.7). Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.15. For any AF F and any binary relation Φ over A ,
NFstb,Φ ≥ NFss,Φ ≥ NFpr,Φ ≥ NFco,Φ ≥ NFad,Φ.
A similar result may be obtained for different kinds of modifications (compare Defini-
tion 2.13). Note that strong and weak expansions are incomparable, i.e. there is no subset
relation between them. U denotes the universal relation over A , i.e. U = A ×A .
Corollary 7.16. For any AF F and any semantics σ,
NFσ,W , NFσ,S ≥ NFσ,N ≥ NFσ,E ≥ NFσ,U .
The following proposition strengthens the result of Corollary 7.15. It shows that the prefer-
red, complete and admissible characteristics coincide.
Proposition 7.17. For any F and any binary relation Φ over A ,
NFstb,Φ ≥ NFss,Φ ≥ NFpr,Φ = NFco,Φ = NFad,Φ.
2If the semantics σ and the modification type Φ are clear from the context (or unimportant) we only refer to
characteristic. The same holds for the later defined value functions.
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Proof. We have to show that for every C ⊆ A(F), NFstb,Φ(C) ≥ NFss,Φ(C) ≥ NFpr,Φ(C) = NFco,Φ(C) =
NFad,Φ(C). In consideration of Corollary 7.15 it suffices to show that NFpr,Φ(C) ≤ NFad,Φ(C). First
note that the assertion follows immediately in case of NFad,Φ(C) =∞. Assume now NFad,Φ(C) =
k < ∞. If k = 0, then there is a set C′, such that C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Ead(F). Either C′ is a
subset maximal admissible extension, i.e. C′ ∈ Epr(F) or not, hence there is a C′′, such that
C ⊆ C′ ⊂ C′′ and C′′ ∈ Epr(F). In both cases, NFpr,Φ(C) = 0. If k > 0 we conclude the existence
of an AF G, such that d(F ,G) = k, (F ,G) ∈ Φ and NGad,Φ(C) = 0. Consequently, NGpr,Φ(C) = 0
(compare subcase k = 0). Hence, min{d(F ,G) ∣ (F ,G) ∈ Φ and NGpr,Φ(C) = 0} ≤ k concluding
the proof.
7.2.2 Value Functions - Local Criteria
The characteristic is a precisely defined numerical value, but as yet we have not provided any
means to actually compute this value. This is the question we address in the following three
subsections. The significant challenge here is to define a function whose values are equal to
the considered characteristics and, furthermore, whose values can be established in a finite
number of steps based on rather simple properties of the underlying AF.
7.2.2.1 The (σ, W)-value
The first characteristics we are interested in are characteristics with respect to weak expansions.
This means, what is the minimal number with respect to the distance d if only the addition of
weaker arguments, i.e. arguments which do not attack previous arguments, is allowed. It turns
out that there are only two possibilities, namely either a desired set C is already contained in
an extension, i.e. the characteristic equals zero, or C is unenforceable, i.e. the characteristic
equals infinity.
Definition 7.18. Given an AF F . The (σ, W)-value (σ ∈ {stb, ad}) of a set C ⊆ A(F) is zero or
infinity defined by the following function
VFσ,W ∶ ℘(A(F))→ {0,∞} C ↦ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩0, ∃C
′ ∶ C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Eσ(F)∞, otherwise.
Proposition 7.19. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,W ≥ NFσ,W .
Proof. Let C ∈ ℘(A(F)). In case of VFσ,W(C) = ∞ the inequality is obviously fulfilled. If
VFσ,W(C) = 0, then there is a set C′, such that C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Eσ(F). In consideration of
Definition 7.13 we conclude NF
σ,⪯NW (C) = 0 concluding the proof.
Proposition 7.20. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,W ≤ NFσ,W .
Proof. Let C ∈ ℘(A(F)) and VFσ,W(C) = k. For k = 0 we have nothing to show since 0 ≤ NFσ,W(C)
holds. Let k =∞. Hence, there is no superset C′ of C with the property C′ ∈ Eσ(F) (*). Assume
now the existence of an AF G with F ⪯W G and a set C′′, such that C ⊆ C′′ and C′′ ∈ Eσ(G).
Applying statement 2 of splitting theorem 4.10 we have C′′ ∩ A(F) ∈ Eσ(F) contradicting (*).
Consequently, NFσ,W(C) =∞.
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Now we are prepared to show the main characterization theorem for stable, preferred,
complete and admissible semantics for the class of weak expansions.
Theorem 7.21. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {pr, co, ad},
NFstb,W = VFstb,W and NFad,W = VFσ,W .
Proof. Combine Propositions 7.17, 7.19 and 7.20.
Interestingly, semi-stable semantics does possess values between zero and infinity and is
therefore not adequately characterized by the (stb, W)- or (ad, W)-values. Consider therefore
the following example.
Example 7.22. Consider the AF F and the desired set of arguments {a1}. We observe that the(stb, W)-value of {a1} equals infinity since there are no supersets which are stable extensions
in F . In case of admissible semantics we deduce VFad,W({a1}) = 0 since {a1} is admissible
in F . Furthermore, {a1} and all its proper supersets are not semi-stable in F . This means,
NFss,W({a1}) ≠ 0.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3b
Figure 7.9: Inbetween Zero and Infinity
Consider now the weak expansion G of F . It shows that NFss,W({a1}) ≤ 2 since {a1} is
semi-stable in G and d(F ,G) = 2.
7.2.2.2 The (σ, S)-value
How does the situation change if we consider strong expansions? Since the class of strong
expansions provides the possibility to attack or defend former arguments there should be a
greater range of the characteristics than in case of weak expansions. We will see that this is
indeed the case. Furthermore, we will show that the strong expansion characteristics are a
lower bound for their corresponding weak expansion terms. Quite surprisingly, we were able
to show that the characteristics of arbitrary expansions as well as normal expansions coin-
cide with the strong expansion characteristic. This means, the additional feature of arbitrary
extensions in contrast to strong expansions, namely bringing into play new attacks between
existing arguments or new attacks from old argument to new arguments, is useless in the sense
of achieving a lower value for the minimal change problem.
We now start with a first approximation for the characteristics with respect to strong ex-
pansions. As a by-product of the standard construction (compare Example 7.8) in the proof of
the possibility theorem 7.7 we state the following upper bound. We want to mention that the
assertion does not necessarily hold if considering infinite AFs.
Corollary 7.23. Given an AF F and a set C ∈ c f (F). For any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ss, pr, co, ad},∞ > ∣A(F)∖C∣ ≥ NFσ,S(C).
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This means, whenever a set C is conflict-free we may enforce C in finitely many steps. As
shown in Example 7.9 we may stay below the upper bound ∣A(F)∖C∣. In this example the
upper bound according to the above corollary equals 3 = ∣A(F)∖C∣. On the other hand the
alternative construction depicted in Figure 7.7 proved a minimal effort of at most 1.
Inspired by this observation we give the following strong expansion values. We use R+F(C)
for C ∪ {b ∣ (C, b) ∈ R(F)} and analogously, R−F(C) for C ∪ {b ∣ (b, C) ∈ R(F)}.
Definition 7.24. Given an AF F . The (σ, S)-value (σ ∈ {stb, ad}) of a set C ⊆ A(F) is a natural
number or infinity defined by the following function
VFσ,S ∶ ℘(A(F))→N∞ C ↦min ({∣σ(F , C′)∣ ∣ C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ c f (F)}∪ {∞})
where ad(F , C′) = R−F(C′)∖ R+F(C′) and stb(F , C′) = A(F)∖ R+F(C′).
As a direct consequence of the definition above we may state that the weak expansion value
is greater than or equal to the strong expansion value.
Corollary 7.25. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,W ≥ VFσ,S.
Now we will show that the (σ, S) - value does not exceed the (σ, E) - characteristic. We
therefore prove some technical properties first.
Proposition 7.26. Given two AFs F , G, such that F ⪯E G and d(F ,G) = n and a semantics σ ∈{stb, ad}. For any C ⊆ C′ ⊆ A(F), C ⊆ D ⊆ A(G) and any G ⊆ A(G)∖ A(F),
1. VFσ,S(C) ≤ VFσ,S(C′), (monotonicity[1])
2. σ(F , C) ⊆ σ (FA(G), C ∪G), (subset property)
3. VFσ,S(C) ≤ VFA(G)σ,S (C ∪G), (monotonicity[2])
4. VFσ,S(C) ≤ VFA(G)σ,S (D), (monotonicity[3])
5. if ∣σ(G, D)∣ = k, then ∣σ (FA(G), D)∣ ≤ k + n and (cardinality relations)
6. if VFσ,S(C) = k, then VGσ,S(C) ≥ max{k − n, 0}. (greatest lower bound)
where FA(G) = (A(G), R(F)).
Proof. ad 1.) Assume VFσ,S(C′) = k. If k =∞ we have nothing to show. Let k <∞. Thus, there is
a set C′′, such that C′ ⊆ C′′, C′′ ∈ c f (F) and ∣σ(F , C′′)∣ = k. Since C ⊆ C′ (⊆ C′′) is assumed, we
deduce VFσ,S(C) ≤ k.
ad 2.) Let a ∈ stb(F , C), i.e. a ∈ A(F) ∖ R+F(C). Since R(F) = R (FA(G)) we deduce
R+FA(G)(C∪G) = R+F(C)∪G. Hence, a ∉ R+FA(G)(C∪G) and consequently, a ∈ A(G)∖R+FA(G)(C∪
G) = stb (FA(G), C ∪G) follows. Note that R−FA(G)(C ∪ G) = R−F(C) ∪ G holds. Since G and
R−F(C), R+F(C) are disjoint we get R−FA(G)(C ∪G) ∖ R+FA(G)(C ∪G) = R−F(C) ∖ R+F(C) and this
means, in case of admissible semantics we have even shown equality (instead of the subset
property).
ad 3.) Since R(F) = R (FA(G)) we deduce C ∈ c f (F) iff C ∪ G ∈ c f (FA(G)). Hence,
VFσ,S(C) = ∞ iff VFA(G)σ,S (C ∪G) = ∞. Let VFσ,S(C) = k < ∞ and assume VFA(G)σ,S (C ∪G) = k∗ < k
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(proof by contradiction). Thus, there is a set C′ ∪ G′ ∈ c f (FA(G)), such that C ⊆ C′ ⊆ A(F),
G ⊆ G′ ⊆ A(G) ∖ A(F) and ∣σ (FA(G), C′ ∪G′)∣ = k∗. Applying statement 2 (subset property)
we deduce ∣σ(F , C′)∣ ≤ k∗ and consequently, VFσ,S(C) ≤ k∗ < k contradicting the assumption.
ad 4.) Without loss of generality we may assume that D = C ∪ F ∪G, such that F ⊆ A(F)∖C
and G ⊆ A(G) ∖ A(F). Let us assume that the claim does not hold, i.e. VFσ,S(C) > VFA(G)σ,S (D)
(A1). Applying the already proven statement 3 we get VFA(G)σ,S (D) ≥ VFσ,S(C ∪ F). Furthermore,
we derive VFσ,S(C ∪ F) ≥ VFσ,S(C) by statement 1. Thus,
VFσ,S(C) A1ucurly> VFA(G)σ,S (C ∪ F ∪G) 11.3.ucurly≥ VFσ,S(C ∪ F) 11.1.ucurly≥ VFσ,S(C).
Since we have derived a contradiction VFσ,S(C) > VFσ,S(C) the original claim is proven.
ad 5.) At first note that d (F ,FA(G)) = 0 holds by definition. Hence, d(F ,G) = n implies
d (FA(G),G) = n (Proposition 7.11, triangle inequality). Since F ⪯E G is assumed we deduce
that R(G) contains R(F) = R (FA(G)) plus n further attacks. Obviously, removing one attack
may increase the number of unattacked attackers of D by one. The same holds for the number
of elements which are not attacked by D. Consequently, ∣σ(FA(G), D)∣ ≤ k + n follows.
ad 6.) Let VFσ,S(C) = ∞, i.e. C ∉ c f (F). Since F ⪯E G is assumed we deduce D ∉ c f (G)
for any D ⊇ C. Consequently, VGσ,S(C) = ∞ which proves VGσ,S(C) ≥ max{k − n, 0}. Consider
now VFσ,S(C) = k < ∞ (A1). Note that in case of d(F ,G) = n ≥ k we have nothing to show
because max{k − n, 0} = 0. Hence, without loss of generality we may assume that n < k. Let
us further assume that VGσ,S(C) ≥ max{k − n, 0} does not hold (proof by contradiction), i.e.
VGσ,S(C) = k∗ < k− n (A2). This implies the existence of a set C′, such that C ⊆ C′, C′ ∈ c f (G) and∣σ(G, C′)∣ = k∗. Applying the already proven statement 5 we deduce ∣σ(FA(G), C′)∣ ≤ k∗ + n.
Consequently, VFA(G)σ,S (C′) ≤ k∗ + n (R1). Thus,
k
A1ucurly= VFσ,S(C) 11.4.ucurly≤ VFA(G)σ,S (C′) R1ucurly≤ k∗ + n A2ucurly< k − n + n = k.
Since we have derived a contradiction k < k the original claim follows.
Now we are prepared to show that the strong expansion values do not exceed the (arbitrary)
expansion characteristics.
Proposition 7.27. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,S ≤ NFσ,E.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any C ∈ ℘(A(F)), VFσ,S(C) = k implies NFσ,E(C) /< k. If k = ∞,
then no superset C′ of C is conflict-free in F and even not conflict-free in any G with F ⪯E G,
i.e. C′ ∉ c f (G). Consequently, C′ ∉ Eσ(G) which proves NFσ,E(C) =∞.
Let us assume now VFσ,S(C) = k <∞ and NFσ,E(C) = k∗ < k (proof by contradiction). Assume
k∗ = 0. Hence, k ≥ 1 has to hold. NFσ,E(C) = 0 implies the existence of a set C′, such that
C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Eσ(F) (in particular C′ ∈ c f (F)). Thus, σ(F , C′) = ∅ and consequently,
VFσ,S(C) = 0 = k contradicting k ≥ 1. Consider now k∗ > 0. Hence, there is an AF G, such thatF ⪯E G, d(F ,G) = k∗ and NGσ,E(C) = 0. This implies the existence of a set C′, such that C ⊆ C′
and C′ ∈ Eσ(G). Consequently, VGσ,S(C) = 0 which contradicts VGσ,S(C) ≥ k − k∗ > 0 (statement 6,
Proposition7.26).
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The next proposition proves that the (σ, S)-value is greater than or equal to the (σ, S)-
characteristic.
Proposition 7.28. For any AF F and σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,S ≥ NFσ,S.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any C ∈ ℘(A(F)), VFσ,S(C) = k implies NFσ,S(C) ≤ k. If k = ∞
we have nothing to show. Let k be finite. VFσ,S(C) = k means that there is set C′, such that
C ⊆ C′, C′ ∈ c f (F) and ∣σ(F , C′)∣ = k. In case of k = 0 nothing needs to be shown because
C′ ∈ Eσ(F) follows and hence, NFσ,S(C) = 0. Let k > 0. Thus, there are k unattacked attackers
a1, ..., ak of C′ in F (σ = ad) or k unattacked elements a1, ..., ak in F (σ = st), respectively. Let b be
a fresh argument. We define the AF G = (A(F) ∪ {b}, R(F) ∪ {(b, a1), ..., (b, ak)}). We observe
d(F ,G) = k, F ⪯S G and C′ ∪ {b} ∈ Eσ(G), i.e. NGσ,S(C) = 0. Hence, NFσ,S(C) ≤ k concluding the
proof.
The following theorem shows that the stable value and admissible value adequately de-
termine the strong expansion characteristics for stable or preferred, complete and admissible
semantics, respectively. Furthermore, this characteristic does not vary if we shift from strong
expansions to normal or arbitrary expansions and vice versa.
Theorem 7.29. For any AF F , any semantics σ ∈ {pr, co, ad} and any Φ ∈ {E, N, S},
NFstb,Φ = VFstb,S and NFσ,Φ = VFad,S.
Proof. Let σ ∈ {stb, ad}. Applying Corollary 7.16 and Proposition 7.19 and 7.20 we get VFσ,S ≥
NFσ,S ≥ NFσ,N ≥ NFσ,E ≥ VFσ,S. Hence, NFσ,Φ = VFσ,S for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}. Together with Proposi-
tion 7.17 we conclude VFad,S = NFτ,Φ for τ ∈ {pr, co, ad} completing the proof.
A valuable side-effect of the theorem above is that we have now clarified the relation bet-
ween the classes of weak and strong expansions in case of stable, preferred, complete and
admissible semantics. Remember that there is no subset relation between them since they are
completely different concepts. Nevertheless, the following proposition states that the weak
expansion characteristic is greater than or equal to the strong expansion characteristic for the
considered semantics. Here is the whole picture.
Proposition 7.30. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {stb, pr, co, ad},
NFσ,W ≥ NFσ,S ≥ NFσ,N ≥ NFσ,E ≥ NFσ,U .
Proof. Combine Corollaries 7.16, 7.25 and Theorem 7.29.
Consider the following example showing that neither the stable value nor the admissible
value adequately determine the semi-stable characteristic with respect to strong expansions.
Example 7.31. Consider the AF F and the desired set of arguments {a1}. The (stb, S)-value of
C = {a1} in F equals 2 since firstly, b, a3 and a4 are unattacked by C and secondly, there is no
conflict-free superset of C. In case of admissible semantics we have R+F(C) ∖ R−F(C) = ∅ and
hence VFad,S({a1}) = 0. Since C is not semi-stable and does not have proper and conflict-free
supersets in F we conclude NFss,W({a1}) ≠ 0.
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F ∶ a1 a2
a3 a4
G ∶
b
a1 a2
a3 a4
Figure 7.10: Inadequateness of Stable and Admissible Value
Consider now the strong expansion G of F . One may easily check that C∪{b} is semi-stable
in G. Hence, NFss,S(C) = 1. Thus, neither the stable value nor the admissible value can be used
to determine the semi-stable characteristic with respect to strong expansions.
7.2.2.3 The (σ, U)-value
We now turn to arbitrary modifications, i.e. in contrast to arbitrary expansion we even allow
deleting attacks between previous arguments. What consequences does this have for the mi-
nimal change problem? As a first and important difference we will show that any desired set
of arguments may be enforced by a finite manipulation, i.e. the (σ, U)-characteristic has to be
finite for all considered semantics. The following proposition gives us an upper bound.
Proposition 7.32. Given an AF F and a set C ⊆ A(F). For any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ss, pr, co, ad},∞ > ∣R(F)∩ (C ×C)∣+ ∣A(F)∖C∣ ≥ NFσ,U(C).
Proof. First we delete all inner conflicts of C (= ∣R(F)∩ (C ×C)∣). Hence, C is conflict-free now.
Second, we attack all outer arguments of C (= ∣A(F)∖C∣). Obviously, C stable in the resulting
AF and therefore semi-stable, preferred, complete and admissible (compare Proposition 2.7).
Inspired by the proposition above we present the following definitions which adequately
determine the characteristics with respect to arbitrary modifications.
Definition 7.33. Given an AF F . The (σ, U)-value (σ ∈ {stb, ad}) of a set C ⊆ A(F) is a natural
number defined by the following function
VFσ,U ∶ ℘(A(F))→N C ↦min ({∣R(F)↓C′ ∣+ ∣σ(F , C′)∣ ∣ C ⊆ C′ ⊆ A(F)}) ,
where R(F)↓C′ = R(F)∩ (C′ ×C′).
To prove that the defined values do not exceed the characteristics with respect to arbitrary
modifications we have to show some technical properties first.
Proposition 7.34. Given two AFs F , G and a semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad}. For any C ⊆ D ⊆ A(F)∩A(G),
E ⊆ A(G)∖ A(F) where D ∪ E ∈ Eσ(G) and S ⊆ A(F)∖ A(G) a set of isolated arguments in F ,
1. R(G)∆R(F∗) = R(G)∆R(G∗) ∪˙ R(G∗)∆R(F∗), (partition[1])
2. R(G)∆R(F) = R(G)∆R(G∗) ∪˙ R(G∗)∆R(F∗) ∪˙ R(F∗)∆R(F), (partition[2])
3. ∣R(G∗)↓D∣+ ∣σ(G∗, D)∣ ≤ d(G,G∗), (inequality[1])
4. ∣R(F∗)↓D∣+ ∣σ(F∗, D)∣ ≤ d(G,F∗), (inequality[2])
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5. ∣R(F)↓D∣+ ∣ad(F , D)∣ ≤ d(G,F), (inequality[3])
6. ∣R(F)↓D∣+ ∣stb(F , D)∣ ≤ d(G,F)+ ∣I∣, (inequality[4])
7. ∣st(F , D ∪ S)∣ = ∣stb(F , D)∣− ∣S∣ (isolated arguments)
where F∗ = (A(F) ∩ A(G), R(F)↓(A(F)∩A(G))), G∗ = (A(F) ∩ A(G), R(G)↓(A(F)∩A(G))) and I ={i ∣ i ∈ A(F)∖ A(G), i isolated in F}.
Proof. ad 1.-2.) These assertions can be checked in a straightforward manner. Take into ac-
count that the following equations hold: R(G)∆R(G∗) = R(G)↓(A(G)∖A(F)), R(F)∆R(F∗) =
R(F)↓(A(F)∖A(G)) and R(G∗)∆R(F∗) = (R(G)∆R(F))↓(A(F)∩A(G)).
ad 3.) Since D ∪ E ∈ Eσ(G) is assumed we deduce ∣R(G)↓(D∪E)∣ + ∣σ(G, D ∪ E)∣ = 0. Hence,∣R(G∗)↓D∣ has to be zero too (conflict-freeness). Assume n = d(G,G∗) and let us consider the
AF G′ = (A(G), R(G∗)). We observe n = d(G,G′) and furthermore, D ∪ E possess at most n
unattacked attackers in G′ (σ = ad) or unattacked arguments in G′ (σ = stb), respectively since n
attacks were deleted. This means, ∣σ(G′, D ∪ E)∣ ≤ n. The attack-relation R(G∗) does not contain
attacks which involve arguments in A(G)∖A(G∗). Consequently, ad(G∗, D) = ad(G′, D∪E) and
stb(G∗, D) ⊆ stb(G′, D ∪ E). In both cases, ∣R(G∗)↓D∣+ ∣σ(G∗, D)∣ ≤ n = d(G,G∗) follows.
ad 4.) Let us assume d(G,F∗) = n. In consideration of statement 1 there are some k1, k2 ∈N,
such that k1 + k2 = n, k1 = d(G,G∗) and k2 = d(G∗,F∗). Applying statement 3 it follows∣R(G∗)↓D∣+ ∣σ(G∗, D)∣ ≤ k1. Furthermore, k2 = l1 + l2 for some l1, l2 ∈N, such that l1 equals the
number of deleted attacks during the transformation from G∗ to F∗, namely ∣R(G∗)∖ R(F∗)∣
and l2 equals the number of added attacks during the transformation from G∗ to F∗, namely∣R(F∗)∖ R(G∗)∣. Consider therefore G′ = (A(G∗), R(G∗) ∩ R(F∗)). Obviously, d(G∗,G′) =
l1 and d(G′,F∗) = l2. We obtain, R(G′)↓D = R(G∗)↓D and ∣σ(G′, D)∣ ≤ ∣σ(G∗, D)∣ + l1 since
deleted attacks do not increase the number of inner conflicts of D but may increase the number
of unattacked arguments or unattacked attackers by at most l1. Furthermore, ∣R(F∗)↓D∣ +∣σ(F∗, D)∣ ≤ ∣R(G′)↓D∣ + ∣σ(G′, D)∣ + l2 since added attacks may either increase inner conflicts
of D or the number of unattacked attackers by at most l2. Altogether we have shown that∣R(F∗)↓D∣+ ∣σ(F∗, D)∣ ≤ k1 + l1 + l2 = k1 + k2 = n = d(G,F∗) concluding the proof.
ad 5.-6.) Let us assume d(G,F) = n. Applying statement 1 and 2 there are some k1, k2 ∈N,
such that k1 + k2 = n, k1 = d(G,F∗) and k2 = d(F∗,F). By statement 4 we get ∣R(F∗)↓D∣ +∣σ(F∗, D)∣ ≤ k1. Note that k2 equals the number of added attacks during the transformation
from F∗ to F , namely ∣R(F)∖ R(F∗)∣. This means, R(F)↓D = R(F∗)↓D since the new attacks
do contain attacks in D×D. In case of admissible semantics we obtain ∣ad(F , D)∣ ≤ ∣ad(F∗, D)∣+
k2 because at most k2 new unattacked attackers may arise. In case of stable semantics we
have to take into account that new isolated arguments (which are distance-neutral) may arise.
This means, an upper bound for A(F) ∖ A(G) is given by k2 + ∣I∣ where I = {i ∣ i ∈ A(F) ∖
A(G), i isolated in F}. Consequently, ∣stb(F , D)∣ ≤ ∣stb(F∗, D)∣+ k2 + ∣I∣. Altogether, ∣R(F)↓D∣+∣ad(F , D)∣ ≤ k1 + k2 = n = d(G,F) and ∣R(F)↓D∣ + ∣stb(F , D)∣ ≤ k1 + k2 + ∣I∣ = n + ∣I∣ = d(G,F) + ∣I∣
is shown.
ad 7.) Note that D and S are disjoint. Since S only contains isolated arguments we have
S∪S′ = stb(F , D) for some S′ disjoint from S. Consequently, S′ = stb(F , D∪S) and the assertion
follows.
Proposition 7.35. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,U ≤ NFσ,U .
Proof. Given a set C ∈ ℘(A(F)) and VFσ,U(C) = k. Let us assume NFσ,U(C) = k∗ < k (proof
by contradiction). Hence, there is an AF G, such that d(F ,G) = k∗ and NGσ,U(C) = 0. This
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means, there is a set C′ with the property C ⊆ C′ and C′ ∈ Eσ(G). Without loss of generality
C′ = D ∪ E where C ⊆ D ⊆ A(F) ∩ A(G) and E ⊆ A(G) ∖ A(F). Hence, in case of admissible
semantics we deduce ∣R(F)↓D∣+ ∣ad(F , D)∣ ≤ d(F ,G) = k∗ (statement 5, Proposition 7.34). Since
C ⊆ D holds we conclude k = VFad,U(C) ≤ k∗ contradicting the assumption k∗ < k. In case
of stable semantics we get ∣R(F)↓D∣ + ∣stb(F , D)∣ ≤ d(F ,G) + ∣I∣ where I = {i ∣ i ∈ A(F) ∖
A(G), i isolated in F} (statement 6, Proposition 7.34). Obviously, ∣R(F)↓D∪I ∣ = ∣R(F)↓D∣ since
all i‘s in I are isolated. Furthermore, in consideration of statement 7, Proposition 7.34 it follows∣R(F)↓D∪I ∣ + ∣stb(F , D ∪ I)∣ ≤ d(F ,G) + ∣I∣ − ∣I∣ = d(F ,G) = k∗. Again, since C ⊆ D ∪ I holds we
deduce k = VFstb,U(C) ≤ k∗ contradicting the assumption k∗ < k.
Proposition 7.36. For any AF F and σ ∈ {stb, ad}, VFσ,U ≥ NFσ,U .
Proof. Given a set C ∈ ℘(A(F)) and VFσ,U(C) = k. This means, there is a superset C′ of C, such
that ∣R(F)↓C′ ∣ + ∣σ(F , C′)∣ = k. In case of k = 0 we deduce C′ ∈ Eσ(F) and hence, NFσ,U(C) = 0.
Let k > 0. We may assume ∣R(F)↓C′ ∣ = l and ∣σ(F , C′)∣ = m for some l, m ∈ N with k = l +m.
This means C′ has l inner attacks and furthermore, there are m unattacked attackers a1, ..., am
of C′ in F (σ = ad) or m unattacked elements a1, ..., am in F (σ = stb) respectively. Since
k > 0 is assumed we conclude C′ ≠ ∅ in case of σ = ad. Let c ∈ C′. We define the AF G =(A(F), (R(F)∖ R(F)↓C′)∪ {(c, a1), ..., (c, am)}). We observe d(F ,G) = l +m = k and C′ ∈ Ead(G),
i.e. NGad,U(C) = 0. Hence, NFad,U(C) ≤ k. The same construction holds for stable semantics
if C′ ≠ ∅. Consider C′ = ∅. Hence, l = 0 and m = A(F) > 0. Let c ∈ A(F). We defineG = (A(F), (R(F) ∖ {(c, c)}) ∪ {(c, a1), ..., (c, am)}). In any case d(F ,G) ≤ m = k. Obviously,{c} ∈ Estb(G), i.e. NGstb,U({c}) = 0. Thus, NFstb,U(∅) ≤ k concluding the proof.
Theorem 7.37. For any AF F and any semantics σ ∈ {pr, co, ad},
NFstb,U = VFstb,U and NFσ,U = VFad,U .
Proof. Combine 7.17 ,7.35 and 7.36.
The following AFs prove that the (ss, U)-characteristic is not adequately characterized by
the (stb, U)- or (ad, U)-values.
Example 7.38 (Example 7.31 continued). Consider again the AF F and the desired set of argu-
ments {a1} depicted below. The (stb, U)-value of {a1} equals 2 because: firstly, ∣R(F)↓{a1,a2}∣+∣stb(F ,{a1, a2})∣ = 2 and secondly, there is no other superset C of {a1}, such that ∣R(F)↓C∣ +∣stb(F , C)∣ < 2. In case of admissible semantics we deduce VFad,U({a1}) = 0 since {a1} is admis-
sible in F . On the other hand NFss,U({a1}) ≠ 0 since {a1} and all its proper supersets are not
semi-stable.
F ∶ a1 a2
a3 a4
G′ ∶ a1 a2
a3 a4
Figure 7.11: Inadequateness of Stable and Admissible Value
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Consider now the AF G’ resulting from F by deleting the attack (a2, a1). Now, NFss,U({a1}) = 1
since {a1} is semi-stable in G’ and d(F ,G′) = 1.
7.2.3 Summary of Results
The following table gives a comprehensive overview over results presented in this section. In
particular, we summarize the main characterization theorems with respect to weak (Theorem
7.21), strong, normal and arbitrary (Theorem 7.29) expansions as well as arbitrary modifica-
tions (Theorem 7.37). Note that the values may shrink from above to below and from left to
right.
W S N E U
VFst,W VFst,S VFst,S VFst,S VFst,U
VFad,W VFad,S VFad,S VFad,S VFad,U
VFad,W VFad,S VFad,S VFad,S VFad,U
VFad,W VFad,S VFad,S VFad,S VFad,U
NFσ,Φ
stb
pr
co
ad
Figure 7.12: State of the Art: Characterizing Characteristics
On a final note, our results and/or introduced techniques can contribute to solve open
problems addressed in several works dealing with dynamics. In [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007]
for instance the authors say: “Moreover, ..., we are interested in questions about the change
needed to change an argument from being accepted to rejected, or vice versa.” or slightly
different versions like in [Cayrol et al., 2008], “How to make the minimal change to a given
argumentation framework so that it has a unique non-empty extension?”.
7.3 Spectrum Problem
In the last section we studied the so-called minimal change problem [Baumann, 2012b] which can
be formulated as follows: what is the minimal number of modifications (additions or removals
of attacks) needed to reach an enforcement? This value, called characteristic, depends on the
underlying semantics σ and type of allowed modifications Φ. As we have shown, there are
local criteria, so-called value functions to determine the minimal number (see Figure 7.12 for an
overview).
In this section we proceed with a formal analysis of characteristics. In particular, given a
certain semantics σ and a modification type Φ, we study whether there is, for a given natural
number n, an AF F and a set of arguments E such that n is the (σ,Φ)-characteristic of E
with respect to F . In other words, we want to determine the set of all natural numbers
which may occur as (σ,Φ)-characteristics, the so-called (σ,Φ)-spectrum. This is what we call
the spectrum problem [Baumann and Brewka, 2013b]. The characterization of spectra yields
interesting insights into particular semantics. To mention one result, we will show that in
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case of semi-stable semantics and the addition of weak arguments (arguments which do not
attack previous arguments) not each natural number may arise as the minimal effort needed
to enforce a certain set E. In particular, the characteristic cannot be 1.
What makes our study even more interesting, as we believe, is the fact that it provides
useful and at times surprising new insights into the interrelationships among the studied
semantics. To this end, we perform our analysis in parallel for a whole group of semantics
which we consider as some of the most important semantics for Dung frameworks. Rather
than sets of values, spectra thus become sets of tuples of values. Appropriate properties of the
spectra like m.d.s.-completeness and coherence will help us to identify such relationships.
7.3.1 Formal Properties of Spectra
In the following we consider n-tuples of semantics and modification types and ask whether
some F and C possess a given n-tuple of characteristics simultaneously. A tuple of charac-
teristics satisfying this condition is called a fibre. A fibre is said to be finite if all entries are
natural numbers. The set of all fibres provides important insights on how close or far apart
the characteristics of a set C may be. That is why this set is called the spectrum. Here is the
formal definition.
Definition 7.39. Given n semantics σ1,...,σn and n binary relations Φ1, ...,Φn ⊆ A ×A . The
(σ1,Φ1, ...,σn,Φn)-spectrum is a set of n-tuples (so-called fibres) defined as follows:S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 = {(k1, ..., kn) ∣ ∃F ∈ A ∃C ⊆ A(F) ∶ NFσi ,Φi(C) = ki for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}} .
For convenience, if Φ1 = ... = Φn we simply write (σ1, ...,σn,Φ)-spectrum or S(σ1,...,σn ,Φ).
These are exactly the types of spectra which we will consider in this chapter. In particular,
we consider (stb, ss, pr,Φ)-spectra where Φ equals normal, strong, weak or arbitrary expan-
sions. Remember that we have already shown that for any modification type Φ the characteris-
tics with respect to preferred, complete and admissible semantics coincide (Proposition 7.17).
Thus, an analysis of S(stb,ss,co,Φ) and S(stb,ss,ad,Φ) is implicitly given.
We first introduce some basic properties spectra may possess.
Definition 7.40. A spectrum S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 is
1. m.d.s. iff any finite fibre (k1, ..., kn) ∈ S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 is a monotonic decreasing sequence,
2. m.d.s.-complete iff S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 is m.d.s. and {(k1, ..., kn) ∈Nn ∣ k1 ≥ ... ≥ kn} ⊆ S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 ,
3. coherent iff there is no fibre (k1, ..., kn) ∈ S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 , such that ki = ∞ and k j ≠ ∞ for some
indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and
4. positive iff any fibre (k1, ..., kn) ∈ S(σi ,Φi)ni=1 is finite.
These properties are interesting for the following reasons: if a spectrum for semantics
σ1, . . . ,σn is m.d.s., then we know that whenever enforcing is possible for all of them it is at
least as difficult using σi as it is using σj given that i < j. If it is m.d.s.-complete we know in
addition that it can in fact be arbitrarily more difficult. Coherence means that whether some
C is enforceable or not does not depend on the choice of the considered semantics. Positive
means each set C can actually be enforced.
A few relationships among these properties are clear by definition. First, an m.d.s.-complete
spectrum is m.d.s. and second, a positive spectrum is coherent. Further interpretations of the
introduced properties are given in the following subsections.
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7.3.2 The (stb, ss, pr,Φ)-Spectrum (Φ ∈ {E, N, S})
In this subsection we will characterize the (stb, ss, pr)-spectra with respect to strong, normal
and arbitrary expansions. In Corollary 7.15 it was shown that the stable (semi-stable) charac-
teristic exceeds the semi-stable (preferred) characteristic w.r.t. any binary relation over the set
of all finite AFs. Consequently, the considered spectra are m.d.s.
Quite surprisingly, the following proposition shows that the mentioned spectra are even
m.d.s.-complete, i.e. the stable (semi-stable) characteristic may take values which exceed the
semi-stable (preferred) characteristic by any natural number. In a sense this result is nega-
tive as it tells us that information about the characteristic of one semantics does not help in
determining the characteristic of the other semantics: even if we know that the characteristic
with respect to preferred semantics for a certain set C is, say, 1 (i.e., only 1 additional attack
is needed), there is no possibility to give an upper bound of the characteristic with respect
to semi-stable or stable semantics. The result underlines the independence of the considered
semantics with respect to the minimal change problem. It indicates that the choice of the
considered semantics may influence the characteristic dramatically, even though the conside-
red semantics possess many similarities.
Proposition 7.41. For any Φ ∈ {E, N, S}, S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) is m.d.s.-complete.
Proof. Let Φ ∈ {E, N, S} and k, l, m ∈ N, such that k ≥ l ≥ m. Hence, we may assume that
l = m + n and k = m + n + o for some n, o ∈ N. If we may construct AFs F and corresponding
sets C ⊆ A(F), such that NFstb,Φ(C) = m + n + o, NFss,Φ(C) = m + n and NFpr,Φ(C) = m, then(k, l, m) ∈ S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) follows. Thus, S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) is shown to be m.d.s.-complete. We define the
AF Fm,n,o = (Am,n,o, Rm,n,o) where
Am,n,o = {a}∪ {bj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ m}∪ {cj, dj, ej ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ { f j ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ o} and
Rm,n,o = {(bj, a), (bj, bj) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {(cj, dj), (dj, cj), (ej, ej) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪{(dj, ei) ∣ 1 ≤ j, i ≤ n} ∪ {(dj, bi) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪{(dj, di) ∣ j ≠ i, 1 ≤ j, i ≤ n} ∪ {( f j, f j) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ o} ∪{(dj, fi) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ o}.
Note that if a subindex equals zero, then there are no corresponding arguments and attacks.
For the sake of clarity we present here an instantiation of the presented scheme, namely F3,2,4.
a
c2
c1
d1
d2
b1 b2 b3
f1 f2 f3 f4
e2
e1
Figure 7.13: The AF F3,2,4
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The grey highlighted arguments belong to the set C2 = {a, c1, c2} which is an instantiation of
the scheme Cn = {a}∪ {cj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n}. We claim that NFm,n,ostb,Φ (Cn) = m + n + o, NFm,n,oss,Φ (Cn) = m + n
and NFm,n,opr,Φ (Cn) = m. By construction Cn is conflict-free in Fm,n,o. Furthermore, Cn does
not have proper conflict-free supersets (*). Applying the characterization theorem 7.29 we
obtain NFm,n,opr,Φ (Cn) = VFm,n,oad,S (Cn) = ∣R−Fm,n,o(Cn)∖ R+Fm,n,o(Cn)∣ = ∣{bj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ m}∣ = m because
these arguments are not counterattacked by Cn. In case of stable semantics N
Fm,n,o
stb,Φ (Cn) =
VFm,n,ostb,S (Cn) = ∣A(Fm,n,o)∖ R+Fm,n,o(Cn)∣ = ∣{bj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {ej ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n}∪ { f j ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ o}∣ =
m + n + o since exactly these arguments are not attacked by Cn.
To see that NFm,n,oss,Φ (Cn) = m+n is much more difficult. At first we will show that NFm,n,oss,E (Cn)≥ m+ n and finally, NFm,n,oss,S (Cn) ≤ m+ n. Consequently, NFm,n,oss,Φ (Cn) = m+ n for any Φ ∈ {E, N, S}
is proven (Corollary 7.16). Consider the n conflict-free sets S1n, ..., S
n
n where S
j
n = {a} ∪ {ci ∣
1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∖ {cj} ∪ {dj}. We observe that Cn /⊆ Sjn for n ≥ 1 and furthermore, R+Fm,n,o(Cn) ⊂
R+Fm,n,o(Sjn) = Am,n,o. Assume now NFm,n,oss,E (Cn) = l′ < m + n. Hence, there is an AF G, such that
d(Fm,n,o,G) = l′, Fm,n,o ⪯ G and furthermore, there is a conflict-free superset C′n of Cn with the
property C′n ∈ Ess(G). In consideration of (*) we deduce that C′n = Cn ∪G where G is a set of
fresh arguments. Since any semi-stable extension is admissible we conclude that each bj has
to be attacked by C′n. This means at least m additional attacks of G are required for this task.
Let us consider now the remaining l′′ < n = ∣{Sjn ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n}∣ new attacks. The set Sjn that
we look for satisfies the following conditions: 1. for any g ∈ G, (dj, g), (g, dj) ∉ R(G), 2.(dj, dj) ∉ R(G), 3. for any i ≠ j, (ci, dj), (dj, ci) ∉ R(G) as well as (a, dj), (dj, a) ∉ R(G) and 4. for
any g ∈ A(G) ∖ {A(Fm,n,o) ∪ G}, (cj, g), (g, dj) ∉ R(G). Since any new attack may eliminate at
most one potential candidate we deduce that there is indeed such a Sjn satisfying 1. - 4. We will
show now that Sjn ∪G ∈ Ead(G) and R+G(Cn ∪G) ⊂ R+G(Sjn ∪G) contradicting C′n ∈ Ess(G). Let us
consider the range R+G(Cn ∪G). Obviously, there is an index i, such that ei ∉ R+G(Cn ∪G) since
l′′ < n was assumed. Note that ei ∈ R+G(Sjn ∪G) by construction of Fm,n,o and Sjn. Furthermore,
in consideration of the first part of condition 4. (cj does not “reach” further arguments) we
immediately conclude that R+G(Cn ∪G) ⊆ R+G(Sjn ∪G). Altogether, R+G(Cn ∪G) ⊂ R+G(Sjn ∪G) has
to hold. Furthermore, Sjn ∪G is conflict-free in G for two reasons, first Sjn satisfies conditions
1. - 3. and second, Cn ∪ G is assumed to be admissible and in particular, conflict-free in G.
Assume now that Sjn ∪ G ∉ Ead(G). This means, there is argument g ∈ A(G) which attacks
Sjn ∪G without being counterattacked. Since conflict-freeness is already shown and AFm,n,o ⊆
R+G(Sjn ∪G) obviously holds, we deduce g ∈ A(G)∖ {Am,n,o ∪G}. In consideration of the second
part of condition 4. ((g, dj) ∉ R(G)) it follows that g attacks some ci with i ≠ j or an argument
g′ ∈ G. Since Cn ∪G is assumed to be admissible in G there is an argument c′ ∈ Cn ∪G, such that(c′, g) ∈ R(G). If c′ ∈ G, then obviously c′ ∈ Sjn ∪G. If c′ ∈ Cn, then c′ ∈ Sjn ∪G because the second
part of condition 4. ((cj, g) ∉ R(G)) guarantees cj ≠ c′. This means, under the assumption
NFm,n,oss,E (Cn) = l′ < m + n we derived a contradiction, namely C′n ∈ Ess(G) ∧C′n ∉ Ess(G). Hence,
NFm,n,oss,E (Cn) ≥ m + n is shown.
Let us prove now that NFm,n,oss,S (Cn) ≤ m + n. Consider therefore a fresh argument c and the
AF Gm,n = (Am,n,o ∪ {c}, Rm,n,o ∪ {(c, bj) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {(c, dj) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n}). One can easily verify
that Cn ∪ {c} ∈ Ess(Gm,n) and furthermore, F ⪯S Gm,n. Since d(Fm,n,o,Gm,n) = m + n we conclude
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NFm,n,oss,S (Cn) ≤ m + n. Finally, NFm,n,oss,Φ (Cn) = m + n for any Φ ∈ {E, N, S} is proven.
The following proposition shows that the spectrum S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) is coherent, i.e. any fibre
either possesses finite values or all values equal infinity. This means, under the considered
semantics it is impossible that a set C may be enforced with respect to a semantics σ and
simultaneously, C is not enforceable with respect to another semantics τ. Furthermore, we
show that the considered spectra are not positive, i.e. there are unenforceable sets.
Proposition 7.42. For any Φ ∈ {E, N, S}, S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) is coherent but not positive.
Proof. Given Φ ∈ {E, N, S}. First, we will prove the coherence of S(stb,ss,pr,Φ). Since S(stb,ss,pr,Φ)
is already shown to be m.d.s.-complete it suffices to prove that for any fibre (k, l, m) ∈S(stb,ss,pr,Φ), if m < ∞, then l < ∞ and if l < ∞, then k < ∞. Let m < ∞. Hence there is an AFF and a set C ⊆ A(F), such that NFpr,Φ(C) = m. This means, C has to be conflict-free in F .
Applying Corollary 7.23 we deduce l = NFss,S(C) ≤ ∣A(F)∖C∣ <∞. Since NFss,S(C) ≥ NFss,N(C) ≥
NFss,E(C) (compare Corollary 7.16) holds we are done. In the same way one may show that
l <∞ implies k <∞.
To prove that S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) is not positive it suffices to construct a non-finite fibre. Consider
therefore F = ({a},{(a, a)}) and C = {a}. Since C does not possess conflict-free supersets we
deduce NFad,Φ(C) = ∞ (Theorem 7.29). Furthermore, by Proposition 7.17 we get (∞,∞,∞) ∈S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) concluding the proof.
The following Theorem summarizes the earlier results. Note that the listed properties fully
characterize the considered spectra. This means, it is decidable whether an arbitrary fibre
belongs to the considered spectra.
Theorem 7.43. For any Φ ∈ {E, N, S}, S(stb,ss,pr,Φ) is coherent, m.d.s.-complete but not positive.
7.3.3 Properties of the (stb, ss, pr, W)-Spectrum
We start with an example showing some first and notable differences between the coinciding
spectra with respect to normal, strong and arbitrary expansions and the spectrum with respect
to weak expansions considered in this section.
Example 7.44 (Example 7.22 continued). The AFs below exemplify that the (stb, ss, pr, W)-
spectrum is not coherent since NFstb,W({a1}) =∞ (unenforceable) and NFpr,W({a1}) = 0 (already
accepted). Furthermore, 1 ≤ NFss,W({a1}) ≤ 2 because {a1} and all its proper supersets are not
semi-stable in F but {a1} is semi-stable in G.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3b
Figure 7.14: Non-coherence of the Weak Spectrum
Unfortunately, (up to now) there are no characterization theorems for semi-stable seman-
tics. Nevertheless, using the following impossibility result it is shown that NFss,W({a1}) = 2
holds. This means, if a desired set of arguments D is not already contained in a semi-stable
extension of the initial framework, then the minimal effort needed to enforce D is at least 2 in
case of weak expansions.
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Proposition 7.45. (n, 1, m) ∉ S(stb,ss,pr,W) for each n, m ∈N∞.
Proof. Since n, m are assumed to be arbitrary natural numbers or ∞ it suffices to prove that(1) ∉ S(ss,W). Assume (1) ∈ S(ss,W), i.e. there is an AF F and a set C with the property
NFss,W(C) = 1. This means there is an AF G, such that F ⪯W G, d(F ,G) = 1 and a set C′ ⊇ C
with C′ ∈ Ess(G). Without loss of generality C′ = D ∪ E where C ⊆ D ⊆ A(F) and E ⊆ A(G) ∖
A(F). Since every semi-stable extension is admissible we deduce D ∈ Ead(F). Furthermore,
NFss,⪯W (C) = 1 ≠ 0 implies there is an admissible set D′ in F , such that R+F(D) ⊂ R+F(D′) (*).
We will show now that D ∪ E ∉ Ess(G) by proof by cases. Let (d, e) be the new attack. Note
that e ∈ A(G) ∖ A(F) is implied since F ⪯W G is assumed. Furthermore, d ∈ D and e ∈ E is
impossible since D ∪ E ∈ c f (G).
1stcase: Let d ∈ D ∖ D′ and e ∉ E. We observe R+G(D ∪ E) = R+F(D) ∪ E ∪ {e}. Furthermore,
E only contains isolated arguments in G and hence, D′ ∪ E ∈ Ead(G). Because of (*) and d ∈
D ∖ D′ we conclude e is defended by D′ in G. Thus, D′ ∪ E ∪ {e} ∈ Ead(G) and obviously,
R+G(D′ ∪ E ∪ {e}) = R+F(D′) ∪ E ∪ {e}. In consideration of (*) it follows that R+F(D) ∪ E ∪ {e} =
R+G(D ∪ E) ⊂ R+G(D′ ∪ E ∪ {e}) and hence, D ∪ E ∉ Ess(G) is shown.
2ndcase: Let d ∈ D ∩ D′ and e ∉ E. Consequently, D′ ∪ E ∈ Ead(G) and furthermore, R+G(D ∪
E) = R+F(D)∪ E ∪ {e} ⊂(∗) R+F(D′)∪ E ∪ {e} = R+G(D′ ∪ E) contradicting D ∪ E ∈ Ess(G).
3rdcase: Let d ∈ D′ ∖D and e ∉ E. Again, D′ ∪E ∈ Ead(G) holds and furthermore, R+G(D∪E) =
R+F(D)∪ E ⊂(∗) R+F(D′)∪ E ∪ {e} = R+G(D′ ∪ E) in contradiction to D ∪ E ∈ Ess(G).
4thcase: Let d ∈ D′ ∖D and e ∈ E. Hence, D′ ∪ (E ∖ {e}) ∈ Ead(G). Furthermore, R+G(D ∪ E) =
R+F(D) ∪ E ⊂(∗) R+F(D′) ∪ (E ∖ {e}) ∪ {e} = R+F(D) ∪ E = R+G(D′ ∪ E). Consequently, D ∪ E ∉Ess(G) is shown.
5thcase: Let d ∈ A(F)∖ (D′ ∪D) and e ∈ E. Thus, D has to counterattack d in F since D ∪ E
is assumed to be admissible in G. Let d′ ∈ D be the counterattacker of d. If d′ ∈ D′ we conclude
D′ ∪ E ∈ Ead(G). If not, it follows the existence of an argument d′′ ∈ D′, such that (d′′, d) ∈ R(F)
since (*) is assumed. Again, we get D′ ∪ E ∈ Ead(G). In both cases, R+G(D ∪ E) = R+F(D)∪ E ⊂(∗)
R+F(D′)∪ E = R+G(D′ ∪ E) contradicting D ∪ E ∈ Ess(G).
6thcase: Let d ∈ A(F)∖ (D′ ∪D) and e ∉ E. Consequently, D′ ∪ E ∈ Ead(G) and thus, R+G(D ∪
E) = R+F(D)∪ E ⊂(∗) R+F(D′)∪ E = R+G(D′ ∪ E) in contradiction to D ∪ E ∈ Ess(G).
7thcase: Let d, e ∈ A(G)∖A(F). Since d(F ,G) = 1 it follows that e ∉ E. Consequently, D′ ∪E ∈Ead(G) and furthermore, R+G(D ∪ E) = R+F(D) ∪ R+G(E) ⊂(∗) R+F(D′) ∪ R+G(E) = R+G(D′ ∪ E)
contradicting D ∪ E ∈ Ess(G).
The proposition above and its usage for the illustrated problem, namely determining the
characteristic in a certain argumentation scenario, underline that the investigation of spectra
reveals important insights into the minimal change problem. The following impossibility result
reveals a further surprising interrelation between the considered semantics, namely that for
any F and any set of arguments C it is impossible that C is already contained in a preferred
extension yet unenforceable using semi-stable semantics.
Proposition 7.46. (∞,∞, 0) ∉ S(stb,ss,pr,W).
Proof. We will show the stronger result, namely (∞, 0) ∉ S(ss,pr,W). Assume (∞, 0) ∈ S(ss,pr,W),
i.e. there is an AF F and a set C with the property NFpr,W(C) = 0 and NFss,W(C) = ∞. This
means, there exists a set C′ ⊇ C with C′ ∈ Epr(F). Since all considered AFs are assumed to be
finite we deduce C′ = {c′1, ..., c′n} for some n ∈N. Let D = {d1, ..., dn} be a set of fresh arguments
and consider G = (A(F) ∪ D, R(F) ∪ {(di, di), (c′i , di) ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). Obviously, d(F ,G) = 2n and
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F ⪯W G. Furthermore, the range of C′ in G includes the set D and obviously, no proper subset
of C′ possess this property too. Consequently, there is no C′′ ∈ Ead(G), such that R+G(C′) ⊂
R+G(C′′) because C′ is also preferred in G. Hence, C′ ∈ Ess(G) contradicting the assumption.
In the light of Prop. 7.46 the corresponding question about the fibres (∞,∞,∞), (∞, 0, 0)
and (0, 0, 0) arises. The following proposition gives the (positive) answer:
Proposition 7.47. {(∞,∞,∞), (∞, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0)} ⊆ S(stb,ss,pr,W).
Proof. Consider the AFs F1 = ({a},{(a, a)}), F2 = ({a, b},{(b, b)}) and F3 = ({a},∅). In consi-
deration of Theorem 7.21 and Definition 7.18 one may easily verify that the set {a} possesses
the claimed fibres with respect to the AFs F1, F2 and F3.
We have already shown that the minimal effort with respect to semi-stable semantics and
weak expansions needed to enforce a desired set C cannot be 1. This raises the question about
other natural numbers lying between 2 and ∞. The following proposition proves that there are
infinitely many numbers n between 2 and ∞, such that (∞, n, 0) is a fibre of the (stb, ss, pr, W)-
spectrum.
Proposition 7.48. For any natural number n ∈ N there exists k ∈ N, such that n ≤ k ≤ 2n and(∞, k, 0) ∈ S(stb,ss,pr,W).
Proof. We define the AF F∞,n,0 = (A∞,n,0, R∞,n,0) where
A∞,n,0 = {cj, dj, ej ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n} and
R∞,n,0 = {(cj, dj), (dj, cj), (dj, ej)(ej, ej) ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n}∪ {(di, ej) ∣ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n}.
For the sake of clarity we present here an instantiation of the presented scheme, namely F∞,3,0.
c3
c2
c1
d3
d2
d1
e3
e2
e1
Figure 7.15: The AF F∞,3,0
The grey highlighted arguments belong to the set C3 = {c1, c2, c3} which is an instantiation
of the scheme Cn = {cj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ n} (Dn, En are defined analogously). We claim that NF∞,n,0stb,W (Cn) =∞ and NF∞,n,0pr,W (Cn) = 0. We observe that no superset of Cn is stable in F∞,n,0 and furthermore,
Cn itself is preferred in F∞,n,0. Consequently (Theorem 7.21, Definition 7.18), the characteristics
of Cn in case of stable and preferred semantics hold as claimed.
Consider now the semi-stable semantics. At first we will show that NF∞,n,0ss,W (Cn) ≥ n. (proof
by contradiction) Assume NF∞,n,0ss,W (Cn) = n′ < n. This means, there is an AF G, such that
d(F∞,n,0,G) = n′, F∞,n,0 ⪯W G and furthermore, there is a superset C′n of Cn, such that C′n ∈Ess(G). We deduce that C′n = Cn ∪G where G is a set of fresh arguments since we consider weak
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expansions and furthermore, Cn does not possess proper supersets which are conflict-free inF∞,n,0.
Since n′ < n is assumed it follows that there has to be an index j, such that cj ∈ Cn does
not possess attacks to arguments in A(G) ∖ A∞,n,0 (1) and dj ∈ Dn does not possess attacks
to arguments in G (2). Consider Sjn = {ci ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∖ {cj} ∪ {dj}. Obviously, R+F∞,n,0(Cn) ⊂
R+F∞,n,0(Sjn) = A∞,n,0 (3). We will show now that Sjn ∪G is admissible in G and it possesses a
strictly greater range than C′n in G. Since we assumed C′n ∈ Ess(G), (2) and we are considering
weak expansions the conflict-freeness of Sjn ∪G in G is implied. Furthermore, admissibility of
Sjn ∪G in G holds because Sjn is admissible in F∞,n,0 and all potential attackers of arguments
in G are counterattacked by at least one argument in Sjn ∪G (dj counterattacks any ei, any di
where i ≠ j is counterattacked by ci, an attacker g′ ∈ A(G) ∖ {A∞,n,0 ∪ G} is counterattacked
by some g ∈ G or some ci ∈ Sjn because of the admissibility of C′n and property (1)). Finally,
R+G(Cn ∪ G) ⊂ R+G(Sjn ∪ G) has to hold because of properties (1) and (3). This contradicts the
assumption that Cn ∪G is semi-stable in G.
Let us prove now that NF∞,n,0ss,S (Cn) ≤ 2n. Let C′n = {c′1, ..., c′n} a set of fresh arguments and
consider G = (A∞,n,0 ∪C′n, R∞,n,0 ∪ {(c′i , c′i), (ci, c′i) ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). Obviously, d(F∞,n,0,G) = 2n andF∞,n,0 ⪯W G. One can easily verify that Cn ∈ Ess(G). Finally, NF∞,n,0ss,W (Cn) ≤ 2n is shown.
It is an open question whether each number greater than 1 can appear as the characteristic
of semi-stable semantics in a fibre, i.e. whether {(∞, k, 0) ∣ 2 ≤ k < ∞} ⊆ S(stb,ss,pr,W). We
would like to recall that it is already shown that in case of stable and preferred semantics,
either a desired set C is already contained in an extension or C is not enforceable (compare
Definition 7.18 and Theorem 7.21). Consequently, an affirmative answer of the open question
would imply a complete characterization of the (stb, ss, pr, W)-spectrum.
7.3.4 A Note on the (stb, ss, pr, U)-Spectrum
We use U to denote the universal relation among argumentation frameworks. In other words,
we allow for arbitrary modifications including deletions of attacks and arguments. What
consequences does this have for the corresponding spectrum? In contrast to the other consi-
dered spectra the (stb, ss, pr, U)-spectrum is the first one proven to be positive. This means
there are no cases where the enforcing of a certain set D is impossible. Furthermore, the(stb, ss, pr, U)-spectrum is m.d.s. in analogy to the spectra with respect to arbitrary, normal
and strong expansions.
Proposition 7.49. The spectrum S(stb,ss,pr,U) is positive and m.d.s.
Proof. Both properties follow immediately by applying Proposition 7.32 (positive) and Corol-
lary 7.15 (m.d.s.).
A detailed analysis of the (stb, ss, pr, U)-spectrum is part of future work. Due to the multi-
tude of possibilities to modify a certain argumentation scenario if arbitrary modifications are
allowed it is a hard task to show further properties. We want to mention that we conjecture
that the considered spectrum is m.d.s.-complete (but were unable to find a proof so far).
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7.4 Minimal Change Equivalence
Expansion equivalence (see Chapter 5) between two AFs guarantees their mutual replaceabi-
lity for any dynamic scenario without loss of information. In contrast to taking into account
any dynamic scenario we are now interested in an equivalence notion which corresponds to
the very nature of a dispute where (counter)arguments are put forward with the objective to
convince the participants of a certain opinion D. Two AFs are called minimal-D-equivalent if
the minimal effort needed to enforce D is the same for both. If minimal-D-equivalence holds
for every subset D of the AFs in question we call them minimal change equivalent [Baumann,
2012b].
In this section we present characterization theorems for the newly introduced equivalence
notions in case of stable, preferred, complete and admissible semantics. Furthermore, we
study the relation between minimal change equivalence and expansion or standard equiva-
lence in general, i.e. rather than considering specific semantics we provide our results for a
whole range of semantics satisfying certain abstract principles. More specifically, we provide
a complete picture about the relationships among all equivalence notions (so-called equiva-
lence zoo) studied in this thesis for two of the most relevant semantics of Dung-style AFs,
namely stable and preferred semantics [Baumann and Brewka, 2013a]. It turns out that mini-
mal change equivalence naturally fits into this equivalence zoo, although its definition includes
a graph-theoretical distance function and therefore an arithmetic aspect in contrast to standard
or expansion equivalence as well as the considered intermediate variants.
7.4.1 Formal Definitions and General Results
We start with the formal definitions. Minimal-D-equivalence between two AFs guarantees
that the minimal effort needed to convince the participants of a certain opinion D (a set of
arguments) is identical. Minimal change equivalent AFs possess this property for every subset
of the considered AFs.
Definition 7.50. Two AFs F and G are
1. minimal-D-equivalent (in symbols: F ≡σ,DΦ G) or
2. minimal change equivalent (in symbols: F ≡σ,MCΦ G),
with respect to a semantics σ and a binary relation Φ ⊆ A ×A iff
1. D ⊆ A(F) and NFσ,Φ(D) = NGσ,Φ(D) and
2. for any D, such that D ⊆ A(F) or D ⊆ A(G), NFσ,Φ(D) = NGσ,Φ(D).
A few properties are clear by definition: First, minimal change equivalence guarantees sha-
ring the same arguments (in contrast to minimal-D-equivalence) and second, minimal change
equivalence implies minimal-D-equivalence for all subsets D.
In the following we are interested in characterization theorems for the introduced equiva-
lence notions as well as their relation to standard and expansion equivalence. In Section 7.2.2
we already proved that the introduced value-functions adequately determine the correspon-
ding characteristics and, therefore, the minimal change problem. Now we take advantage of
this work. The value-functions provide us with a procedure for deciding whether two AFs are
minimal change equivalent or not since they are based on local criteria of the underlying AF
and thus can be established in a finite number of steps.
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The following two theorems provide characterizations for stable, preferred, complete and
admissible semantics with respect to weak, strong, normal and arbitrary expansions as well as
arbitrary modifications.
Theorem 7.51. Let σ ∈ {stb, ad} and Φ ∈ {W, S, U}. For any AFs F and G,
1. F ≡σ,DΦ G iff D ⊆ A(F) and VFσ,Φ(D) = VGσ,Φ(D),
2. F ≡σ,MCΦ G iff for any D, such that D ⊆ A(F) or D ⊆ A(G), VFσ,Φ(D) = VGσ,Φ(D).
Proof. Consider Definition 7.50 and the characterization theorems 7.21, 7.29 and 7.37.
Remember that some values are even strong enough to characterize the minimal change
problem for more than one semantics and/or different classes of expansions (see Figure 7.12
for an overview).
Theorem 7.52. Let Φ ∈ {N, E}. For any AFs F and G,
1. F ≡stb,DΦ G iff D ⊆ A(F) and VFstb,S(D) = VGstb,S(D),
2. F ≡stb,MCΦ G iff for any D, such that D ⊆ A(F) or D ⊆ A(G), VFstb,S(D) = VGstb,S(D).
Let σ ∈ {pr, co}. For any AFs F and G,
3. F ≡σ,DW G iff D ⊆ A(F) and VFad,W(D) = VGad,W(D),
4. F ≡σ,MCW G iff for any D, such that D ⊆ A(F) or D ⊆ A(G), VFad,W(D) = VGad,W(D).
Let σ ∈ {pr, co} and Φ ∈ {N, E}. For any AFs F and G,
5. F ≡σ,DΦ G iff D ⊆ A(F) and VFad,S(D) = VGad,S(D),
6. F ≡σ,MCΦ G iff for any D, such that D ⊆ A(F) or D ⊆ A(G), VFad,S(D) = VGad,S(D).
Let σ ∈ {pr, co}. For any AFs F and G,
7. F ≡σ,DU G iff D ⊆ A(F) and VFad,U(D) = VGad,U(D),
8. F ≡σ,MCU G iff for any D, such that D ⊆ A(F) or D ⊆ A(G), VFad,U(D) = VGad,U(D).
Proof. Combine Definition 7.50 and characterization theorems 7.21, 7.29 and 7.37.
Example 7.53. The following AFs exemplify the novel equivalence notions.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 F ′ ∶ a1 a2 a3
G ∶ a1 a2 a3 G′ ∶ a1 a2 a3 a4
Figure 7.16: Minimal Change Equivalence and Minimal-{a1, a2}-Equivalence
The AFs F and G are minimal change equivalent with respect to preferred semantics and
strong expansions, i.e. F ≡pr,MCS G. This can be seen as follows: First, VFad,S({a1}) = VGad,S({a1}) =
150
Chapter 7. Enforcing and Minimal Change
VFad,S({a3}) = VGad,S({a3}) = 1, second, VFad,S({a2}) = VGad,S({a2}) = VFad,S(∅) = VGad,S(∅) = 0 and
finally, all other sets E ⊆ {a1, a2, a3} do not possess conflict-free supersets in F or G and thus
take the value infinity. Similarly, one can show that F ′ ≡pr,{a1,a2}S G′.
We turn now to the relation between minimal change equivalence and expansion or stan-
dard equivalence in general, i.e. rather than considering specific semantics we provide our
results for a whole range of semantics satisfying certain abstract principles.
To get the first insight into the relations consider again the minimal change equivalent
AFs F and G depicted in Figure 7.16. One main result in [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011] is
that expansion equivalence is immediately linked to the existence of self-loops, in particular it
collapses to syntactic equivalence in case of self-loop-free AFs (compare Proposition 5.47). This
means, F and G are not expansion equivalent which indicates that minimal change equivalence
is possibly weaker than strong equivalence. The following theorem shows that the assertion
holds for any semantics σ which satisfy that expansion equivalent AFs have to share the same
arguments. Let us call this property regularity. Note that regularity is a very weak criterion.
One can imagine that for reasonable defined semantics it is always possible to find an AF H,
such that Eσ(F ∪H) ≠ Eσ(G ∪H) if A(F) ≠ A(G). All semantics considered in this thesis satisfy
regularity (see Proposition 5.48).
Theorem 7.54. For any AFs F , G, any regular semantics σ and any binary Φ ∈ {E, N, S, W},
F ≡σE G ⇒ F ≡σ,MCΦ G.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume F ≡σE G and F /≡σ,MCΦ G. Since σ is assumed to be
regular it follows A(F) = A(G). Hence, we deduce the existence of a subset E, such that
NFσ,Φ(E) ≠ NGσ,Φ(E). Let NFσ,Φ(E) = k1 and NGσ,Φ(E) = k2 where k1, k2 ∈ N∞ and without
loss of generality k1 < k2. Consequently, there are an AF H and a set E′ ⊆ A(H), such that(F ,H) ∈ Φ, d(F ,H) = k1 and E ⊆ E′ ∈ Eσ(H). Without loss of generality there exists an AFH′, such that ∣R(H′)∣ = k1, R(F)∩ R(H′) = ∅ and H = F ∪H′ (compare Definition 2.13). SinceF ≡σE G is assumed we conclude E′ ∈ Eσ(G ∪H′). It can be easily seen that (G,G ∪ H′) ∈ Φ
and d(G,G ∪H′) ≤ k1. Thus, k2 = NGσ,Φ(E) ≤ k1 which contradicts the assumption k1 < k2. This
means, F ≡σE G ⇒ F ≡σ,MCΦ G is shown.
Since extensions possess a characteristic of zero, one might expect minimal change equi-
valence to imply standard equivalence. However, it turns out that this implication does not
hold in general but can be shown for semantics satisfying I-maximality [Baroni and Giacomin,
2007]. Remember I-maximality is fulfilled, if no extension can be a proper subset of another
one (compare Definition 2.11).
Theorem 7.55. For any AFs F , G, any semantics σ satisfying I-maximality and any binary Φ ∈{U, E, N, S, W}, F ≡σ,MCΦ G ⇒ F ≡σ G.
Proof. Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that F ≡σ,MCΦ G and F /≡σ G. By Definition 7.50
minimal change equivalence implies A(F) = A(G). Without loss of generality we may assume
the existence of a subset E, such that E ∈ Eσ(F) and E ∉ Eσ(G). This means, NFσ,Φ(E) = 0 and
thus, NGσ,Φ(E) = 0 since F and G are assumed to be minimal change equivalent. Consequently,
there is a proper superset E′ of E, such that E′ ∈ Eσ(G). This means, NGσ,Φ(E′) = 0 and therefore
NFσ,Φ(E′) = 0. Again, there has to be a superset E′′ of E′, such that E′′ ∈ Eσ(F). Observe that
E ⊂ E′′ is implied which contradicts the I-maximality of σ.
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Remember that stable, semi-stable, stage, preferred, grounded, ideal, eager and naive se-
mantics satisfy I-maximality whereas complete and admissible does not (see Figure 2.4). We
want to conclude our study with two AFs showing that we cannot drop the I-maximality
criterion in Theorem 7.55.
Example 7.56. We have F /≡co G since {a4} ∈ Eco(G) and {a4} ∉ Eco(F). On the other hand,F ≡co,MCE G since: First, for all E ⊆ {a2, a4}, VFad,S(E) = VGad,S(E) = 0 because {a2, a4} is complete inF and G. Furthermore, VFad,S({a3}) = VGad,S({a3}) = 1, and finally, all other sets E ⊆ {a1, a2, a3, a4}
(such that E /⊆ {a2, a4} and E ≠ {a3}) do not possess conflict-free supersets in F or G and thus
take the value infinity.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 a4 G ∶ a1 a2 a3 a4
Figure 7.17: Necessity of I-maximality
7.4.2 Stable and Preferred Semantics: Analyzing the Equivalence Zoo
In Section 5.5.2 (Theorem 5.46) we studied relationships between expansion, normal expansion,
strong expansion, weak expansion, local expansion and standard equivalence for all semantics
considered in this thesis. In this section we provide a complete analysis including the family
of minimal change equivalence relations for two of the most relevant semantics of Dung-
style AFs, namely stable and preferred semantics. Besides the general case, i.e. considering
arbitrary AFs, we also provide results for two special cases, namely the case where the AFs do
not contain self-loops, i.e. attacks of the form (a, a) for some argument a, and the case where
two AFs have the same arguments. In the interest of readability we present our results not
only in terms of propositions, but also graphically.
7.4.2.1 Stable Semantics: The Full Picture
The following proposition characterizes stable semantics in the unrestrictive case, i.e. we consi-
der arbitrary AFs.
Proposition 7.57. For any AFs F and G,
• F ≡stbE G⇔ F ≡stbN G⇔ F ≡stbS G ⇒ F ≡stbL G ⇒ F ≡stbW G ⇒ F ≡stb G,
• F ≡stb,MCE G⇔ F ≡stb,MCN G⇔ F ≡stb,MCS G ⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G ⇒ F ≡stbW G,
• F ≡stbE G⇔ F ≡stb,MCE G.
The following Figure 7.18 describes the results for stable semantics graphically. In case of
stable semantics only local expansion equivalence and the family of minimal change equiva-
lence relations are unrelated. For any other two equivalence relations we have at least one
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implication chain. In particular, the different forms of minimal change equivalence are shown
to be intermediate forms between strong expansion and weak expansion equivalence.
expansion
+
normal
expansion
+
strong
expansion
equivalence
local
expansion
equivalence
MC-
equivalence
w.r.t.
arbitrary
expansion
+
normal
expansion
+
strong
expansion
MC-
equivalence
w.r.t.
weak
expansion
weak
expansion
equivalence
standard
equivalence
Figure 7.18: Stable Semantics (Arbitrary AFs)
Proof. In Theorem 5.46 it was already shown that F ≡stbE G ⇔ F ≡stbN G ⇔ F ≡stbS G ⇒ F ≡stbLG ⇒ F ≡stbW G ⇒ F ≡st G. Since stable semantics satisfy regularity, i.e. expansion equivalent
AFs have to share the same arguments (compare Proposition 5.48) we conclude that F ≡stbEG ⇒ F ≡stb,MCE G (Theorem 7.54). Furthermore, by applying Theorems 7.51 and 7.52 we deduceF ≡stb,MCE G⇔ F ≡stb,MCN G⇔ F ≡stb,MCS G.
We will show now that F ≡stb,MCS G ⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G. Assume F ≡stb,MCS G and F /≡stb,MCW G.
Note that the first assumption implies that A(F) = A(G). The second assumption means
that there is a set E, such that NFstb,W(E) ≠ NGstb,W(E). Without loss of generality we assume
NFstb,W(E) = ∞ and NGstb,W(E) = 0 (Theorem 7.21). Since the characteristic with respect to
strong expansions does not exceed the characteristic with respect to weak expansions we have
NGstb,S(E) = 0 (Proposition 7.30). Consequently (first assumption), NFstb,S(E) = 0 in contradiction
to NFstb,W(E) =∞ which proves the claimed implication.
We show now that F ≡stb,MCW G ⇒ F ≡stbW G. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that F ≡stb,MCWG and F /≡stbW G. First, minimal change equivalence implies A(F) = A(G). In Theorem 5.38 it
was shown that two AFs are weak expansion equivalent with respect to stable semantics iff i)
A(F) = A(G) and Estb(F) = Estb(G) or ii) Estb(F) = Estb(G) = ∅. Consequently, Estb(F) ≠ Estb(G).
Let E ∈ Estb(F) and E ∉ Estb(G). Hence, NFstb,W(E) = 0. Since minimal change equivalence is
assumed, NGstb,W(E) = 0. Since we assumed E ∉ Estb(G) there has to be a proper superset E′
of E, such that E′ ∈ Estb(G). Consequently, NGstb,W(E′) = 0 and therefore NFstb,W(E′) = 0. This
means there is a superset E′′ of E′, such that E′′ ∈ Estb(F). This means, there are two stable
extensions E, E′′ of F , such that E ⊂ E′′. This is impossible because stable semantics satisfies the
I-maximality principle (compare Figure 2.4). Altogether, the claimed implications are shown.
Now we present some counter-examples showing that the converse directions do not hold.
It suffices to consider the following four cases. The other non-relations can be easily obtained
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by using the already shown relations presented in Figure 7.18.
1. F ≡stb G /⇒ F ≡stbW G.
F ∶ a1 a2 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
We have Estb(F) = Estb(G) = {{a2}} ≠ ∅ and obviously, A(F) ≠ A(G). In Theorem 5.38 it
was shown that two AFs are weak expansion equivalent with respect to stable semantics iff i)
A(F) = A(G) and Estb(F) = Estb(G) or ii) Estb(F) = Estb(G) = ∅. Consequently, F /≡stbW G and at
the same time F ≡stb G.
2. F ≡stb,MCΦ G /⇒ F ≡stbL G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
Both AFs share the same arguments. Furthermore, Estb(F) = Estb(G) = {{a1, a3}}. Ap-
plying Theorem 7.29 we conclude: First, for any E ⊆ {a1, a3}, we have NFstb,S(E) = NGstb,S(E) = 0.
Second, NFstb,S({a1}) = NGstb,S({a1}) = 1 and third, for all not mentioned subsets C of A(F),
NFstb,S(C) = NGstb,S(C) =∞ because they contain at least one conflict. This verifies F ≡stb,MCΦ G for
each Φ ∈ {E, N, S} (Theorems 7.29, 7.51 and 7.52). Consider the AFs H = ({a2, a3},{(a2, a3)}).
We observe that Estb(F ∪H) = {{a1, a3},{a2}} ≠ {{a1, a3}} = Estb(G) = Estb(G ∪H). Thus,F /≡stbL G.
3. F ≡stb,MCW G /⇒ F ≡stb,MCΦ G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
Both AFs share the same arguments and Estb(F) = Estb(G) = {{a2}}. Thus, NFstb,W(∅) =
NGstb,W(∅) = NFstb,W({a2}) = NGstb,W({a2}) = 0. Furthermore, for any other subset C of A(F),
NFstb,W(C) = NGstb,W(C) =∞ because they are not contained in an extension (Theorem 7.21, De-
finition 7.18). Consequently, F ≡stb,MCW G. On the other hand, NFstb,S({a1}) = 1 ≠ 2 = NGstb,S({a1})
(compare Theorem 7.29, Definition 7.24). This means, F /≡stb,MCΦ G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}.
4. F ≡stbL G /⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G.
F ∶ a1 a2 G ∶ a1
Since minimal change equivalence implies sharing the same arguments we state F /≡stb,MCWG. Furthermore, it can be easily checked that for any AF H, such that A(H) ⊆ {a1, a2}, we haveEstb(F ∪H) = Estb(G ∪H). Hence, F ≡stbL G.
How does the situation change if we restrict our considerations to AFs possessing the same
arguments? It turns out that the equivalence zoo collapses to only 3 distinct classes, and in
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contrast to the general case local expansion equivalence and the different forms of minimal
change equivalence become comparable.
Proposition 7.58. For any AFs F and G such that A(F) = A(G) we have:
• F ≡stbE G⇔ F ≡stbN G⇔ F ≡stbS G⇔ F ≡stbL G ⇒ F ≡stb,MCE G,
• F ≡stb,MCE G⇔ F ≡stb,MCN G⇔ F ≡stb,MCS G ⇒ F ≡stbW G,
• F ≡stbW G⇔ F ≡stb G⇔ F ≡stb,MCW G.
Here is the graphical representation of the result:
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Figure 7.19: Stable Semantics (Same Arguments)
Proof. For this proof we consider AFs sharing the same arguments, i.e. A(F) = A(G). Using
the results presented in Figure 7.18 it suffices to show the following three implications.
First, we will show that F ≡stbL G ⇒ F ≡stbE G. In [Oikarinen and Woltran, 2011, Theorem 9] it
is proven that two AFs are local expansion equivalent iff i) F ≡stbE G or ii) Estb(F) = Estb(G) and
there is an argument a ∈ (A(F) ∖ A(G)) ∪ (A(F) ∖ A(G)) satisfying certain properties. Since
A(F) = A(G) is assumed, F ≡stbE G follows because there are no arguments in (A(F)∖ A(G))∪(A(F)∖ A(G)).
We will show now that F ≡stb G ⇒ F ≡stbW G. Theorem 5.38 shows that two AFs are weak
expansion equivalent with respect to stable semantics iff i) A(F) = A(G) and Estb(F) = Estb(G)
or ii) Estb(F) = Estb(G) = ∅. Consequently, standard equivalence, i.e. Estb(F) = Estb(G) together
with the assumption A(F) = A(G) implies weak expansion equivalence, i.e. F ≡stbW G is shown.
Finally, we show that F ≡stbW G ⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G. Assume F ≡stbW G and F /≡stb,MCW . Using the
characterization theorem 5.38 we deduce Estb(F) = Estb(G). Since we assumed that F and G
are not minimal change equivalent we deduce NFstb,W(E) ≠ NGstb,W(E) for some E ⊆ A(F)(=
A(G)). Without loss of generality we assume NFstb,W(E) = 0 and NGstb,W(E) =∞ (Theorem 7.21,
Definition 7.18). This means there is a superset E′ of E, such that E′ ∈ Estb(F). Consequently,
E′ ∈ Estb(G) in contradiction to NGstb,W(E) =∞.
In consideration of the counter-examples 2 and 3 it follows that the converse directions do
not hold because the considered AFs share the same arguments.
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The role of self-loops is somewhat controversial in the literature. It is sometimes argued
such self-attacks are necessary as they model paradoxical statements. On the other hand, it was
shown (see Theorem 4.13 in [Besnard and Hunter, 2001]) that self-attacking arguments do not
occur if Dung-style AFs are considered as instantiations of classical logic-based frameworks.
At least in such contexts investigating AFs without self-loops is of interest. For this reason
we present the equivalence zoo restricted to self-loop-free AFs. In contrast to the general case,
local expansion equivalence coincides with strong, normal expansion and strong expansion
equivalence and thus, the equivalence zoo becomes totally ordered.
Proposition 7.59. For any self-loop-free AFs F and G,
• F ≡stbE G⇔ F ≡stbN G⇔ F ≡stbS G⇔ F ≡stbL G ⇒ F ≡stb,MCE G,
• F ≡stb,MCE G⇔ F ≡stb,MCN G⇔ F ≡stb,MCS G ⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G,
• F ≡stb,MCW G ⇒ F ≡stbW G,
• F ≡stbW G ⇒ F ≡stb G.
Here is again the graphical representation of the result:
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Figure 7.20: Stable Semantics (Self-loop-free AFs)
Proof. In consideration of the counter-examples given in the proof for stable semantics without
restrictions we observe that only the fourth example showing that F ≡stbL G /⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G
contains self-loops. This is not a coincidence because local expansion equivalence coincides
with strong equivalence in case of self-loop-free AFs. This follows immediately by [Oikarinen
and Woltran, 2011, Theorem 13] and Proposition 5.47.
Finally, we present a counter-example showing that F ≡stbW G /⇒ F ≡stb,MCW G.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3 a5 a4
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Two AFs are weak expansion equivalent with respect to stable semantics iff i) A(F) = A(G)
and Estb(F) = Estb(G) or ii) Estb(F) = Estb(G) = ∅ (Theorem 5.38). The second condition holds
for the considered AFs. Furthermore, they are not minimal change equivalent with respect to
weak expansions since they do not share the same arguments.
7.4.2.2 Preferred Semantics: The Full Picture
How does the equivalence zoo look if we turn to the more relaxed notion of preferred seman-
tics? The following result presents the interrelations if we put no restriction on the considered
AFs. We observe that as in the case of stable semantics there is no total ordering of the equi-
valence relations in the equivalence zoo. In particular, weak expansion equivalence is not
comparable with strong expansion equivalence and minimal change equivalence with respect
to arbitrary, normal and strong expansions. Furthermore, members of the family of minimal
change equivalence relations are shown to be intermediate forms between strong expansion and stan-
dard equivalence. Interestingly, weak expansion equivalence and minimal change equivalence
with respect to weak expansions change their position in comparison to stable semantics.
Proposition 7.60. For any AFs F and G,
• F ≡prE G⇔ F ≡prN G⇔ F ≡prL G ⇒ F ≡prS G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCE G,
• F ≡prE G ⇒ F ≡prW G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G ⇒ F ≡pr G,
• F ≡pr,MCE G⇔ F ≡pr,MCN G⇔ F ≡pr,MCS G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G.
Here is again the graphical representation of the result:
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Figure 7.21: Preferred Semantics (Arbitrary AFs)
Proof. In Theorem 5.46 it was already shown that F ≡prE G⇔ F ≡prN G⇔ F ≡prL G ⇒F ≡prS G,F ≡prW G ⇒ F ≡pr G. In the following we prove the remaining interrelations.
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First, we will show that weak expansion equivalence implies minimal change equivalence
with respect to weak expansions, i.e. F ≡prW G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G. Applying Theorem 5.40 we
deduce A(F) = A(G) and Epr(F) = Epr(G). If F /≡pr,MCW G, then there is a set E ⊆ A(F),
such that NFpr,W(E) ≠ NGpr,W(E). Without loss of generality we assume NFpr,W(E) = 0 and
NGpr,W(E) =∞ (compare Theorem 7.21, Definition 7.18). Hence, there is a superset E′ of E, such
that E′ ∈ Epr(F) and E′ ∉ Epr(G) in contradiction to Epr(F) = Epr(G).
Since preferred semantics satisfies I-maximality (compare Figure 2.4), i.e. no extension can
be a proper subset of another one, we conclude F ≡pr,MCW G ⇒ F ≡pr G (Theorem 7.55).
We show now that F ≡prS G implies F ≡pr,MCΦ G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}. We have already
shown that minimal change equivalence with respect to arbitrary, normal and strong expan-
sions coincide (Theorems 7.51 and 7.52). Hence, it suffices to prove that F ≡prS G and F /≡pr,MCS G
yields a contradiction. Since strong expansion equivalence implies sharing the same arguments
(Proposition 5.48) it follows the existence of a subset E ⊆ A(F) = A(G), such that F /≡pr,ES G.
Consequently, NFpr,S(E) ≠ NGpr,S(E). Let NFpr,S(E) = k1 < k2 = NGpr,S(E) where k1, k2 ∈N∞. Note
that k1 = 0 yields a contradiction because strong expansion equivalence implies standard equi-
valence, i.e. Epr(F) = Epr(G) (Proposition 2.18). Assume k1 ≠ 0. Consequently, there are an AFH and a set E′ ⊆ A(H), such that F ⪯S H, d(F ,H) = k1 and E ⊆ E′ ∈ Epr(H). Without loss of ge-
nerality there exists an AF H′, such that R(F)∩R(H′) = ∅ and any attack in R(H′) contains at
least one fresh argument and H = F ∪H′ (compare Definition 2.13). Since F ≡prS G is assumed
and A(F) = A(G) is already shown we conclude G ⪯S G ∪H′ and therefore E′ ∈ Epr(G ∪H′). It
can be easily seen that d(G,G ∪H′) = k1. Thus, k2 = NGpr,S(E) = k1 in contradiction to k1 < k2.
Consequently, F ≡prS G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCΦ G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S} is shown.
Finally, we will show that F ≡pr,MCΦ G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}. Again, it suffices
to show that F ≡pr,MCS G and F /≡pr,MCW G yields a contradiction (Theorems 7.51 and 7.52). The
first assumption implies A(F) = A(G). The second assumption means that there is a set E,
such that NFpr,W(E) ≠ NGpr,W(E). Let NFpr,W(E) = ∞ and NGpr,W(E) = 0 (Theorem 7.21, Defini-
tion 7.50). Recalling that the characteristic with respect to strong expansions does not exceed
the characteristic with respect to weak expansions (Proposition 7.30) we conclude NGpr,S(E) = 0.
Hence, applying minimal change equivalence with respect to strong expansions we deduce
NFpr,S(E) = 0. This means, there is a superset E′ of E, such that E′ ∈ Epr(F). Consequently,
NFpr,W(E) =∞ is impossible concluding the proof.
For the sake of completeness we will present some counterexamples showing that the
converse directions do not hold. It suffices to check the following four cases. The other non-
relations can be easily obtained by using the already shown relations depicted in Figure 7.21.
1. F ≡pr G /⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G.
F ∶ a1 a2 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
Obviously, Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a1}}. Furthermore, F /≡pr,MCW G since minimal change equi-
valence guarantees sharing the same arguments (compare Definition 7.50) but A(F) ≠ A(G).
2. F ≡pr,MCΦ G /⇒ F ≡prS G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}.
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F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
It can be checked (compare Theorem 7.29, Definition 7.24) that NFpr,S({a1}) = NGpr,S({a1}) =
NFpr,S({a3}) = NGpr,S({a3}) = 1 and NFpr,S({a2}) = NGpr,S({a2}) = NFpr,S(∅) = NGpr,S(∅) = 0 and for
any other E ⊆ A(F) = A(G) (thus, E ∉ c f (F) = c f (G)), we have NFpr,S(E) = NGpr,S(E) = ∞.
Hence, F ≡pr,MCS G. Furthermore, F /≡prS G because F and G are self-loop-free but not syntacti-
cally identical (compare Proposition 5.47).
3. F ≡prW G /⇒ F ≡pr,MCΦ G for each Φ ∈ {E, N, S}.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3 G ∶ a1 a2 a3
Since A(F) = A(G), Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a2}} and UF{a2} = ∅ = UG{a2} we conclude F ≡prW G
(Theorem 5.40). Furthermore, NFpr,S({a1}) = 1 ≠ 2 = NGpr,S({a1}) (compare Theorem 7.29, Defi-
nition 7.24). Consequently, F /≡pr,MCS G.
4. F ≡prS G /⇒ F ≡prW G.
F ∶ a1 a2 G ∶ a1 a2
Since F and G possess identical admissible-*-kernels, namely F = F k∗(ad) = Gk∗(ad) we
deduce F ≡prS G (Theorem 5.16). Furthermore, Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{a1}} but UF{a1} = {a2} ≠ ∅ =
UG{a1}. Hence, F /≡prW G (Theorem 5.40).
Restricting our considerations to AFs sharing the same arguments does not have a big
effect in comparison to the general case. We state a slight difference only, namely standard
equivalence of two AFs becomes sufficient for their minimal change equivalence with respect
to weak expansions.
Proposition 7.61. For any AFs F and G such that A(F) = A(G) we have:
• F ≡prE G⇔ F ≡prN G⇔ F ≡prL G ⇒ F ≡prS G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCE G,
• F ≡prE G ⇒ F ≡prW G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G ⇒ F ≡pr G,
• F ≡pr,MCW G⇔ F ≡pr G,
• F ≡pr,MCE G⇔ F ≡pr,MCN G⇔ F ≡pr,MCS G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G.
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Figure 7.22: Preferred Semantics (Same Arguments)
Proof. Consider again the counter-examples given in the proof before showing that some re-
lations do not hold. We observe that only the first counter-example (showing that F ≡pr G /⇒F ≡pr,MCW G) deals with AFs which do not share the same arguments. This is not a coincidence
as the following proof shows.
We assume A(F) = A(G) and F ≡pr G. Standard equivalence of two AFs, i.e. Epr(F) =Epr(G) together with the assumption guarantees that for any set E ⊆ A(F), either NFpr,W(E) =
NGpr,W(E) = 0 or NFpr,W(E) = NGpr,W(E) =∞ (compare Definition 7.18). Consequently, F ≡pr,MCW G
is shown (Theorem 7.21).
Finally, we consider the class of self-loop-free AFs. It turns out that in this case stable
and preferred semantics behave in a very similar manner. The only difference is the role (or
better, position) of weak expansion equivalence and minimal change equivalence with respect
to weak expansions.
Proposition 7.62. For any self-loop-free AFs F and G,
• F ≡prE G⇔ F ≡prN G⇔ F ≡prS G⇔ F ≡prL G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCE G,
• F ≡pr,MCE G⇔ F ≡pr,MCN G⇔ F ≡pr,MCS G ⇒ F ≡prW G,
• F ≡prW G ⇒ F ≡pr,MCW G,
• F ≡pr,MCW G ⇒ F ≡pr G.
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Figure 7.23: Preferred Semantics (Self-loop-free AFs)
Proof. In this proof we assume that the considered AFs do not possess self-loops. Conse-
quently, in consideration of the results presented in Figure 7.21 it suffices to show the follo-
wing two relations. First, F ≡prS G ⇒ F ≡prN G (already shown in Proposition 5.47) and second,F ≡pr,MCS G ⇒ F ≡prW G.
Given F ≡pr,MCS G we deduce A(F) = A(G) and Epr(F) = Epr(G). Consequently, if F /≡prW G,
then there is an extension E ∈ Epr(F), such that UFE ≠ UGE (Theorem 5.40). Without loss of
generality let a ∈ UFE ∖UGE . This means a ∉ E, (E, a) ∉ R(F) and (E, a) ∈ R(G). Consequently,(a, E) ∉ R(F) because E is assumed to be preferred in F . Furthermore, we deduce E ∪ {a} ∈
c f (F) since we consider self-loop-free AFs. In Corollary 7.23 it was shown that whenever a
set C is conflict-free we may enforce C in finitely many steps. This means, NFpr,S(E ∪ {a}) <∞.
On the other hand, we have E ∪ {a} ∉ c f (G) because (E, a) ∈ R(G) is already shown. Thus,
NFpr,S(E ∪ {a}) = ∞ (Theorem 7.29, Definition 7.50). This means, F /≡pr,MCS G is implied (in
contradiction to the assumption) concluding the proof.
Consider again the counter-examples given in the proof of the relations depicted in Fi-
gure 7.21. We observe that the counter-examples 1-3 do not possess self-loops. Hence,
these (non)-relations do not hold here either. A counter-example remains to be given forF ≡pr,MCW G /⇒ F ≡prW G.
F ∶ a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
G ∶ a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
One may check that Epr(F) = Epr(G) = {{b3}}. Furthermore, A(F) = A(G). Consequently,
for any set E ⊆ A(F), either NFpr,W(E) = NGpr,W(E) = 0 or NFpr,W(E) = NGpr,W(E) = ∞ (compare
Definition 7.18). Hence, F ≡pr,MCW G is shown (Theorems 7.51 and 7.52). On the other hand,
UF{b3} = {a1, a2, b1, b2} ≠ {a1, a2, a3, b1, b2} = UG{b3}. Thus, F /≡prW G (Theorem 5.40).
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7.5 Conclusions and Related Work
In this last chapter we presented a study of three main problems regarding dynamical aspects
of argumentation, namely the enforcing problem [Baumann and Brewka, 2010], the minimal
change problem [Baumann, 2012b] as well as the spectrum problem [Baumann and Brewka,
2013b]. The first problem deals with the question whether it is possible to modify a given
AF such that a certain set of arguments becomes a subset of an extension of the revised AF.
This question is of high interest from a strategical point of view since the very nature of a
dispute is putting forward arguments or counterarguments with the objective to convince the
opponent. We therefore investigated conditions for the possibility as well as impossibility of
enforcements.
In addition to clarifying the possibility of enforcing certain arguments, a natural further
question we dealt with is concerned with the effort needed for the enforcements. This more ge-
neral problem of minimal change can be precisely formulated as follows: what is the minimal
number of modifications (additions or removals of attacks) needed to reach an enforcement
of E? We defined the so-called characteristics which represent the problem formally. We then
showed that for stable, preferred, complete and admissible semantics that this problem can be
decided by local criteria encoded by the so-called value functions. The most remarkable result
is that the characteristic does not change if we switch simultaneously between strong, normal
or arbitrary expansions and preferred, complete or admissible semantics.
After the characterization of the minimal change problem we turned to an analysis of the
space of possibilities of characteristics. We therefore introduced the so-called spectra which
describe, for a collection of chosen semantics, the range of possible minimal efforts needed
to enforce a set of arguments. Due to the coincidence of preferred, complete and admissible
semantics with respect to minimal change we focused only on stable, semi-stable and preferred
semantics. We were able to fully characterize the spectra for strong, normal and arbitrary
expansions. This analysis revealed the surprising result that, although the three semantics are
closely related, it may be arbitrarily more difficult to enforce arguments using stable rather
than semi-stable semantics, and also using semi-stable rather than preferred semantics. The
analysis of the spectrum for weak expansions turned out to be more difficult. We provided
an almost complete characterization only including several impossibility results. A detailed
analysis of the spectrum with respect to arbitrary modifications is part of future work.
There are a number of natural directions in which this research can be further pursued.
For instance, a detailed classification of different kinds of changes with respect to the set of
extensions if new information is added. A preliminary study (one argument, one interaction) is
to be found in [Cayrol et al., 2008]. Since accepted arguments and therefore extensions possess
a characteristic of zero a change of the outcome corresponds to a change of characteristics
and thus can be analyzed by using the introduced value-functions. For the same reason,
another important problem in dynamic argumentation is closely related to our study, namely
the determination of the status of an argument. Since computing the justification state of an
argument from scratch each time new information is added is very inefficient the possibility
to reuse some previous computations would be a great advantage. Some results in this line
of research (compare [Liao et al., 2011] as well as Sections 3.2 and 4.1.4) show that reusing is
possible if the considered semantics satisfy the directionality criterion.
Further future work may include the consideration of a stronger form of enforcement where
the enforced set of arguments has to be contained in all extensions rather than in some exten-
sion. We also might want to enforce a set of arguments C and at the same time exclude another,
disjoint set D, that is, we might be interested in modifications leading to an AF possessing an
extension E such that C ⊆ E and E ∩D = ∅.
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Booth and colleagues investigated several quantitative distance measures for argumenta-
tion [Booth et al., 2012]. In contrast to our work where the focus is on distances among
different argumentation frameworks, the distance in that paper measures how far apart two
labellings representing two complete extensions of the same argumentation framework are.
This has applications in argument-based belief revision (e.g. if an agent is forced to switch to
another extension and tries to identify the one closest to his original extension) and in judge-
ment aggregation. Although the goals of this work are different from ours, it remains to be
seen whether results from that work can be reused for our purposes.
The fourth main topic we studied in this chapter was replacements without loss of in-
formations with respect to minimal change. In particular, we introduced and characterized
minimal-D-equivalence and the more general minimal change equivalence. We present cha-
racterization theorems for several Dung semantics and furthermore, we showed the relations
to standard and expansion equivalence for a whole range of semantics satisfying abstract prin-
ciples like regularity and/or I-maximality. In case of stable and preferred semantics we fully
clarified the relationship among all equivalence notions for AFs presented in this thesis. We
provided an analysis for the whole class of AFs as well as for two important subclasses, na-
mely AFs sharing the same arguments and self-loop-free AFs. The most relevant “take home"
message following from our results is that the different notions of minimal change equivalence
fit nicely into the global picture of other equivalence notions in the sense that they constitute
alternative notions in between expansion and standard equivalence.
In [Baroni et al., 2012] so-called input/output argumentation frameworks were introduced,
an approach to characterize the behavior of an argumentation framework as sort of a black box
with a well-defined external interface. The paper defines the notion of semantics decomposa-
bility and analyzes complete, stable, grounded and preferred semantics in this regard. It turns
out that, under grounded, complete, stable and credulous preferred semantics, input/output
argumentation frameworks with the same behaviour can be exchanged without affecting the
results of the evaluation of other interacting arguments. Since replaceability is one of the
main motivations for studying equivalence notions, we plan to explore connections between
equivalence and decomposability in the near future.
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Conclusion
Finally, we briefly summarize the main results of this thesis, sketch open problems and give
pointers to future research directions.
8.1 Summary
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of meta-logical properties in abstract argumenta-
tion. One can conclude that although AFs are among the simplest nonmonotonic systems one
can think of, they give rise to deep and interesting mathematical questions. Indeed, in terms
of the complexity and subtleness of the established results AFs are certainly placed alongside
the well-established nonmonotic formalisms like auto-epistemic logic, logic programs and de-
fault logic (cf. [Brewka, 1991] for an excellent overview). In the following we review our main
contributions and refer to the sections “Conclusions and Related Work” (3.4, 4.4, 5.6, 6.4 and
7.5) for more details.
In Chapter 3 we studied the behavior of the extensions of an argumentation framework if
finitely or infinitely many new arguments are added. In general, adding new arguments and
their associated interactions obviously may change the outcome of an AF in a nonmonotonic
way. This means, arguments accepted earlier may become unaccepted, others become accepted
and the number of extensions may shrink or increase, depending on the new arguments. In
contrast to this general observation we identified sufficient conditions for monotonic evolve-
ments (Theorem 3.2). Roughly speaking, the class of weak expansions and semantics satisfying
directionality play the decisive role. We showed how to simplify the computation of justifica-
tion states (Proposition 3.6). In particular, the results allow to consider finite subframeworks
even if the underlying argumentation framework is infinite. In the last part of that chapter
we showed how to use abstract argumentation to reason about actions. The theoretical results
proven before played a key role in showing that our approach can be efficiently implemented
(Proposition 3.29).
In propositional logic we have: Mod(S ∪ T) = Mod(S) ∩Mod(T) for any theory S and T.
This means, it is possible to divide a theory in subtheories such that the formal semantics
of the entire theory can be obtained by constructing the semantics of the subtheories. In
Chapter 4 we studied this possibility in case of abstract argumentation. We have shown that
the extensions of an AF can be alternatively obtained if one splits the considered AF into
two parts such that the remaining attacks are restricted to a single direction. The procedure
is as follows: one computes an extension E1 of the first part, uses E1 to reduce and modify
the second part, computes an extension E2 of the modification and then simply combines E1
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and E2 (Theorems 4.10). In case of stable semantics we even prove a generalized splitting
result allowing for arbitrary splits (Theorem 4.28). One exciting result is the establishment of
a general relation between universal definedness, the splitting property and the directionality
principle (Theorem 4.13).
Argumentation is inherently dynamic. Thus, the question whether two frameworks re-
present the same knowledge even if this knowledge is not captured by the actual extensions,
but can be made explicit by augmenting the framework under consideration is of great impor-
tance, for instance in the light of replaceability and therefore simplification issues. Chapter 5
was dedicated to this problem. In particular, we provided characterization theorems for nor-
mal and strong expansion equivalence arguably the most important notions with respect to
dynamic evolvements. It turned out that syntactical criteria, so-called kernels, play a crucial
role (see Figure 5.18). Quite surprisingly, we showed that for any semantics considered in this
thesis expansion equivalence and normal expansion equivalence coincide. This means, whe-
never two AFs are semantically distinguishable via an arbitrary expansion, then this can be
made explicit by a normal expansion too. A further main result is that any equivalence notion
on the set of AFs characterizable through kernels presented in this thesis collapses to identity
if we restrict ourselves to self-loop-free AFs (Theorem 5.47). This underlines the thesis that
abstract argumentation frameworks provide a very “compact” KR formalism.
In Chapter 6 we conducted a detailed analytical and empirical study on the maximal and
average numbers of stable extensions in abstract argumentation frameworks. We proved a
non-trivial tight upper bound on the maximal number of stable extensions. In particular, gi-
ven an AF possessing n arguments, then the number of its stable extensions does not exceed
3
n
3 (Theorem 6.5). For specific numbers of attacks, we have also given the precise average
number of stable extensions in terms of closed-form expressions (Proposition 6.8). Our empi-
rical results show that attacks cannot simply be thought of as constraining: adding an attack
may sometimes increase and sometimes decrease the number of stable extensions. Although
this might be obvious in general to argumentation researchers, for the first time we were able
to present some precise numerical figures around this phenomenon (cf. Figures 6.4 and 6.5).
Furthermore, the results indicate that the distribution of stable extensions as a function of the
number of attacks in the framework seems to follow a universal pattern that is independent of
the number of arguments.
In Chapter 7 we presented a study of several problems regarding dynamical aspects of ar-
gumentation. The enforcing problem deals with the question whether it is possible to modify
a given AF such that a certain set of arguments becomes a subset of an extension of the revised
AF. This question is of high interest from a strategical point of view since the very nature of
a dispute is putting forward arguments or counterarguments with the objective to convince
the opponent. We therefore investigated conditions for the possibility as well as impossibility
of enforcements (Theorems 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7). In particular, enforcing is always possible given
that the desired set of arguments is conflict-free. Then, in addition to clarify the possibility
of enforcing we studied the minimal number of modifications (additions or removals of at-
tacks) needed to reach an enforcement, the so-called minimal change problem. We presented
characterization theorems for weak, strong, normal, arbitrary expansions as well as arbitrary
modifications for the stable, preferred, complete and admissible semantics. The most remar-
kable result is that the characteristic (representing the minimal change problem formally) does
not change if we switch simultaneously between strong, normal or arbitrary expansions and
preferred, complete or admissible semantics (Theorem 7.29). In Section 7.3 we provided a pre-
cise mathematical analysis of characteristics. The spectrum problem which we studied there
can be summarized as follows: given a collection of semantics and a modification type, what
are the corresponding tuples of characteristics one may obtain for an arbitrary argumentation
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framework and set of arguments. In other words, determine the set of all tuples of natural
numbers which may occur as characteristics simultaneously, the so-called spectrum. In case
of stable, semi-stable and preferred semantics we provided a complete characterization with
respect to strong, normal and arbitrary expansions (Theorem 7.43). The study of spectra is not
an academic exercise only. To the contrary, the investigation of spectra reveals interesting and
sometimes surprising insights into the relationship among several semantics. For instance, we
have shown that it may be arbitrarily more difficult to enforce arguments using stable rather
than semi-stable semantics, and also using semi-stable rather than preferred semantics. Addi-
tionally, we presented some first results for the spectra with respect to weak expansions as well
as arbitrary modifications. In Section 7.4 we studied notions of equivalence which guarantee
equal minimal efforts, namely minimal-D-equivalence and the more general minimal change
equivalence. We presented characterization theorems (Theorems 7.51, 7.52) and provided the
relation between minimal change equivalence and expansion or standard equivalence in gene-
ral via using abstract principles (Theorems 7.54 and 7.55). Furthermore, in case of stable and
preferred semantics we gave the complete picture for all equivalence relations considered in
this thesis. In particular, in case of stable semantics the different forms of minimal change equi-
valence are shown to be intermediate forms between strong expansion and weak expansion
equivalence (cf. Figure 7.18).
8.2 Open Problems and Future Research
Some obvious further work remains to be done. In particular, it would be worthwhile to ex-
tend our analysis to further (more exotic) argumentation semantics like c f 2 semantics, and the
recently introduced variant, stage2 semantics [Baroni et al., 2005; Dvorˇák and Gaggl, 2012].
In contrast to the semantics studied in this thesis both are representatives of redundancy-free
semantics. This means, any attack may play a crucial role with respect to further evaluation
or more precisely, it is shown that for both expansion equivalence and syntactical identity
coincide [Dvorˇák and Gaggl, 2012; Gaggl and Woltran, 2012]. It would be interesting to check
whether this behaviour carries over to normal and/or strong expansion equivalence. Further
semantics which have not been considered in this thesis at all are robust [Jakobovits and Ver-
meir, 1999] as well as sustainable and tolerant [Bodanza and Tohmé, 2009] semantics. The study
of these semantics, especially in the context of equivalence might be interesting since these
approaches actually are designed to treat self-attacks different to standard semantics.
A more promising but substantially more difficult task is instead of considering particular
semantics to alternatively look at general criteria sufficient and/or necessary for being in a
particular interrelation or satisfying a certain desired property. Note that we already achieved
some results in this direction, for instance concerning the splitting property (Theorem 4.13)
as well as general relations between minimal change, expansion and standard equivalence
(Theorems 7.54 and 7.55).
Another possible future direction would be the study of meta-logical properties like mono-
tonicity and replacement for certain generalizations of Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
works. We mention here the recently proposed extended argumentation frameworks (EAFs)
[Modgil, 2009], abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) [Brewka and Woltran, 2010] and the
promising argumentation frameworks with recursive attacks (AFRAs) [Baroni et al., 2011b].
In Section 5.3 we have proven that normal expansion equivalence equals expansion equi-
valence for any semantics considered in this thesis. This result was more than unexpected
since the class of normal expansions is a strict subset of arbitrary expansion. Although we
have shown the coincidence in a rigorous manner there still remains the question why?. What
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do these semantics all have in common? Is there a certain abstract property guaranteeing this
equality? Does a reasonable semantics exists such that normal expansion equivalence is strictly
coarser than expansion equivalence?
As a final remark concerning future work, we pose the question whether there is an ana-
logue to Arrow’s impossibility theorem in social choice theory [Arrow, 1950]. More precisely, is
there a set of desirable properties for argumentation semantics which cannot be satisfied simul-
taneously. Without doubt, such a result would be of enormous interest to the argumentation
community.
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